1. Here is the text of a speech delivered to the Florida Coalition of Rail Passengers here in Jacksonville, Florida on Saturday, November 7, 2009 by this writer.
   

   It’s been an interesting week for the railroad business; changes we couldn’t imagine a decade ago have suddenly become true. America again has a “railroad robber baron” – but, this time, it’s a benevolent man who may be the smartest businessman in the world.

   Warren Buffett said he would cheerfully pay $34 billion for the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, and BNSF said they would cheerfully accept his offer.

   While many people agree this is not going to launch a series of mergers – there isn’t much left to merge other than creating a transcontinental railroad – this is a game changer. BNSF under private ownership no longer has to act by the dictates of Wall Street.

   Think of the BNSF deal as a giant-sized version of what happened to our own Florida East Coast Railroad: going private allowed it to think radically outside of the box.

   The FEC – after over a decade of waiting – has partnered with the Florida Department of Transportation and Amtrak to restore passenger service on its coast route between Jacksonville and Miami. Now, start thinking about BNSF and passenger service – they have already publicly indicated if the right business opportunity comes along, they will talk about it.

   Reading the FEC/FDOT proposal – which is part of the national grab for high speed rail stimulus money – gives any reader respect for the Florida DOT.

   Amtrak has its usual equipment demands, because both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star will again be split here in Jacksonville, and half of the consists will go to Miami via Orlando, and half go on the FEC.

   The best part is the request for additional local regional trains running between Jacksonville and Miami to provide a higher level of frequencies. The most obvious part left out is extending the Palmetto south of Savannah and running it down the FEC or perhaps over to Tampa.

   The only part of Florida’s rail plan found wanting is mention of doing something to bolster Tampa’s conventional train service. In the Tampa Bay area we have Florida’s second largest metropolitan area, and its level of train service is less than that of Sebring and Palatka.

   If you really want to look at the unfairness of it all, take a look at Florida’s panhandle. The people living there pay all of the same taxes we pay, but their train – the Sunset Limited – went away because Amtrak doesn’t want to bother restoring the train after a hurricane that happened over four years ago temporarily tore up some track.

   As I join you today on behalf of United Rail Passenger Alliance, my late friend and predecessor, Austin Coates, was no stranger to this group or many of you personally. We’ve never forgotten Austin’s most famous line regarding Amtrak – “it’s just business as usual.”

   More than half a decade after Austin’s passing, we need to help Amtrak stop its continuing “business as usual.”

   Let’s look at how Amtrak has treated us here in Florida over the past 25 years or so.

   Going back to the pre-Amtrak days, Florida had so many passenger trains you couldn’t walk very far without tripping over one. Florida was a state built by the passenger train.

   We had the Seaboard’s Silver Meteor, Silver Star, Palmland, Sunland, and Gulf Wind. Not only did we have service to Miami, but we also had service down the middle of the state and from Tampa down the west coast to Venice.

   The Atlantic Coast Line provided us with service on the East Coast Champion, West Coast Champion, Gulf Coast Special, seasonal Florida Special, and the Everglades. The ACL on the west coast would take you to Fort Myers.

   From Chicago and the Midwest, you could catch the City of Miami, South Wind, Seminole, or Dixie Flyer.

   Until just a couple of years prior to Amtrak, the Florida East Coast even operated its daily two car train between Miami and Jacksonville.

   Then came Amtrak Day in 1971.

   Amtrak Day wasn’t as bad for Florida as elsewhere, for we still had the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, Champion, and South Wind. We lost the Gulf Wind, and that huge – and currently unfilled gap – between Jacksonville and New Orleans opened up. We lost service south of Tampa on the west coast. But you could still get to Florida from Chicago with single train service, and you had three choices from New York to Florida, and both coasts and the middle of Florida through Ocala were still served.

   We all know what has happened since then.

   The once busy crew and maintenance base in Tampa is gone, with just a single daily train remaining. Naturally, this occurred only after the City of Tampa decided to spend a king’s ransom on the breathtaking restoration of Tampa Union Station.

   Miami, once the golden goose of passenger railroading, now has two trains a day.

   The South Wind, then the Floridian, with direct Chicago service, is gone.

   The Cross Florida service between Tampa and Miami came and went.

   The extended Palmetto from Savannah to Jacksonville, and eventually to Tampa, and then turned into the Silver Palm to Miami – is gone.

   We now have Auto Train, but unless you’re taking along your car and only have a destination of Northern Virginia or beyond, it’s not the most useful service in Amtrak’s stable.

   Then, there is the sad saga of the Sunset Limited. We all worked hard in Florida to bring the Sunset to us in 1993. The State of Florida ponied up over $7 million to help upgrade the CSX line in the panhandle.

   We knew prior to the Sunset’s extension, there was an average of 75,000 calls per year into the Amtrak res centers seeking a train between New Orleans and Florida.

   Now, the Sunset is almost history. I say “almost” because it never officially went away, just in reality went away. As [FCRP member] George Bollinger often asks, “what if it had been the Seaboard and L&N that had suddenly decided to stop running the Gulf Wind, just because it was inconvenient?”

   For a while, unknowing people tried to blame our friends – yes, make no mistake about it, at CSX they are our friends – for not allowing Amtrak to resume service on the Sunset. But, we know CSX gave Amtrak written notice the line was available for the Sunset on April 1, 2006.

   By law, when Amtrak cancels an entire train route, it is supposed to post a 180 day notice of cancellation. This minor technicality to Amtrak has never been honored, with the ongoing excuse of not only did the dog eat Amtrak’s homework, but Amtrak merely “suspended” the service due to conditions wrought by the hurricane.

   A number of union jobs on all levels were lost by the suspension of the Sunset. Yet, Amtrak’s unions have chosen to do nothing about this. No union filed a lawsuit, no union screamed at the top of its organized lungs about this flagrant abuse of the law.

   Congresswoman Corrine Brown put $1 million into last year’s Amtrak reauthorization to study the restoration of the Amtrak route. We know the result of that; a lot of paper with a lot of excuses and reasons why Amtrak doesn’t want to restart the service.

   The quickest, cheapest, cleanest way to restore service is to extend the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando.

   Because of bad equipment scheduling, the City trainsets sit for a full day in New Orleans before they return to Chicago. On any given day there are two trainsets in Louisiana, the one just departing New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal and the one about to arrive at NOUPT. By extending the route to Orlando, only one extra trainset would be required to bring the train to Florida.

   Amtrak will instantly whine about stations; the only real station problem is at Mobile, where the Eisenhower-era relic of the L&N Railroad’s poor choice of architect station building was mercifully torn down after Katrina. The only problem for Mobile is finding a new spot for a platform and placement of a temporary Amshack.

   Remember, the only manned stations between New Orleans and Jacksonville were Mobile, Pensacola, and Tallahassee. Everything else was just a platform and city-run shelter.

   Many of my readers of This Week at Amtrak know I talk about the Sunset and the City of New Orleans a lot, and there’s a reason for that. From 1996 to 2000, I was a paid consultant to the Gulf Coast Business Group, working with both of those trains, plus the Crescent. My late business partner and I specialized in marketing for these trains, creating onboard services programs, the highly successful 24 hour dining car test runs on the Sunset, and handled special events, such as station openings and helped with the inaugural of the Gulf Coast Limited. Even today, those are still my trains.

   From 1999 to 2000, we ran the Sunset Limited and City of New Orleans Promotional Office for Amtrak from our offices here in Jacksonville. We worked a number of projects that brought new riders to the Sunset and City through radio and television station promotions, worked with local media, and even hosted a dining car gathering in Memphis for local and regional media food critics.

   Like any large company, we found white hats and black hats inside of Amtrak. Some very good people left because of the constant problems caused by the black hats, and others left merely because Amtrak was not the most pleasant place to work if you weren’t part of the good old boy network.

   But, there is a shrinking core group of dedicated people who are there because they like running passenger trains.

   What can we do to help those at Amtrak who want the company to succeed?

   First, everyone must realize there is more than one answer to Amtrak’s problems. Those who constantly plead “we all have to work together” generally mean we all have to agree with them, and forget about any other solutions.

   Second, we have to realize the reality of passenger rail around the world. Amtrak constantly wants us to believe no passenger rail system in the world makes money. This is only an excuse to enable Amtrak’s dysfunctional behavior.

   I invite you to do your own research; scan credible publications like the International Railway Journal and read the stories about passenger rail systems in The Netherlands, Germany, and Japan which make money.

   Doubters say this isn’t true, these companies are still propped up by their governments. Wrong. Some of these systems may operate over government owned right of way – just as trains do on the Northeast Corridor – but they still pay a train mile fee. Some of the systems share the rails with freight trains – just like Amtrak – and they receive a benefit – just like Amtrak – from the shared cost of infrastructure.

   For years, URPA has been crunching numbers and seeing almost every long distance train in the Amtrak system makes money “above the rail.” This is the same system used by other countries – based on operating costs, not full infrastructure maintenance costs – and revenue passenger miles.

   One thing URPA has talked about for decades is Amtrak’s erroneous use of warm body counts in the form of ridership instead of the real world metrics of load factor and revenue passenger miles. Amtrak wants us to be wowed by warm body counts, which are meaningless. What matters is how far you carry a passenger, and what revenue you derive from a passenger, not how many passengers.

   Which passenger would you rather have: one passenger traveling the 608 mile average length of trip on the Silver Meteor at 15.7 cents a revenue passenger mile … or four passengers on Oklahoma’s Heartland Flyer, traveling an average length of trip of 175 miles at 12 cents a revenue passenger mile? That one passenger on the Meteor not only makes Amtrak more money than the four passengers on the Heartland Flyer, but that one passenger will also spend more money onboard in the diner and lounge, had less cost to the national reservations system, less to reach through marketing, and tracks all the way through Amtrak’s accounting system with less costs because Amtrak is handling one passenger instead of four.

   When the late Graham Claytor – without a doubt Amtrak’s best president – retired from Amtrak in 1993, the company was generating internally enough money to cover 72% of its 1989 $1.7 billion operating budget, up from 48% in 1981. Today, that number has slipped dramatically, down to about 60%.

   Since Mr. Claytor retired, we have seen a virtual parade of permanent and semi-permanent interim chief executive for Amtrak, from Tom Downs to George Warrington to David Gunn to David Hughes to Alex Kummant to today’s Joe Boardman.

   Every new Amtrak president seems to have made the company worse in so many ways. We’ve seen the Heritage fleet – which is highly valued and treasured by VIA Rail Canada today – sold off. The original Pennsylvania Railroad Metroliners were scrapped. The Turboliners were rehabbed with someone else’s money, and then suddenly hidden and stored, and are now for sale.

   We have seen the delivery – and subsequent running off the wheels – of the too small order of Viewliners, with a promise, but no firm order for any more. We’ve seen a more than decade old order of Superliners, but those numbers are thinning due to neglected maintenance. We’ve seen the much heralded arrival of the Acela trainsets, but their mechanical troubles, too, have become legendary.

   In short, Amtrak has no reserve equipment pool it can activate quickly to expand or create new services. Even though there are still nearly 200 cars sitting in the wreck line, most of that is needed just to restore existing consists to previous levels of productivity, or put a service back east of New Orleans.

   During all of this while we have seen meaningless ridership numbers rise, we’ve also seen abysmal systemwide load factors; during some years more than half of Amtrak’s highly perishable inventory goes unsold.

   We have seen train consists shrink and shrink.

   So, Amtrak is running fewer seats miles for occupancy, creating less of a chance for success. Its equipment is old and getting more worn out by the hour. We know some equipment is being rehabbed by this year’s stimulus money, but it’s only token amounts for the national system.

   Which brings us back to, what can you do to help change Amtrak?

   I urge everyone in this room to start a new campaign.

   The Cardinal is the only train in Amtrak’s entire system which is run by federal mandate. Senator Robert Byrd slipped into federal law that his train – the Cardinal running through his home state of West Virginia – has to be operated. Amtrak uses and abuses this train, but it’s helpless to cancel it the way it did the east end of the Sunset Limited.

   My conservative soul is tortured by this next suggestion, but it may be necessary until Amtrak can be made to run like a real business. FCRP needs to convince the Florida Congressional Delegation the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, and an extended Palmetto south from Savannah to Jacksonville and beyond, and some sort of restored service east of New Orleans, must be mandated to be operated by federal statute.

   Your sister organizations in other states need to do the same with their trains. Remember – if it happened to the Sunset Limited east of New Orleans – it can happen to any train. Most of you know the very most basic rule of railroad safety: when on railroad property, be prepared for a train to be coming towards you at any time, from any direction. You know the second most basic safety rule – the one which separates real railroaders from rail fans – never, never, never, step on top of the rail; always step over the rail.

   Florida – and every other state – is currently standing on top of the rail, unaware a train is bearing down from an unknown direction. Amtrak’s management is much more interested in seeking free federal monies than in operating trains.

   We’ve seen no new equipment orders to date – just promises of a single-level order for Viewliner cars – and the just released update of Amtrak’s ongoing five year plan calls for no new cars.

   If Amtrak is serious about keeping its system intact, it would be at least talking about a new car order, especially for Superliners. But, the silence is all we need to know.

   Paul Dyson, President of the Railroad Passenger Association of California and Nevada, has openly raised the question of whether or not Amtrak is actually planning to exit the long distance route business because of a lack of equipment order.

   A few weeks back, one of our URPA associates was attending a rail fair in the Northeast. He ran across an Amtrak Engineering Department intern who wanted the world to know how important he was – after all, he was an intern at Amtrak.

   The question of equipment orders came up, and this young man offered a glimpse into Amtrak’s corporate thinking. He said, “Amtrak isn’t interested in slow trains, it’s only interested in fast trains.”

   Just shortly after that, Tom Carper, Amtrak’s Chairman of the Board, gave a presentation to the Midwest High Speed Rail folks touting Amtrak as the logical and national operator of all of the nation’s high speed systems. When you read Mr. Carper’s presentation, you realize the young intern wasn’t just whistling “Dixie.”

   So, if you’re [FCRP member] Jerry Sullivan and you want to travel west to visit your grandchildren in Texas, it’s not likely to happen any time soon on a restored Sunset Limited. If you’re George Bollinger and you just want to ride trains, you better plan your trip early, because too often you can’t get there from here.

   Until Congress mandates Amtrak must operate its long distance trains, every one of those trains is in danger. The train may not go away today, but it’s consist will be constantly shrinking, the level of service will deteriorate worse and Amtrak will remain – as Union Pacific’s official spokesman labeled it – “novelty transportation.”

   Amtrak today accounts for only two tenths of one percent of America’s transportation output, hardly enough for anyone to take seriously. Even worse, Amtrak isn’t doing much to change that.

   The only people Amtrak listens to is Congress, when it mandates Amtrak do something. It’s time for Congress to mandate – without exception – Amtrak must run all of its long distance trains, and throw in some restorations like the Sunset back to Florida, the Pioneer, with a full second frequency operating all the way between Chicago and Denver, the North Coast Hiawatha, and take the Sunset and the Cardinal daily.

   Amtrak will kick and scream and whine everyone is being mean to it by making it run trains it doesn’t want to run. But, if someone doesn’t do something this drastic soon, long distance passenger rail in America will be only a memory like steam locomotives, dome cars, and Pullman berths.

   Thank you so much for allowing me to be with you today; it’s a pleasure to be here.

2. Warren Buffett’s privatization of the venerable Burlington Northern Santa Fe rocked the railroad world. Here is what William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona had to say.
   

   Warren Buffett’s offer for BNSF the first week in November might prove to be a pivotal event for intercity passenger rail, having come at a time when, as Don Phillips in his recent Trains magazine column recently highlighted, dissatisfaction over Amtrak’s seeming refusal to participate in a renaissance of train travel is at a peak.

   Undoubtedly, Buffett has a record of making sound business decisions; and BNSF, being among the best managed and progressive of large railroads, does fit a motif of acquiring something good and making it better.

   Over the next weeks we will look at some of the synergies (much as that word is overused, it does apply here) and economies of scale that could apply to an enlarged role for BNSF in the passenger train business. But right now a single move would signal a positive direction. Words and attitude cost little but mean much; as you may know, trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, are most defensible when they are in continuous business use. BNSF could gain much publicity, and build on its widespread and long standing – even if subconscious – recognition, by reviving its classic red, yellow, and silver “Warbonnet” scheme.

   A new interpretation of their classic corporate symbol would show a revived interest in being a participating citizen in every railroad town and city. Not to mention the free advertising garnered from rolling under practically every child’s Christmas tree. Renewing interest in today’s youth will perpetuate the recent industry rediscovery that trains are good for more than just hauling coal – they are the future of transportation, as well as the history.

   Yes, we undoubtedly will consider details in our upcoming columns here, but for now, Mr. Buffett, we simply convey – Welcome to the world of railroading.

3. Professor James McCommons of Northern Michigan University has a new book out this month, and it’s required reading for anyone interested in the business of passenger railroading.

   For full disclosure, this writer was interviewed for the book here in Jacksonville by Mr. McCommons. The interview was full of serious, well thought out questions and observations; it’s very clear the product of all of his interviews and research has led Mr. McCommons to creating a book far any beyond anything else on the market today regarding passenger rail as it stands in America.

   “Waiting on the Train: The Embattled Future of Passenger Rail Service – A Year Spent Riding Across America” is much more succinct than its title, and presents a wide variety of honest opinions and thoughts about passenger rail. More than just the usual viewpoints are presented with conclusions both obvious and left for the reader to determine.

   The book is actually too short; Mr. McCommons reports his publisher, Chelsea Green (www.chelseagreen.com) had him remove about 40,000 words of his original text to fit into a predetermined format. What a shame; when you read the book, you are wanting more, and another brief 40,000 words would be welcomed by any reader.

   There is a lengthy review of the book in the current issue of Passenger Train Journal magazine by Karl Zimmermann for those wishing more detail, but, please, if your buy just one railroad book this year, buy “Waiting on the Train;” it’s time and money well spent. We can only hope Mr. McCommons will one day do a follow-up book.

4. Speaking of the latest issue of Passenger Train Journal (2009:4, Issue 241) which just hit the newsstands in the past week or so, there is an ever-so-timely article on Amtrak’s Pioneer, the subject of much discussion for an expensive route restoration, as well as the usual mix of good articles and photos. Editor Mike Schafer’s On The Point column – as always – not only hits the mark about the Pioneer, but covers some other good points, too. Other rail magazines may publish more frequently, but Passenger Train Journal remains the magazine of record for the business of passenger trains.
5. And, this e-mail to TWA arrived shortly after the last issue was published regarding VIA Rail Canada.
   

   I am a big fan of VIA and have been doing a yearly trip from Toronto to Vancouver on that lovely train, the Canadian for quite a few years. About a year ago, I wrote a comment to Crain’s Chicago Business online about Amtrak and their lack of interest in taking care of their equipment. When we board the Canadian in Toronto, she is shining, the windows are spotless,  (glass, not micro scratched plastic), flowers are fresh and the crew seems happy to see us!

   A couple of weeks ago, we went from Portland, Maine to New York City, and while waiting in Boston to transfer trains, several Acela’s came and went: they were already grimy and neglected looking. One of my stories about VIA involved what I consider to be a remarkable piece of quality railroading when the Canadian from the west was delayed by a blizzard and a freight accident making it too late east to turn. VIA put together a very spiffy “shuttle” consist which left on schedule from Toronto with a complementary lunch, complementary wine too!, and in several hours we rendezvoused with the now turned train and proceeded west, right on schedule. I asked a supervisor how this feat was accomplished, to which he replied, “it is all a matter of attitude.” Says it all about the difference between VIA and Amtrak.

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1. Well. A lot has been happening in the two weeks since the last This Week at Amtrak was published. Before we get into some specifics, we first need to hear what Minnesota Association of Rail Passengers and United Rail Passenger Alliance Vice President of Law and Policy Andrew Selden has to say on the current state of Amtrak.
   

   By Andrew C. Selden

   Amtrak blinds itself, in its endless posturing to fool its bankers in Congress, by measuring its performance by numbers that do not really matter, while ignoring or burying numbers that do matter. As a result, it makes decisions, including strategically important allocations of precious investment capital, on the basis of fundamentally misleading data.

   The most glaring example is Amtrak’s endless blathering about “ridership.” Ridership is only a measure of a sale transaction. It does not differentiate among the size of the sales. One “rider” from New Haven to Boston is, by this yardstick, exactly equal to one rider from Washington, D.C. to Boston, or even Los Angeles to Boston. Amtrak makes this worse by blurring useful sales data (ticket prices) into averages by which they measure (actually, it’s just arithmetic, not really “measuring” anything) “yield,” which is the average revenue per passenger mile on a train or route. This tends to reinforce the false belief any one passenger is pretty much the same as any other.

   In an urban transit system where every passenger pays the same fare, that might be okay.

   But on Amtrak, where a typical “corridor” customer might pay $10 to $30, but a family in a sleeper to the west coast could be paying $1,000 or more, these “riders” are decidedly unequal. Fifty of the former are less than two of the latter. But Amtrak is obsessively focused on “ridership.”

   A yardstick Amtrak tries to hide, and apparently never uses to make important resource allocation decisions, is load factor. Load factor is the percentage of your inventory you are able to sell. Airlines live and breathe load factor.

   Load factor is available seat miles (total inventory) divided by revenue passenger miles (seat-miles sold to paying passengers).

   Load factor (“LF”) matters greatly. Among other things it is a perfect measure of capital efficiency, and where a business is over-invested vs. under-invested. It is an indirect measure of opportunity cost. A trend analysis of LF is a tell-tale for a growing or a dying business.

   It indicates whether an operation has achieved an efficiency of scale, or needs to ramp up, or down, its application of capital assets to achieve an efficiency of scale. The NEC’s low load factors show Amtrak is already over-invested there: it offers much more inventory than it can sell for $30, or even give away. Long distance trains, with high load factors, show where Amtrak is under-invested, turning away potential $1,000 customers by the hundreds.

   Simple “ridership,” without consideration of load factor, is classic “Amtrak accounting” that disregards the cost and utilization of capital. If you have a rich uncle who doesn’t care, or a politically-oriented appropriations committee that has other objectives, or a gullible state agency that doesn’t seem to get it (a la Oklahoma and the Heartland Flyer), then one can disregard capital costs, load factor, and utilization. Ready access to “free” capital (but always with a heavy political and opportunity cost) obscures that.

   Suppose a train or route has a LF of 40% (NEC average is about 40%). Suppose the LF is static, or even growing slowly. Is that a good thing? Or does that suggest the capital – represented here by the rolling stock, the overheads and even the relationship and rent costs with the host railroad – might be better applied elsewhere?

   In other words: Can those trainsets produce, or earn, even more someplace else?

   Real world, actual example: take a standard KFC restaurant with 72 seats grossing a million a year, and is often “full” (i.e., has a very high LF). It is a cash cow. The owner is happy. His banker is happy. But an investment banker focused on returns on capital (i.e., making money by maximizing output) will say, “Bulldoze this obsolete, underperforming asset. Get rid of it. It is a parasite. It is an obstacle to growth and profit. In its place, build a new, larger KFC with 150 seats and a bigger kitchen and a drive-through, that is physically capable of growing into a TWO or even three million a year store.” And if the KFC instead were a lightly-used 40-seater that was doing $500,000 a year and showing no real growth, even if it were steadily profitable at that level, any rational analysis would conclude the store should be closed outright, and maybe re-located across town by the Wal-Mart, or out by the interstate. LF as well as cash flow, market share, and earnings are all part of the constant analysis that should be done of any commercial activity.

   Amtrak NEVER does that. Amtrak instead fools itself and fools its bankers in Congress and its client state governments with phony-baloney data about transaction volumes (“ridership”) and other irrelevancies.

   ITEM: Amtrak’s net loss last year was UP from the year before, for the umpteenth year in a row, even after all the subsidy and the deferred maintenance and the shrunken fleet and all the other voodoo accounting. That is why Amtrak is still a sinking ship, and why Interim President and CEO Joe Boardman, just like his several predecessors, is no different from Captain Edward Smith of the White Star Line. And trains like the Harrisburg – Philadelphia locals, or Acela, or the Heartland Flyer, with their low load factor, whatever the ridership, are just like that tiny scrape in the hull that eventually worked its disproportionate magic on the fortunes of the RMS Titanic.

2. Amtrak issued another route renewal report, and issued a final report on a second route.

   The Pioneer route report, which was commented on previously in this space, was issued in a final form with no real changes in how Amtrak perceives to put this train between Denver and Seattle back into service at extremely high costs and a too long lead time, despite questioning from two United States Senators along the route, Senator Crapo of Idaho, and Senator Wyden of Oregon.

   The new report issued was for restoration of the North Coast Hiawatha (Originally, the North Coast Limited, pre-Amtrak.) over the original Northern Pacific Railroad tracks. This route will parallel the Empire Builder route, but make a more southerly trip. Pre-Amtrak, the Empire Builder and the North Coast Limited were strong rivals between Chicago and Seattle, and both routes have breath-taking mountain scenery. The North Coast Hiawatha was one of the trains massacred by the route cuts of the Carter Administration.

   Amtrak wants – yes, we’re not kidding – over one billion dollars to restore this route, with the bulk of the money going to track upgrades. After the Burlington, Northern Pacific, and Great Northern railroads were all folded into one company (which eventually became BNSF when the Santa Fe was added to the mix), the Northern Pacific route was considered redundant to the Great Northern (Empire Builder) route, and was downgraded. Part of the route in Montana was sold to a short line operator, too.

   All of that aside, Amtrak has come out with ridiculously high figures for route restoration, including an amazing $330,000,000 just for six trainset of new equipment, including locomotives. This works out to an astounding $4,500,000 per piece of equipment, which is not only impossible to justify, but incredible anyone could present this figure with a straight face. Additionally, Amtrak demands millions and millions of dollars for crew training, as it has done in previous reports.

   This analysis of the North Coast Hiawatha landed in the This Week at Amtrak mailbox.

   Amtrak North  Coast Hiawatha Report Reflects Apathy and Atrophy; Fails to Answer Many Questions

   By Joseph D. Henchman

   October 17, 2009

   Introduction

   On October 16, 2009, Amtrak published the North Coast Hiawatha Passenger Rail Study as required by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA). That law required Amtrak to produce a report within one year of October 16, 2008 examining the feasibility of restoring passenger rail service between Chicago and Seattle via the former Northern Pacific mainline in Southern Montana.

   Confronted with a political environment favorable to the expansion of its services, the report suggests an institution whose marketing and innovative instincts have atrophied. The report’s tone reflects a determination to drag out the timeline and extract as many subsidies as possible rather than seriously consider how a successful passenger rail service in the study area can be implemented.

   Below are specific areas the report is insufficient or raises serious concerns.

   Amtrak penalizes the study train for diverted passengers from other trains, but does not credit it for passengers fed to other trains.

   Amtrak’s report penalizes the ticket revenue of the North Coast Hiawatha by $8 million because Amtrak estimates the train will divert passengers from the Empire Builder, a heavily-patronized Amtrak train (693 passengers each train in FY 2009 through July) that also operates daily between Seattle and Chicago. Amtrak goes so far as to say that the diverted revenue will “increase Amtrak’s direct operating loss.”

   This analysis is incomplete for two reasons. First, the Empire Builder is often sold out for being over capacity, so an additional train may have the net impact of freeing up space on that train to be sold to others, wiping out any revenue loss. Second, and more importantly, Amtrak does not estimate additional revenue for other trains from the addition of the North Coast Hiawatha (or if they do, they don’t report it). Few Amtrak long-distance passengers ride end-to-end, with many taking shorter trips often involving transfers to other trains. On the west end is the Seattle-Portland Cascade train as well as the long-distance Coast Starlight to California. On the east end are services to St. Louis, New Orleans, Washington, Boston, New York, and Michigan. Added service into and out of Seattle and Chicago will result in additional revenues for all of these trains. If Amtrak “penalizes” the North Coast Hiawatha for “diverting” passenger revenue from trains, it should also “credit” the North Coast Hiawatha for “feeding” passenger revenue to other trains.

   One approach Amtrak did not take would be to estimate system-wide revenues and expenses from the addition of the North Coast Hiawatha. This would give a true picture of the actual incremental cost of service expansion. Amtrak is also studying the expansion of services in several other routes, and is producing piecemeal reports on financial impacts, one-by-one. As Amtrak adds trains and frequencies, the additional options stimulate demand beyond that of one-train-on-one-corridor. A comprehensive approach of these proposals would be necessary for informed decision-making.

   Amtrak Inexplicably Buries Its Conclusion that the Train Will Cost Its Operating Costs

   There are two types of costs associated with running trains. One are relatively fixed costs that do not vary with the number of trains (system reservations and website, management costs, station costs), and the other are costs that vary with the number of trains (crew costs, fuel, payments to host railroads, and to some extent equipment maintenance). Amtrak’s estimate of North Coast Hiawatha operations, put in these terms, is as follows:

   Passenger Related Revenue *	$51,000,000
   Variable Expense: Fuel	$13,000,000
   Variable Expense: On-Board Services Labor	$11,900,000
   Total Variable Expenses	+$3,000,000
   Non-Variable: Station & System Expenses	$74,100,000
   Total Net, All Expenses	($24,100,000)
   Farebox Recovery, Variable Expenses Only	108.5%
   Farebox Recovery, All Expenses **	68.8%

   ^* not including $8 million revenue penalty for diversions from Empire Builder
   ^** Amtrak reduces the farebox recovery by 10 percentage points by excluding the diverted revenue to the Empire Builder

   Amtrak’s long-distance service requires subsidies to cover its operating shortfalls [Based on Amtrak accounting methods]. Few if any recover 68.8% of their costs for all expenses, or actually break even on variable expenses, as Amtrak estimates here. Why Amtrak buries this information is inexplicable. One possibility would be that acknowledging Amtrak will run a train with a rather positive financial performance undermines its argument that massive subsidies are required to operate it.

   Note: Amtrak does not clarify whether its estimate of system and route costs are the amounts that will be assigned to the North Coast Hiawatha or whether they are incremental costs of adding the train. For example, assume (using made-up numbers) Amtrak spends $100,000 a year operating the existing station at Fargo, North Dakota (which the North Coast Hiawatha would stop at), and $5 million a year running its existing national reservation system. Assume also Amtrak’s cost estimates in the report include line-items of $50,000 for the Fargo station and $200,000 for system reservations (they don’t; those items are not broken out). Does that mean Amtrak is spending an additional $250,000 when the North Coast Hiawatha is launched, or rather the North Coast Hiawatha will be assigned $250,000 of existing costs?

   If the latter, it is relevant information, but its inclusion warps the decision-making process. Among Amtrak’s costs of operating the North Coast Hiawatha would be costs Amtrak is already incurring, and will incur whether the route is launched or not. To use economics terms, a decision-maker would be erroneously looking at average cost instead of marginal cost.

   If it is the former, Amtrak needs to justify the $27 million in route and system expenses beyond merely saying they are “other direct expenses.” The amount reflects a third of the expenses associated with running the train, and while not suspect on its face, it does raise questions. Why does Amtrak’s report not include a technical appendix itemizing the costs it has estimated?

   Amtrak Provides Just One Option: A Single, Slow, Short Train over the Entire Route

   Unlike here, Amtrak’s past studies have often included a series of operating options. The recent Pioneer Service Study looked at several different alignments, the Sunset Limited Service Study looked at different service options, and the Ohio Service Study looked at different frequency options. Here, however, Amtrak provides no option other than one single, slow, short train. Given Amtrak’s own ridership and cost estimates, this is indefensible. It also allows Amtrak to demand higher subsidies than would be required to operate the North Coast Hiawatha.

   The report recommends the establishment of one round trip a day along the 2,300 mile route on a 49 hour schedule, for an average speed of 47 M.P.H. (The North Coast Limited in 1956 managed 46.5 hours, so Amtrak proposes a train slower than one run 50 years ago.). The train would consist of locomotives, a baggage car, a crew car, two sleeping cars, three coaches, a dining car, and a lounge. Since each sleeping car has a maximum capacity of 49 and each coach has a maximum capacity of 74, that would mean a total train capacity of 320.

   On page 28, Amtrak estimates even this slow, single train will result in 359,800 passengers a year, or 492 per train. On the face of it, this suggests the train will fill 153% of its capacity. Of course, few passengers will ride end-to-end, resulting in turnover en route. It would be useful to know Amtrak’s estimate of passenger-miles or load factor, but the report does not provide those numbers. Even if each seat turns over once per trip, the load factor would still be 76% (which would make airlines envious).

   Amtrak’s report handicaps itself by limiting the train’s capacity. Many of a train’s expenses are fixed (engineer and conductor costs, for instance) or grow only minimally (fuel and service attendant costs, for instance) with additional cars. In the past, American passenger trains have operated with 16 to 22 cars (Today, in Canada, the Canadian transcontinental often operates with 22 cars in high season). The only serious limiting factor on train lengths are station platform lengths and locomotive power (itself limited based on the route’s curves and grades) and the ability to transmit hotel power from the locomotive to the rest of the train; usually 18 cars in the United States is the maximum train length because of this. Amtrak provides no information on why it limits the North Coast Hiawatha to nine cars (with only five being revenue cars) other than it lacks the imagination to try for more.

   Since Amtrak’s proposed train already has locomotives, a baggage car, a crew car, dining car, and lounge, any additional cars would be revenue cars generating sleeping or coach ticket revenue. A 14-car train, for instance, would double the North Coast Hiawatha’s capacity, potentially doubling its revenue and most certainly not doubling its costs. Given Amtrak’s ridership estimates, such a capacity expansion would be justifiable. Amtrak does not investigate this option.

   Amtrak also does not investigate the option of greater frequencies or runs over segments of the route (aside from noting that Washington State would not object to running trains to Minneapolis instead of all the way to Chicago). As Amtrak has discovered with service in California and Illinois, additional trains each day can reduce subsidies because (1) added frequencies can mean equipment spends less time idle at each end and (2) added frequencies can increase revenue from additional riders taking advantage of more options. A second frequency 12-hours off of the proposed schedule would be a natural consideration, as would additional day-train frequencies between segments of the route. It is unfortunate Amtrak looks at additional frequencies not as expanding passengers options and thus revenue, but rather as something to be penalized for “cannibalizing” passengers and revenue from existing trains.

   Most transportation providers offer travelers options. One of Amtrak’s largest weaknesses is many of its trains run only once per day, resulting in equipment sitting idle for 6-18 hours at each end and passengers giving up if they cannot work with Amtrak’s one timetable option. Twice the trains can in many cases result in more than twice as many passengers. Fixed route costs, such as station operating costs (here estimated to be $27.1 million), can also be spread over more trains. As noted above, Amtrak estimates that the train’s operation itself, exclusive of system and route costs, will break even.

   Amtrak Does Not Investigate Marketing Options

   Amtrak’s report also provides no discussion of service options or marketing opportunities. The report mentions the North Coast Hiawatha’s Livingstone station is not far from Yellowstone National Park, but does not enlighten the reader as to whether Amtrak will capitalize on that beyond leaving passengers at Livingstone. (In the past, the Northern Pacific Railroad ran shuttle trains and later shuttle buses to the park.) The private Grand Canyon Railway in Arizona offers four different accommodation options, including a basic coach seat option. The higher-priced options include snacks, entertainment, and Grand Canyon National Park admission. In Europe, the CityNightLine overnight train service offers several different accommodation options, with higher-priced options including welcome wine or beer, an array of magazines, and breakfast on arrival. Other Amtrak trains have included parlor lounges, observation cars, children’s playrooms, quiet cars, wine tastings, and enroute tour guides. Other ideas could include on-board treadmills or weight equipment, video arcades, taverns or bars, or gift shops. Amtrak’s report shows no creative thinking with regard to providing services to passengers, an important aspect of its operation.

   This is particularly indefensible in that Amtrak requires the purchase of brand-new railcars to launch the service, and estimates it will take 4-5 years to begin operations after funding becomes available. If Amtrak needs five years and new trainsets to provide exactly what it has provided for years on other routes, it is not thinking sufficiently creatively.

   Amtrak’s report also provides no discussion of joint marketing opportunities for other popular attractions along the route, including the Mall of America in Minneapolis; historic tourist attractions in Butte, Montana (a larger town which Amtrak inexplicably writes off without bothering to estimate the costs of serving it despite rails existing and being on the train’s route, even though it reports that public and Montana Department of Transportation comments strongly favored studying operating service via Butte) and Bozeman, Montana; airports; and small-town communities currently without rail service in Washington State.

   Conclusion

   Throughout the report and its actions in recent history, Amtrak views its role as merely common-carrier transportation handling passengers when they show up. Instead, Amtrak should push itself to figure out how it can develop a market, providing a travel experience. Doing so will improve the bottom line for the company and for taxpayers, but requires shaking Amtrak out of its apathy and atrophy.

   Questions Unanswered by Amtrak In Its Report

   1. What is Amtrak’s estimate of the load factor for the North Coast Hiawatha, and how many passenger-miles will it generate?
   2. What are the system-wide and marginal revenues and costs associated with launching the North Coast Hiawatha, including additional revenues to other trains from its operation?
   3. How many of the cost items within Amtrak’s estimated $74.1 million in estimated North Coast Hiawatha operating expenses will be incurred whether or not the train route is launched?
   4. What are the revenue and costs associated with other operating options, such as a longer train of 14-22 cars, or additional frequencies?
   5. What additional level of capital investment would be required to raise average operating speed to 55 M.P.H. (42 hour schedule), 65 M.P.H. (36 hour schedule), or 75 M.P.H. (31 hour schedule)?
   6. Given that Amtrak will be purchasing new equipment for these trains, what innovative ideas will Amtrak explore for the equipment?
   7. What marketing opportunities will Amtrak explore for the operation of the trains, to maximize passenger travel experience and develop the market?
   8. What are the costs associated with operating via Butte, Montana?
   9. How would a system-wide expansion of train lengths and frequencies for long-distance trains change the operating performance of this route?
   10. Why does Amtrak estimate so many people will ride the North Coast Hiawatha, relative to other long-distance trains?

   About the Author

   Joseph Henchman lives in Arlington, Virginia, and is interested in transportation economics and rail planning. He works as an attorney and policy analyst with a non-profit think tank in Washington, D.C., but this report is not associated with that organization. His email address is jdhenchman [at] yahoo.com.

3. Amtrak has now issued four reports since the end of the summer. First, the Sunset Limited – East of New Orleans/Gulf Coast report (Amtrak doesn’t want to run the service); the Ohio 3-C report for restored service between Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati (Amtrak doesn’t want to run the service), the Pioneer report for restored service between Denver and Seattle (Amtrak doesn’t want to run the service), and, finally, the North Coast Hiawatha restored service report (Amtrak doesn’t want to run that service, either).

   When you add up Amtrak’s estimates to restart these four routes, it’s over $2,000,000,000 (that’s two billion dollars, if you don’t want to count zeros).

   In reality, if Amtrak really wanted to do any of these projects, the estimates are probably high by at least 40%, if not a full 50%. But, when you’re a planner for a quasi-governmental agency and you’re accustomed to spending someone else’s money (That would be money which belongs to you, the taxpayer.), costs don’t really matter. What matters is convenience and lots of bells and whistles (No pun intended.). Amtrak’s dream world dictates all new equipment, extravagant stations where smaller ones will do, crew training costs which are incomprehensible to any railroad professional, and a gold-plating of railroad infrastructure “just in case” the railroads want their entire right-of-way wish lists fulfilled at someone else’s expense.

   All of this leads to the inescapable, sad conclusion that until Amtrak has a new management team which has any inkling of a vision for the future which includes new passenger car orders, a business plan based on reality instead of only raiding government treasuries, or without fantasies of ignoring the conventional passenger rail business because of the glamour of an incorrect assumption Amtrak will be the exclusive high speed rail operator (there’s a thought to give you nightmares for a week), restored long routes such as the North Coast Hiawatha may not be the best plan.

   As presented, Amtrak’s four route restoration plans are a prescription for disaster.

   The Gulf Coast report laments Amtrak went to all of the trouble of studying multiple scenarios, and settled on four, all of which Amtrak has priced too high. The reality of the Gulf Coast report is if Amtrak simply extends the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando, Amtrak will instantly reestablish a Chicago-Florida train, restore service on the Gulf Coast, and have a powerhouse operation for the cost of one extra trainset for the City of New Orleans (due to current too long equipment layovers in New Orleans) and the cost of Positive Train Control installation on the CSX line between New Orleans and Jacksonville.

   The Pioneer report wants to set up a separate operation for the Pioneer between Denver and Seattle, with through-cars on the back of the California Zephyr between Chicago and Denver. Amtrak never considered the huge benefit of running a second frequency in the form of the Pioneer between Chicago and Denver, apparently because it would be too much trouble, no matter how much of a financial gain would be found.

   The Ohio report wants to set up a pretty good service, but with a lousy end point in Cincinnati so the service will not connect withe the Cardinal; Amtrak continues its reckless policy of not often enough offering connecting trains just in case some passengers may want to travel on more than one route to reach a final destination.

   None of the reports take into account the matrix effect of connectivity, more travel choices, or more stations served. Amtrak can only see costs, instead of benefits.

   Little of Amtrak’s work reflects it was created by anyone with real concepts of passenger service, what’s overall best for passengers, or what posture best serves Amtrak – and, our country – financially.

   For right now, until some of this changes, Amtrak may best serve itself and all of us by making some logical, small steps which will strengthen the company financially. Things like Kansas City-Omaha, Oklahoma City-Kansas City, Peoria-St. Louis, Savannah-Jacksonville, or Barstow-Bakersfield (/San Jose). Maybe think about Harrisburg-Newark via the Lehigh Valley.

   Even easier would be to add truly new Superliner capacity to the existing long distance trains, to start to capture many of those $1,000 tickets Amtrak is losing now because the sleepers are full at various peak load points.

   For those hoping for restoration of routes which never should have went away, this fall is truly a season of discontent. Amtrak seems to have gone out of its way to make things as difficult as possible for any returning trains, yet its chairman of the board and some senior executives are making presentations around the country about how Amtrak is the perfect organization to be the exclusive high speed rail operator for new services in America.

   Until Amtrak gets its house in order and demonstrates it has some – any! – vision, no one (even government bureaucrats) are going to be foolish enough to anoint Amtrak as the high speed rail operator.

4. Last Saturday, October 17, 2009, a determined band of people met together here in Jacksonville, Florida. The group named itself the Sunset Marketing and Revitalization Team, and has been meeting for over a year now at various locations along the former transcontinental route of the Sunset, prior to its unceremonious loss of the east end of the route beyond New Orleans due to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

   John Sita, Jr. of New Orleans is chairman of the SMART group, and Jerry Sullivan of Jacksonville was the gracious host of the meeting.

   The meeting lasted three hours, and the SMART members represented a number of states along the route, both east and west of New Orleans. One SMART member from Louisiana made an all-rail trip from his home to the meeting. To cover the roughly 600 miles from New Orleans to Jacksonville without the Sunset, he rode first to Washington via Birmingham, Atlanta, and Charlotte on the Crescent for a full day and a night, and then took the Silver Star from Washington for the afternoon and overnight trip to Jacksonville. Whew! Talk about dedication …

   Without getting into the various discussions and deliberations the group had, what is notable is the very need for the existence of this group. This group has no formal sponsorship, and is completely self-funded. These people banded together because they feel their quasi-governmental national passenger rail carrier has failed in its duty and obligations to restart the Sunset Limited east of New Orleans, and has constantly failed during the entire existence of Amtrak to make the Sunset Limited a daily train between Los Angeles and New Orleans (And Orlando when the train ran its full route.).

   In the real, non-Amtrak world, this group should never have been necessary. If Amtrak had the compunction to live up to its mandate as a national rail carrier, there would be no discussion about the gaping hole in Amtrak’s route map between New Orleans and Jacksonville. An entire region of the country is disenfranchised for passenger rail service because Amtrak isn’t clever enough to figure out how to make the Sunset a success.

   So, a group whose membership is more than 50 souls is working together to take the place of a taxpayer funded organization’s planning department to figure out how to make the Sunset Limited viable. Amtrak should be terribly embarrassed.

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1. They’re not going to take it lying down – Amtrak’s Pioneer route restoration report, that is. Republican Senator Mike Crapo of Idaho is not pleased with Amtrak’s initial Pioneer report, and has sent a letter to Amtrak outlining his thoughts. Additionally, several groups interested in the route restoration have gone to great pains to point out the many and various flaws in Amtrak’s initial report. These groups include the Cascadia Center, the Pacific Northwest Economic Region organization, All Aboard Washington (the Washington Association of Rail Passengers), and the Pioneer Restoration Organization.

   Here is the Cascadia Center’s Alternative Vision, starting with the Executive Summary. Comments follow at the end.

   The Pioneer: An Alternative Vision

   Cascadia Center for Regional Development

   September 29, 2009

   Executive Summary

   Amtrak’s draft feasibility study on the Pioneer train’s restoration, released September 18, errs on numerous fronts. It neglects the many opportunities for making the Pioneer the backbone of a regional transportation network in the Denver-Seattle corridor.

   • On scheduling and routing, the study’s options include low-potential stops without asking if a better mix of stations exists. The schedules provide poor service times at key tourist stops. We present a higher-ridership scenario that includes northern Colorado’s Front Range cities and responds to expressions of interest from many communities.
   • On equipment, Amtrak’s analysis calls for high-level cars that it says it doesn’t have. Cascadia highlights the good sense of a single-level-equipment option which would not require the study’s proposed purchase of more than $100 million of new equipment.
   • Regarding public-transportation connections at the Pioneer’s stops, the draft study falls silent, overlooking opportunities for new ridership. We show how the Pioneer could connect advantageously with resort destinations and off-route communities, bringing more and more people within the reach of public transportation.
   • In spite of general population growth, the steady growth in travel on other Amtrak long-distance trains, and other factors, Amtrak assumes ridership will be less than it was on the Pioneer of the 1990s. The study offers no ideas for improving the numbers. We present numerous ideas – better connectivity, better scheduling, better routing.
   • Regarding capital costs, Amtrak presents, without question, a list of proposed capacity improvements representing hundreds of millions of dollars. We believe the Pioneer’s impact, on the existing high-quality mainlines, can be fairly compensated with far fewer investments. Freight infrastructure improvement yields public benefits, but should not be cited, in effect, to eliminate chances for passenger rail expansion.
   • Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing funds are available to Amtrak at low cost. We raise the possibility of Amtrak utilizing this very substantial funding source – if a big infrastructure budget is ultimately determined to be necessary.
   • On operating costs, the study again overlooks opportunities for economy, including private provision of some services. We highlight the fact that the Denver-Seattle option, which we favor, has the lowest operating cost per train mile – that cost representing the platform on which the service is built. Better ridership divides that relatively static cost out, improving farebox recovery and thus operating performance.
   • The study’s implementation timeline leaves room for improvement. A recently announced service plan for another Amtrak route uses a much shorter timeline for station improvements, and the single-level equipment scenario we advocate would use cars that are already in the fleet or are part of a procurement process already initiated.

   The draft study makes tomorrow look like yesterday. Where it sees past failings, we see future opportunities. Wisely implemented, the Pioneer service will anchor an effective public transportation system across a vast and largely under-served swath of the country.

   [End of Executive Summary; beginning of full text]

   The Pioneer: An Alternative Vision

   Cascadia Center for Regional Development

   September 29, 2009

   Amtrak’s draft study on the feasibility of restoring the Pioneer train dismisses many exciting opportunities that this service restoration presents. In this analysis we attempt to elucidate some of those opportunities.

   1. Scheduling and route

   The draft study’s set of schedule options contains nothing resembling the operating scenario that, in our opinion, offers the promise of highest ridership and greatest return to the public. We call for a two-night, stand-alone Pioneer running between Denver and Seattle. The westbound California Zephyr would follow its current schedule. Passengers transferring to the Pioneer in Denver would lay over there from morning until evening, when the Pioneer would depart on the BNSF Front Range Subdivision to Wyoming. The train would serve several Front Range cities and Cheyenne, cross Wyoming to Ogden during the night, and (without stopping in Ogden) arrive in Salt Lake City in mid-morning. It would wye in Salt Lake and return to Ogden (stopping there), then proceed to Seattle. Eastbound, the train would reach Salt Lake in early evening, again providing a conveniently timed overnight service when it continues on to Wyoming and Denver. We attach a sample schedule [Not attached in TWA].

   This configuration offers many advantages. No city with a population over 100,000 is served during the middle of the night in either direction. None of the draft study’s timetables accomplish this. Often asymmetrical, those timetables also ensure middle-of-the-night service, in at least one direction, at the key tourist stops in Idaho – thus cutting significantly into discretionary ridership. By contrast, the two-night Pioneer visits calls at these stations during the day in both directions. The “dip” into Salt Lake City (modeled on the Silver Star’s long-established Auburndale-Tampa-Auburndale dip) establishes a quasi-corridor between Denver and Salt Lake, with travelers enjoying a choice between the scenic, lower-speed Rio Grande route during the daytime and a faster, overnight trip, via Wyoming, for predominantly non-tourist travel. The Pioneer serves the key Salt Lake stop at convenient times, and the connection with service to western Colorado is retained. The Pioneer-western Colorado layovers eastbound and westbound are long, but not much longer, in either case, than the 9:35 eastbound layover that Amtrak’s study considers acceptable. At the same time, the Pioneer would not involve even moderately long Salt Lake layovers for most passengers, i.e. those proceeding to or from Denver and points east. The Seattle service times, unlike those in the draft study, meanwhile allow for same-day transfers to and from Vancouver, BC – a key connection. The timetable is considerably more symmetrical than those in the study, meaning ridership is compromised at fewer stops.

   We have developed the Portland-Seattle timetable in the light of the current Cascades schedule, and any Pioneer schedule should give the Cascades priority consideration. In our proposal, the northbound Pioneer will be discharge-only at points between Portland and Seattle, thus sustaining Cascades ridership. Since the southbound Pioneer, presumably, will be the last train of the evening, it will however be full-service rather than receive-only. This will in effect enhance the corridor service as presently configured.

   We view the Denver layover as a plus. The possibility of passenger inconvenience when the draft study’s 2:34 eastbound layover time at Denver fails to “capture” a late-arriving

   Pioneer is eliminated, reducing certain operating costs. Instead of a long sit at Denver Union Station, as the draft study proposes, through-travelers find themselves conveniently positioned for a day of pleasure – or business – in the heart of the Mile High City. In a letter to Amtrak, Denver’s Regional Transportation District has cited many possibilities for coordinating Amtrak travel with local bus tours, transit access, and the like. We attach the letter [Not attached in TWA].

   Of the options presented in the study, no. 3 (Portland-Salt Lake) offers the best alternative to the two-night scenario. If option no. 3 is ultimately adopted, the train should however leave Portland approximately nine hours later, so as to arrive in Salt Lake City with a moderate recovery/working time before its departure eastbound as a section of the California Zephyr. This adjustment would also make the schedule symmetrical and facilitate round-trip day travel between Portland and, for example, Hood River, where the service times would bracket excursions on the Mount Hood Railroad.

   The attached schedule [Not attached in TWA] also differs from the study’s options in its mix of stops. Boulder, Longmont, Fort Collins and potentially Loveland (to begin from Denver) replace Greeley in Colorado. A new stop in downtown Cheyenne replaces the remote Borie stop. Green River, a few minutes’ drive from the larger city of Rock Springs, loses its station. Mountain Home, with its Air Force base, receives service. Nampa, which has no passenger station at all, and whose station location is undesirable, is replaced by Caldwell. Well-positioned halfway between Boise and Ontario, Caldwell has maintained a highly attractive station property and has expressed enthusiasm about receiving Amtrak service. In Oregon, the much-maligned stop at the UP Hinkle yard yields to Stanfield – a solution repeatedly sought by both Stanfield and the nearby off-line city of Hermiston.

   These changes would both reduce certain costs and increase ridership substantially, as discussed below.

   2. The BNSF Front Range Option

   Central to our proposal is the routing of the train on the BNSF Front Range Subdivision, as opposed to the UP Greeley Subdivision, between Denver and Cheyenne. The study draft dismisses the BNSF option with one paragraph:

   Between Denver and the Cheyenne area, BNSF’s Front Range Subdivision which runs through Boulder (home of the University of Colorado) and Fort Collins (home of Colorado State University) to Speer and Cheyenne, is a theoretical alternative to the former Pioneer route through Greeley. However, distances via the BNSF line are longer—14 miles longer between Denver and Speer (where there is no connection to the UP line) and 26 miles longer if the train operated over the BNSF line into Cheyenne (where there is a connection, but no access to UP’s historic station in downtown Cheyenne). Moreover, maximum speed on the unsignalled BNSF line is only 49 mph; over 30 miles are restricted to 30 mph or less; and there is a 15-20 mph speed restriction on the six-mile segment of the line through downtown Fort Collins where trains run down the middle of Mason Street. While operation via the BNSF line is not feasible at the present time due to much longer trip times, it could be a viable alternative in the future if proposals to upgrade the line for high speed rail service come to fruition.

   There is nothing “theoretical” about the BNSF route. The Denver Regional Transportation District (RTD) FasTracks plan calls for developing the route’s Denver-Longmont segment over the next six years for commuter service. From Longmont north to Fort Collins, plans

   including an environmental impact statement process whose completion is expected in 2010 have been outlined for a further extension of commuter rail service, again encompassing major infrastructure improvements. The Front Range Subdivision passes through metropolitan areas totaling 578,000 in population – well over twice that of the Greeley metropolitan area (2007 U.S. Census Bureau estimates). If routed on the Front Range line, the Pioneer would also serve two major universities with a combined enrollment of about 54,000 – more than four times that of Greeley’s university. Further, the Greeley subdivision is not being developed for commuter or regional rail, meaning that the BNSF route offers rail connectivity wholly absent from the UP option. At present, the BNSF route has about half the freight traffic that the Greeley Subdivision sees.

   The study understates the BNSF route’s potential by mentioning the 49 mph speed limit. This is a freight speed limit; the passenger limit is 59 mph. The study also implies erroneously that the street running in Fort Collins totals six miles. In fact the segment is about 1.25 miles long, along a corridor that is being developed for a bus rapid transit system with at least one station that would naturally serve as an interchange point for the Pioneer’s passengers.

   Further, the BNSF route would serve downtown Cheyenne, as opposed to Borie, the Greeley route’s nearest approach – a remote, unpopulated location on a windswept prairie 10 miles from the center of town. This shift would boost ridership from Cheyenne substantially. Perhaps as important, the city of Cheyenne, while it has no interest in underwriting an Amshack station in Borie, is at least in principle prepared to participate in the creation or maintenance of a station in the city center. Contrary to the study’s statement, access to the historic UP station in Cheyenne is possible, and other possibilities for the siting of a station in central Cheyenne also exist.

   The study thus disregards Cheyenne’s ridership and station possibilities, say nothing of the city’s clear interest in the matter. It insists instead on Greeley. In the last three fiscal years of the Pioneer’s operation in the 1990s, Greeley generated 6,845 boardings and alightings – 2% fewer than the 6,991 generated by Laramie, a community with a somewhat smaller university and a far smaller population base. Both stops were served at convenient times. Pocatello, with a university roughly the size of Greeley’s but a somewhat smaller population, contributed 11,614 riders – with middle-of-the-night service (figures from National Association of Railroad Passengers).

   The choice between the UP and BNSF Denver-Cheyenne routings should be clear. The latter has much more potential.

   3. Equipment

   Equipment for a restored Pioneer is far more available than the study asserts. We have drafted several scenarios by which the Pioneer could be restored, a southern Montana service inaugurated, and the Sunset Limited re-extended to Orlando as a thrice-weekly train, without any new equipment [Not attached in TWA] beyond that in the planned 130-car Viewliner order. We attach a summary of what might be the best initial configuration, which deploys single-level equipment to the Pioneer.

   The May 2009 Amtrak fleet plan indicates that Amtrak expected to have 179 stored and wrecked cars and an active fleet surplus of 67 cars as of September 30, 2009 (Amtrak, “System Fleet Plan FY2009″). Most of all these cars are of a type usable on the Pioneer. Many of the stored and wrecked cars are being repaired with ARRA funds. The Viewliner order, for which Amtrak has requested bids, would obviously complement that available single-level fleet.

   The attachment [Not attached in TWA] does not deal with locomotives for the simple reason that their supply appears very adequate. As of October 1, 2008, Amtrak had 7 wrecked P-42s, 30 stored P-40s, and 9 stored F-40s, and plans did not call for any of these 46 units to be activated as of October 1, 2009. Amtrak is reconditioning 15 of the P-40s, according to Amtrak’s own project summary (Amtrak, “ARRA/NRPC Project Summaries,” March 25, 2009; project number PRJ29110074), “in order for them to be used in long distance service.” This rehabbing will leave a balance of 15 P-40s among the still-undeployed units. Given this information, it is difficult to believe that Amtrak needs to buy new locomotives for the Pioneer (and charge them up front to the Pioneer’s account).

   While adequate equipment for launching a Pioneer is available through rehabilitation or activation of idle existing equipment, in combination with the Viewliner order, many worthy expansions of Amtrak service are presently under consideration. We thus view the attached equipment proposal [Not attached in TWA] as a shorter-term solution until Amtrak’s fleet can be replenished more generally through a system-wide program. According to a September 19 press report, Sen. Richard Durbin of Illinois is planning to reintroduce his TrainCARS bill to provide an ongoing funding source for new Amtrak equipment (“Demand for locomotives, train cars to pick up under push for high-speed rail,” Chicago Tribune, September 19, 2009; http://www.pantagraph.com/ business/article_10109942-a38f-11de-b399-001cc4c03286.html). We support Senator Durbin’s initiative. A Pioneer train with largely rehabbed equipment is not a long-term solution; the maintenance of an adequate national fleet is.

   The maintenance of that fleet is a system expense. We do not expect Amtrak to vow that the equipment charged to the Pioneer will never leave the Pioneer equipment pool. A railroad is far too fluid a system for that, and equipment moves from train to train for a variety of reasons. It would be preposterous to charge the anticipated order of Viewliner equipment, for example, to particular trains in the existing system – about like saying that the newborn baby has to buy an extension to the house because the family is now too big for the old one. Establishing the principle that capital assets belong to the entire system puts that system, including new services and old, on a fair and uniform footing. Burdening start-ups with the full cost of new cars, at $4-4.5 million a copy, will only prohibit system expansion.

   4. Connections

   We see the Pioneer as much more than an 11-foot-wide vehicle moving along a set of tracks: it must be the backbone of a much broader system of public transportation. It should catalyze a marketing and business partnership that will welcome large and increasing numbers of tourists, business travelers and prospective residents to an entire region of America.

   In the most obvious terms, this means feeder bus routes – of a sort that Amtrak’s draft study ignores completely. Idaho offers a case in point. With a grant from the Idaho Transportation Department, the Yellowstone Business Partnership, based in Idaho Falls and Bozeman, Montana, is planning an innovative, regional public-private transportation cooperative that, in contrast to the Pioneer’s history, could bring thousands of train travelers to two of America’s most magnificent national parks, multiple ski areas, and numerous towns that today have very limited transit services. The partnership notified Amtrak and its consultant of this initiative in the course of the study draft’s preparation. Regrettably, however, the study does not even mention the partnership or its potential for boosting the Pioneer’s patronage. If just 1% of all visitors to Grand Teton National Park arrived by connecting coach from the Pioneer’s Pocatello station, and departed in like fashion, the train’s ridership would jump by nearly 80,000 yearly – that is, if the train called at Pocatello at times convenient for tourists. The study’s schedules generally give Pocatello wee-hour service.

   The train obviously has to be somewhere in the middle of the night, but the night-to-day differential in ridership at a station where the traffic is largely discretionary is far greater than the same differential at a location where the travel is mostly a matter of business or personal necessity. That is, the draft study’s bad times in Pocatello or Shoshone – stepping-off point for Sun Valley and Ketchum – repeat the train’s history and constrain ridership much more than bad times in western Wyoming would. Our proposal – a two-night train calling at Pocatello and Shoshone at optimal times – would maximize ridership.

   The situation in Pocatello is not much different from that in Shoshone, where the local public bus provider, Mountain Rides, has alerted Amtrak to the potential of connectivity with the Sun Valley-Ketchum resort area and Twin Falls. Mountain Rides has signaled an interest in meeting the train even in the middle of the night, if the schedule demands. None of this potential is mentioned in the study, which focuses instead on the discouraging historical example.

   We have also noted interest from potential partners like Northwestern Trailways and the Wild Horse Casino in Pendleton. These appear to have received no attention in the study draft. While the analysis did correctly note the growth in urban transit systems in Seattle, Portland, Salt Lake City and Denver, we have to wonder whether that increased connectivity was considered in formulating the remarkably low ridership forecasts.

   5. Ridership

   The ridership estimates, indeed, are the most pessimistic element of the entire study. The study methodology is not even entirely fair. That is, the authors penalize the raw ridership figures by deducting riders who would “defect” from other trains. The study reduces the projected raw ridership by about 10% to cover this predation on other trains. By contrast, the study gives the Pioneer no credit for the added ridership that it certainly would generate on other Amtrak trains.

   This summer’s Sunset Limited report takes the proper approach, crediting that projected service restoration for an increase in ridership on the Silver Meteor, for example (Amtrak, “Gulf Coast Service Plan Report,” pp. 7 and 33). Amtrak’s 2000 Market Based Network Analysis likewise illustrates that connecting ridership is a very significant factor, whereby (in negative terms) the elimination of one train cuts into passenger revenue on connecting trains (Amtrak, “Report to Congress: The Market Based Network Analysis of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,” p. 7).

   The draft study exaggerates the role of competition with budget airlines. Trains compete meaningfully with airplanes only in short travel lanes, where the airplane’s cruising speed does not represent a major factor in the traveler’s budgeting of time. For a long-distance train, ridership is drawn almost entirely from motorists, bus travelers, and people who would otherwise stay home.

   The alternative routes for the Pioneer’s traverse of the central Rockies are Wyoming (including northern Colorado) and western Colorado (which term here includes some Utah communities). Serving both Denver and Salt Lake City as outlined above, the two-night

   scenario sacrifices only a minor degree of connectivity between the Pacific Northwest and western Colorado: one has to wait somewhat longer in Salt Lake City for a transfer, but the connection is retained. At the same time, travel from the Pacific Northwest via the Wyoming route to Denver and all points east does not involve any significant layover, or the unpredictability of two train sections meeting, in Salt Lake City. The study’s Pacific Northwest-Salt Lake options – that is, with the California Zephyr picking up the Pioneer in the Utah city – cannot match that advantage. Travel from the Northwest to Denver is also faster by the Wyoming route and, most obviously, the Wyoming-northern Colorado traverse brings many new destinations, and even more city-pairs, into the Amtrak network. The one downside of the somewhat more difficult connection in Salt Lake is more than outweighed, in ridership terms, by the other attributes of the two-night scenario we propose.

   Given all the factors in our proposal – retention of the Salt Lake City stop, routing via downtown Cheyenne and the BNSF Front Range route, improved scheduling for discretionary travelers, energetic development of connecting services – we believe that the Pioneer’s raw ridership would be much higher than in the study draft’s Denver-Seattle scenario. Further, ridership on long-distance trains has increased generally in recent years, rising 17% between FY 2002 and FY 2008. Ridership on the Empire Builder, California Zephyr and Southwest Chief, the three trains most comparable to the Pioneer, has increased by 33%, 7%, and 18%, respectively, over the 2003-2008 period. (Data from National Association of Railroad Passengers website; data from earlier years not readily available).

   Amtrak West projected 42,339 annual riders for the Portland-Boise train contemplated in the late 1990s – on a stub route less than one third the full Denver-Seattle distance now under discussion (“Amtrak West’s presentation on Portland-to-Boise rail service,” September 8, 1999?). This projection, too, suggests that the study draft’s forecasts are very low.

   The 41% general population increase, cited by the study, in the Pioneer’s states since 1992 – in contrast to the 19% national increase over the same period – also argues for the Pioneer’s potential.

   Given all the above, we believe the study’s raw ridership forecast (that is, before impacts on other system trains) should be increased by at least 25-50%, i.e. to 154,500-185,400.

   6. Capital costs

   While many recent passenger rail projects have contended with rising infrastructure demands from host railroads, this study’s figures carry the trend to a daunting extreme.

   Start-up infrastructure improvements charged to the Pioneer’s budget should be limited to the following:

   – a 10,000-foot passing siding at each point where the eastbound and westbound Pioneer are expected to meet. Under the two-night scenario, this would mean sidings in the Great Divide Basin of Wyoming, in Idaho west of Pocatello, and between The Dalles and Stanfield, Oregon.

   – reconstruction of the station track at Ogden. (Should funding considerations so demand, it might be possible to defer the Ogden station track installation, temporarily omitting the Ogden stop. It could be replaced by Brigham City, 20 miles to the north, where the Pioneer once in fact stopped. An Amshack would likely be required.)

   – minimal track and signaling improvements on the BNSF Front Range Subdivision, in anticipation of more extensive upgrades to that line in conjunction with planned regional and commuter rail development.

   – construction of a new run-through track at La Grande to prevent freight-passenger interference while the Pioneer is in the station. The run-through track improvements at Nampa and Hinkle are unnecessary for the simple reason that there should not be a stop at either location.

   With the exception of the Ogden improvements, all these enhancements would also provide benefits for freight traffic.

   In the case of Boise, improvements to the “Boise loop” are called for, but it remains to be seen, among other things, whether the city of Boise, which owns much of the loop, will itself underwrite the improvement of its track. Boise, the third-largest city in the Pacific Northwest, very much wants the service. The City is committed to the maintenance of the Boise Depot for passenger rail purposes.

   In the case of Portland, a new crossover track allowing access between the Steel Bridge and Portland Union Station is needed, as the study notes. However, the Oregon Department of Transportation has applied for ARRA funding that would allow for the restoration of the crossover track, or another engineering solution serving the same practical purpose, as part of a larger package of ARRA projects in the area. Those projects include the Graham Line siding also cited in the draft study, which did not mention the hoped-for funding of either of these improvements from another source. We understand that the crossover would be a relatively minor cost item in any event.

   We are thus unconvinced that the resumption of a single daily passenger train, at any point along the route proposed by the draft study, from Denver to Seattle, would in itself justify major infrastructure projects, i.e., projects beyond those discussed above. Amtrak should not pass on these staggering estimates to the study’s readers without questioning whether they serve freight rail only, without relevance to the passenger train.

   Even the four projects listed above could be viewed as excessive. In 1991, Amtrak studied a reconfiguration of the Pioneer using UP track from Denver to Ogden – as the current draft study does. It concluded that track conditions on that entire segment “are a part of UP’s primary main line and are considered satisfactory for the restoration of passenger service without need for capital expenditures” (Amtrak, “Reroute of the Pioneer and the Desert Wind through Central Iowa and Wyoming,” p. 18). It is difficult to believe that the Denver-Ogden route, as a major active freight line, has deteriorated significantly since that time.

   The California Zephyr has recently had to detour over the Wyoming route between Salt Lake City and Denver because of maintenance on the Rio Grande route. Several reliable reports we have received indicate that the train was typically reaching Denver or Salt Lake at least 2:30 sooner than it would have if it had followed the Rio Grande route’s schedule. The Wyoming route is of course faster by nature; an extrapolation of Amtrak’s 1997 timetable indicates that the Salt Lake-Wyoming-Denver route that the Zephyr has been using should take about 2:15 less than the Rio Grande. The anecdotal evidence thus strongly suggests that the Wyoming route’s condition, without any infrastructure improvements, will consistently support a passenger train moving at the 1997 timetable’s speed.

   Finally, the two-night train we propose allows for relatively slow night-running along the Columbia River, primarily to allow for good service times in Portland. The slow running there will also mean less need to overtake freights, making the need for the ten-mile second main track that the study calls for in the Columbia Gorge all the more doubtful. For passenger traffic access, the basic need is for 10,000-foot sidings at points where the eastbound and westbound Pioneers would meet.

   The point here is not that freight infrastructure improvements are not needed on the route, but that such upgrades should not be charged to a passenger train. If however decision-makers conclude that most or even all of the proposed improvements should be implemented, the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program may provide an alternative. RRIF provides a total pool of $35 billion of capital, currently available to Amtrak at somewhat over 4% interest. Amtrak could borrow the entire $324.1 million foreseen by the draft study for the Denver-Seattle route and pass it on to the railroads in question under attractive terms. The UP, for example, has to pay nearly 12% to obtain capital on the private market, according to the federally calculated cost-of-capital figures for the industry, providing “room” to pay Amtrak a premium above the 4%. That premium could defray part of Amtrak’s operating loss for the train.

   The issue reduces itself to the allocation of investment costs in a complex national economy. Two passenger train movements daily on a high-quality rail line should involve little need for new infrastructure. We agree that capacity investments such as those Union Pacific is calling for will yield social benefits. Shippers will see their products move more expeditiously, expedition of traffic flows will reduce carbon emissions, and so forth. Decision-makers need however to distinguish between the benefits for and needs of passengers, on the one hand, and freight on the other.

   The study’s projected equipment costs express the reflexive public-sector tendency towards expensive turn-key solutions, rather than the resourcefulness of a private-sector business. As the attached equipment scenario makes clear, rehabilitation of existing equipment will reduce costs substantially. According to Amtrak’s ARRA project summaries (cited earlier), the cost for rehabilitation of the variety of equipment being restored with the stimulus funds comes to just under $1 million per car. Those cars represent only part of Amtrak’s inactive fleet: other equipment is sitting – waiting. A private businessman who has expressed interest in operating the Pioneer (see under Operating Costs, below) points also to the availability in the open market of considerable additional bi-level equipment that could be acquired and rehabbed for about $1.2 million per car.

   Even if, for example, rehabilitated single-level equipment were used in combination with new Viewliner sleepers and diners, the cost per car would still be far less than the study projects.

   Cobbling together consists from different sources is not necessarily an ideal solution. Ultimately equipment needs to be obtained system wide, and that equipment should be treated as a system expense, not a charge against any one train.

   Station costs could be reduced in certain instances by the willingness of communities to invest (or, in fact, continue investing) in the station properties they own. Ultimately, Amtrak has to move in the direction of the local provision of station infrastructure, and local players

   will have to secure the resources to do that. Existing opportunities for local contributions in these sources of civic pride and utility should be explored energetically.

   Most of the stations on the potential Pioneer route are either in use as train stations, or have been maintained (in some cases after restoration) through local initiatives, for other purposes. Many of the current station-building activities cited in the draft study either do not occupy the whole facility or serve only occasional events. Because Amtrak will not have agents at most of the stations, the only modification needed at many sites is restoration of the platforms so as to meet ADA requirements.

   7. Operating costs

   The draft study does not weigh the possibility of private entry into any aspect of the Pioneer’s operation (excepting, of course, the private ownership of the railroad). The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act, which mandated the study, also specifically encouraged private operation of passenger trains, precisely because it might save the public money (Public Law 110-432, Division B, Title II, Sections 214, 216 and 217).

   We have explored the potential for private operation of some aspects of the Pioneer’s service. To date, one operator has indicated interest in an arrangement whereby Amtrak would exercise its right of access, and hire the private firm for operations. Having read the study draft, the operator predicted that operating costs could be reduced by about $5 million annually by such a contractual arrangement. While seeking private operators, admittedly, lies beyond the study’s scope of work, the potential for entrepreneurial entry into the Pioneer’s operation needs to be scrutinized, and certainly offers opportunities for economy. We will continue to investigate these possibilities, and would be happy to discuss them in greater detail with Amtrak and appropriate decision-makers.

   The study’s enumeration of operating costs seems mostly reasonable; the only expense that appears clearly excessive is the 4 to 14 full-time employees perceived as necessary for added services at the staffed stations. A Denver Union Station employee with whom we spoke stated that the station staff there was not larger during the Pioneer’s tenure than it is now, with only California Zephyr service. To some extent, of course, the simultaneity of two trains in a station would raise the question of increased staffing needs; however, our two-night scenario essentially avoids a convergence of schedules with other long-distance trains.

   It may be possible to provide the train’s on-board staffing on the model of Amtrak’s Auto Train, which in financial terms out-performs all other Amtrak long-distance services, and whose labor arrangements are more flexible than those elsewhere in the system. Sensible labor contracts could result in some cost savings, for example by allowing employees to cross craft barriers more flexibly.

   It is the severe underestimation of revenue – of ridership – that draws our attention far more than any expense item, however. The analysis should have at least pointed in the direction of a fresher, more imaginative approach to this issue. The study draft’s consist (like the ridership figures) is very small. As the attached equipment summary [Not attached in TWA] suggests, a larger consist would facilitate certain innovations. One coach car – an Amfleet I coach, with its existing seat configuration – would provide budget transportation for persons of limited means, who would take a bus if it weren’t for the fact that the bus service is no longer available. Another coach, with a capacity lower than that of a standard long-distance coach but exceeding that of a sleeper, would be outfitted with seats that recline to full horizontal position, and each two seats would be enclosable by a retractable curtain to provide a modicum of privacy for sleeping – at a somewhat increased fare, naturally. The potentials for attracting new market segments are not the most obvious subjects for a feasibility study, but nothing prohibits their consideration, either.

   The Pioneer needs to be seen in terms of its possibilities, not its difficult history. The most telling statistics in the draft study are the cost per train mile and net per train mile in Table 12 (p. 46). The Denver-Seattle option wins the competition here. While the study considers that route less attractive in the light of other metrics, cost per train mile trumps those other considerations. It does not increase markedly as the train’s occupancy increases or cars are added to the consist. It is the platform we have to work with, and in that sense the table makes it clear that the Denver-Seattle option is best equipped to minimize subsidies per unit of travel.

   8. Timeline

   The study presents a discouraging timeline, and we have to wonder why. The analysis concludes that even ADA projects “will average approximately 36 to 48 months” (p. 26). New equipment must be ordered. Existing equipment cannot be rehabbed, even as a temporary measure to get the wheels rolling while grander solutions await. The possibility of using Viewliners, which would be available relatively soon, is brushed aside because the California Zephyr is a bi-level train.

   The 36 to 48 months for ADA-compliance upgrades contrasts with the Sunset Limited service plan (cited earlier), which (p. 55) allots 9-26 months for comparable enhancements. One is left feeling that the study stretches out the timeline much as it maximizes expenses – and to no one’s benefit in either case.

   Tri-Met (Portland), UTA (Salt Lake City) and RTD (Denver) have experience with building ADA platforms and ramps and working safely in railroad rights-of-way in this region. Amtrak has little experience in implementing improvements in this rugged country, and therefore may be anticipating higher-than-necessary costs. An innovative alternative would be for Amtrak to utilize regional transit agencies as general contractors for this work, to reduce costs and expedite the service launch.

   9. Conclusion

   Under the Amtrak legislation in force since 1970, the nation’s passenger railroad has a right to operate on the tracks of private railroads. It needs to exercise that right, at its discretion rather than the discretion of the private railroads. The draft study gives the contrary impression of a federal institution whose duties include reporting, without question, the claims asserted by private railroads as the price of passenger access. We agree that costs engendered by Amtrak trains should be defrayed by Amtrak and that investments in freight rail infrastructure are necessary and will yield important public benefits. The study appears, however, to mix the two priorities, going beyond the scope of what is the passenger train’s “responsibility.” It is up to Amtrak and Congress to correct this confusion of purposes.

   We also perceive the study’s infrastructure and equipment budgets as a means of discouraging interest in this system expansion – or any system expansion, for that matter. There are ways to do this more economically. We have advanced some possibilities in this paper, and we urge the further exploration of those possibilities. It behooves us to fulfill the Pioneer’s considerable promise without ignoring the need to conserve public resources.

2. Well. Most interesting.

   And, yes, the proposals differ from what was offered as a similar analysis in TWA in September. However, these proposals are offered by competent local authorities, working with local knowledge and vision formed by years of waiting for the Pioneer to return. There are no single, final answers; there are a range of choices of final answers which are superior to those initially offered by Amtrak.

   Some of the equipment use ideas (specifically, reshuffling other train consists which often operate at a high load factor, such as the Empire Builder) need work, but the sense of thinking outside of the box is genuine. When the subject is equipment pools, there are usually a half a dozen good ideas for any one situation.

   Most startling in the analysis is the sense of entrepreneurship, which is totally absent from the Amtrak document. The Cascadia Center for Regional Development obviously does not believe in all power to the government, but, rather, good solutions can be found outside of government. Also most tantalizing is the prospect of private operation of this train under an interesting arrangement with Amtrak.

   Under Amtrak’s proposal, the people of the Pacific Northwest are given a one-bid, one horse race. The Cascadia Center changes that equation, and demands at least two horses in the race, if not more. Bravo! Cascadia Center.

   Now, it will be up to the federal, state, and local politicians along the proposed route of the Pioneer to ask for more than what Amtrak initially offered. Since Amtrak is a creature of government, these people have the power to influence Amtrak and demand more from Amtrak than what Amtrak was initially willing to do.

   And, politicians along the routes of Amtrak’s other two route restoration and new route proposals along the Gulf Coast and in Ohio: the same goes for you, too. The silence coming from Florida and its elected officials since the Gulf Coast report was published in August has been deafening. Congresswoman Corrine Brown of Jacksonville put $1,000,000 of taxpayer money for Amtrak in its 2008 reauthorization to pay for the Gulf Coast report, which had major flaws. To date, not a public word about this report. We’re waiting, Congresswoman. The folks along the Pioneer route have led the way, in record time. We need action in Florida, too.

3. We promised this edition of TWA would contain the latest scribbling of William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona. If you’ve made it this far down, you know this issue of TWA is running considerable longer than normal (Almost 7,000 words.) due to the Pioneer report. Mr. Lindley will return next issue; we promise – really, we do, this time.

If you would like to print a nicely pre-formatted copy of this post, simply press the “print this post” button above.

1. Now, there is no doubt. Amtrak doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business. Last week Amtrak released a requested study on Ohio’s “3 C” corridor, which runs from Cleveland to Cincinnati via Columbus and Dayton. And, Amtrak released a preliminary draft for discussion for the much-awaited Pioneer route restoration between (Chicago), Denver, and the Pacific Northwest. The part of the route from Chicago to Denver would travel over the existing California Zephyr route, but from Denver westward it would be a restored route.

   We will examine each proposal, with the Ohio examination coming in the next issue of This Week at Amtrak, but it’s clear Amtrak is pricing the costs of these routes so high it’s trying to discourage backers and political entities along the route it really doesn’t want to create or restore either of these routes, much in the vein it did with the previous Gulf Coast report earlier this summer.

   Yes, of course, any good businessman makes a presentation which is conservative on sales projections, and high on costs. That way, when things work out like they are supposed to beyond the projections, there are no nasty little surprises. But, Amtrak has gone to such extremes in both of these instances, one can only begin to guess at the metrics Amtrak used to create these studies. Good business sense certainly never came into play when putting these studies together.

   One consistent component of these two studies and the previous Gulf Coast study is Amtrak expects individual states to pony up money for these trains, and doesn’t seem to assume any responsibility for being a national passenger train operator, which transcends state boundaries.

2. To read the Pioneer preliminary report asking for comment before final submission to Congress on October 15^th is to truly understand corporate shallowness.

   For years, Amtrak has gotten away with running the Empire Builder with a Portland, Oregon section separate from the Seattle section by splitting and joining the train in Spokane, Washington. Just as Amtrak does also with the Boston section of the Lake Shore Limited separate from the New York City section, nearly a complete train is operated, minus a dining car. Both of these operations miss a huge revenue producing opportunity for a full, second frequency to operate over the majority of the route.

   Time and again, we know a second frequency on any route not only boosts ridership, revenues, and revenue passenger miles significantly, but it also spreads the infrastructure costs such as stations over two trains instead of one.

   The Silver Meteor and Silver Star on the Right Coast travel nearly identical routes between New York City and Miami, with the Star diverting from the Meteor’s route to traverse the old Seaboard Air Line Railroad route via Raleigh, North Carolina and Columbia, South Carolina, and also call at Tampa, Florida. Less than four hours is added to the running time of the Star versus the Meteor, and the payback for that is reflected in two million additional revenue passenger miles generated for the Star over the Meteor’s performance.

   The Silver Meteor generated in Fiscal Year 2008 $30,538,800 in revenue, 194,454,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 319,800 souls an average length of trip of 608 miles. The Silver Star generated $28,111,900 in revenue, 196,924,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 367,100 passengers an average length of trip of 536 miles.

   The Empire Builder generated $59,389,600 in revenue, 409,480,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 554,300 passengers an average length of trip of 739 miles. The Lake Shore Limited generated $24,212,000 in revenue, 152,329,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 345,600 passengers an average length of trip of 441 miles.

   You can easily see the strength of both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and it’s also easy to imagine if the Portland section of the Empire Builder became the Western Star as its own, second frequency all the way to Chicago how much fiscal strength and transportation output it would generate, as would a second frequency of the Lake Shore Limited into Boston serving the same purpose.

   So, Amtrak’s plan for the possibility of a restored Pioneer to is add three cars to the California Zephyr between Chicago and Denver, consisting of a coach, coach/baggage, and sleeper. In Denver, a dedicated diner/lounge and separate locomotive would be added to the minuscule consist and form the Pioneer to the Pacific Northwest, terminating in either Portland or Seattle (Seattle being the better option of the two.).

   Amtrak projected ridership and revenue for the Pioneer is too small, too. As said above, while being conservative in projections is the best method, Amtrak projections tend more to fatalism than objectivity.

   Amtrak has produced four options for restored Pioneer service, Option 1 being a Salt Lake City-Seattle choice, with 102,000 passengers and $11.6 million in revenue projected.

   Option 2 is a Denver-Seattle choice, with 111,000 passengers and $13.1 million in revenue projected.

   Option 3 is a Salt Lake City-Portland choice, with 82,000 passengers and $7.6 million in revenue, and Option 4 is a Denver-Portland option with 95,000 passengers and $9.2 million in revenue projected.

   Option 2 is consistently the best choice, even though through Amtrak’s projections it also has the greatest cost. Option 2 restores service over Union Pacific’s fabled Overland Route through Wyoming, which would bring service to another state currently without passenger rail benefits.

   Much of Amtrak’s projections are based on ridership and revenues from the former Pioneer, which ceased operations in 1997. In FY 1992, Pioneer ridership peaked at 156,000 passengers a year. Amtrak states in its preliminary report it expects lower ridership because of stiffer airline competition in the region. Amtrak likes to sell itself short with silly statements like this; it never seems to understand the uniqueness of its own product and the desirability of its product among all classes of travelers.

   Amtrak is projecting per mile passenger revenue of 12.2 cents, which would place it only above the Sunset Limited, with revenue of 12.1 cents per passenger mile. It’s a mystery why Amtrak would use this number, since the California Zephyr generates 14.5 cents per passenger mile, the Southwest Chief 13.3 cents per passenger mile, and the Empire Builder 14.5 cents. Why there is any presumption of such a low passenger mile figure can only be explained that Amtrak doesn’t want this train to come back.

   The 111,000 figure for ridership is easily low by 25,000 passengers, but, if a second frequency all the way from Chicago to Denver and then a single frequency to Seattle was used because it is a better choice, then a ridership figure of 250,000 to 300,000 is more likely. Yes, this would require more equipment, but, that’s the cost of having the burden of meeting consumer demand.

   When you couple realistic passenger mile revenue of 14.5 cents per passenger mile as is found on the California Zephyr with the ridership of a second frequency, suddenly the Pioneer is not only a good idea, but a great idea. Perhaps Amtrak doesn’t want to do this because it is afraid of a new service being successful? After all, it’s very difficult for Amtrak today to hide the outright success of its long distance trains, so adding another train would just add to Amtrak’s problems of explaining why long distance trains always work better than state supported corridor trains with greater transportation output and greater efficiencies in every area.

   Training and personnel preparation is another area where Amtrak’s proposal seems to be from outer space. Amtrak wants to budget $6.6 million for crew training for Option 2. Why? Perhaps, Amtrak is considering taking kindergarten students and paying for their entire education (including advanced university graduate studies degrees) and, a lifetime later, making them train and engine crew members. The Pioneer is proposed to operate over a route that is already a freight railroad route; there is no blazing of trails going on here. Between Portland and Seattle, the route is an existing Amtrak route, so it’s just a matter of adding more crew to the crew base, not creating an whole new cadre of employees. As far as the portion of the route between Denver and Portland, it is not rocket science to recruit and train railroad employees. Amtrak has obviously based its numbers of taking raw employees off the street and turning them into railroaders, and then doubling that cost for a final project figure. In the real world, that is not only unrealistic, but just silly.

   On the subject of equipment, Amtrak says it doesn’t have enough equipment on the wreck line it could fix, or other cars in storage to get this service moving. It wants (like in the Gulf Coast report) up to four years to develop and build new equipment, at a cost of $123 million for an expected need (for the too short consist) of 27 cars and locomotives, total. That breaks down to over $4,500,000 for each piece of equipment. Perhaps they are projecting all of this equipment will be made of gold and platinum? This figure is way too high, plus, a few pieces of equipment could come from Amtrak’s wreck line at a much lower price for rehabilitation instead of new build. Amtrak says it needs to buy four new locomotives in this equipment group, but it has seven wrecked P42s in its inactive fleet, plus 30 stored P40s, and nine stored F40s. There are other bits and pieces of Superliner equipment Amtrak has that could easily supplement this equipment request without having to buy everything new.

   The report goes on and on in this vain vein. Probably, the numbers Union Pacific Railroad have submitted for track upgrades are a good starting point for a wish list, and it would help all parties concerned for some infrastructure improvement on the line.

   As far as station costs are concerned, Amtrak worries greatly about taking some existing buildings and having to upgrade them for Americans With Disabilities Act compliance. While this has great merit, it always seems to be Amtrak’s default position on any new project; it doesn’t have the money to spend for ADA compliance. After over a decade without service, many of the route stations have either been removed or converted to other purposes. There will be a great need for new station facilities. However, this is a reasonable expense for cities and towns that wish to have passenger rail service to share the expenses. If they want passenger rail service, provide the portal for that, just like for airlines.

   Amtrak says it will need $469,800,000 to restart Pioneer service, with Denver as the jumping off point. The majority of that is $324,100,000 for track and signals, including the coming need for Positive Train Control.

   An educated guess says this cost is $150,000,000 too high, including unrealistic training, equipment, and new station costs. By the time a realistic number is agreed upon between Amtrak and the Union Pacific Railroad, that $469 million should be closer to $320,000,000.

   Ridership, revenue, and revenue passenger mile projections are tremendously under-represented, and operating expenses are tremendously over-represented. When the true figures meet in the middle, farebox recovery should be in the 50% or higher range (As opposed to Amtrak’s guess of 28%).

   So, at this point, if you’re an elected official of any of the states hoping for a restored Pioneer, what do you do? Amtrak wants $469 million in start-up costs, and then it expects ongoing subsidies to run a train that is positioned in the most expensive way it can be to drain government treasuries.

   Here’s an idea. Let Amtrak submit its grossly flawed report, with all of the figures as gospel. Then, spend some more money and some more time (After all, Amtrak wants four years or more to restore this service, so to them time is not a factor.), and find a credible passenger rail consulting firm to create a real route analysis, using real world numbers, and then take that report and beat Amtrak over the head with it until it comes to its senses and becomes realistic on what it will take to restore the Pioneer as part of its long distance system.

3. Here is the most compelling part of the Amtrak Pioneer report.
   

   These projections reflect the fact that all or virtually all of the equipment required for Pioneer restoration would have to be purchased new. Despite growing ridership, Amtrak’s long distance equipment fleet is smaller now than it was when the Pioneer operated. Due to funding constraints, Amtrak has not ordered any new long distance equipment since the early 1990s, and most of the “Heritage” cars built for other railroads that Amtrak acquired at its formation have been retired due to age. Amtrak’s existing fleet of bi-level Superliner cars is insufficient to meet equipment requirements on the nine long distance trains that currently use Superliner equipment, and Amtrak has only a small number of repairable “wreck status” Superliner cars. In addition, if Amtrak is to continue to provide existing services on long distance routes, it must in the very near future replace nearly 100 remaining “Heritage” cars that are now more than half a century old.

   Amtrak has recently issued a request for proposals for the acquisition of 130 single-level long distance cars, primarily to replace the remaining Heritage cars (although funding for this purchase has not yet been identified). Purchasing additional single-level cars to equip a restored Pioneer would not be an optimal solution. Single level cars would accommodate fewer passengers, and operation of single-level Pioneer cars to/from Chicago on the bi-level California Zephyr would trigger a need for additional Superliner “transition” cars (which are in particularly short supply) equipped with a high-level door one end and a single-level door on the other.

   A purchase of new bi-level equipment for the Pioneer, which would take approximately four years for design, procurement and construction, would have to be part of a larger equipment order. The high upfront design and tooling costs associated with building passenger rail cars make it uneconomic to construct them in small quantities. Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services such as a restored Pioneer.

   What is Amtrak saying, here? Has Amtrak actually said – in writing, in an official document, no less – it has demand for long distance trains that is not being met? (Gasp!) Could this be true? Amtrak has unmet demand on trains which are not corridor trains? Could this be a whole line of revenue Amtrak is ignoring? What about taking more cars out of the wreck line and storage yard and putting them into service? Would that imperil Amtrak’s ongoing business plan which is to mainly request government subsidies instead of generating revenue inhouse?

   And, take a look at the line, “Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services as a restored Pioneer.”

   (Gasp! again) NEW SERVICES? Our Amtrak? Is someone actually preparing a vision for the future for Amtrak? Inquiring minds want to know.

4. While you’re trying to wrap your mind around that concept just above, here’s an editorial which is appearing in the October 2009 issue of RAILPACE Newsmagazine, which is appearing on news stands today. This commentary is by Tom Nemeth, Editor-in-Chief of RAILPACE, and is used with his permission.
   

   EDITORIAL

   By Tom Nemeth

   Amtrak: Getting the Lead Out

   Now that Amtrak has adequate funding for operations and growth, while enjoying unprecedented public and political support, it is time for a management makeover. Amtrak service today, with a few exceptions on some western long-hauls and the Acelas, is beginning to look like the final days of Penn Central. While top management obsesses about photographers, on-time performance continues to lag, trains are dirty, shopworn, and overcrowded. What is the meaning of a “reserved train” when passengers are required to stand between Wilmington and Washington, as a friend did on Train 94 on a recent Friday. This editor endured a Business Class coach from Trenton to Newport News on Train 99 on March 28 with reeking toilets. A round trip on the Texas Eagle on June 15 and June 23 last year, in addition to being 8 hours late each way, revealed shopworn Superliners badly in need of a facelift. Another colleague, writing Amtrak in protest of a rather rude trainman, was advised that Amtrak management is not responsible for the behavior of its crews. Granted that working a crowded train is not easy, but there must be recognition that the company (and Federal funding) exists for the benefit of Amtrak’s customers, the riding public. In short, it appears that top management just doesn’t care.

   There are other Amtrak customers too. The commuter railroads whose spine is the Northeast Corridor, are not treated any better by Amtrak’s insular management.The faulty design of the ARC rail tunnel now being built under the Hudson River, which will not connect to Penn Station in Manhattan, is partly the fault of Amtrak, which did not want a seat at the table when the project was in initial design, a fatal flaw that will haunt regional rail advocates for generations. Amtrak management just didn’t care about “NJ Transit’s tunnel.” New York’s MTA continues to struggle with Amtrak’s inability to execute its responsibility for the Long Island Rail Road East Side Access project. This represents a lack of accountability by Amtrak management, who are in a unique position to influence the outcome of these multi-billion dollar investments. Amtrak’s own engineering department continues to lack competent leadership, allowing substandard quality concrete ties onto the Northeast Corridor (now being replaced at great expense), and serious structural cracks in a bridge in Elizabeth, NJ, to go unnoticed by inadequately trained maintenance workers.

   But where IS management? Corporate culture on Norfolk Southern and other successful railroads dictates that Division Superintendents and Engineering Department officers are not to be found sitting in their offices; rather they get out and ride the trains regularly and observe the property firsthand. On Amtrak, they sequester themselves behind desks and await their long-sought retirement day.

   Then there’s the issue of Amtrak operations. Shrinking consists in an era of growing ridership hardly makes sense. Amtrak’s “One Size Fits All” policy for its long-distance trainsets is also bizarre. One would expect that Western train consists would swell in the summer months, while Florida bound consists would lengthen significantly in the winter season.

   Amtrak’s culture is one of meetings and seminars, and hiring consultants to produce “studies” for a laissez-faire management that doesn’t want to work to resolve the issues themselves.

   Meanwhile, Amtrak’s lethargic bureaucracy continues to balloon. The agency continues to be a dumping ground for failed bureaucrats and retirees from other government agencies eagerly awaiting retirement. In fact, many already seem to be there.

   This is not a Democratic or Republican partisan issue, rather, it concerns the willingness of elected officials to finally purge Amtrak’s management ranks of Bush-era minions and install new, energetic top leaders who are committed to growth and expansion; whose actions speak louder than words (and their consultants’ reports.)

   Nearly a year after the U.S. election, Amtrak still does not have a corporate Strategic Plan for growth. As of this writing, management still does not have a Fleet Plan in place, nor new equipment on order. Management has become so moribund that Joe Szabo, the recently-appointed Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, recently had to direct Amtrak Acting President Joe Boardman to come up with a Fleet Plan. Hello.

   Amtrak’s Bush-era management team has become more insular and combative, and dismissive of its long term supporters and customers; witness Amtrak’s illegal Photography Ban, perhaps the Boardman Administration’s only “accomplishment” this year. Boardman, a career bureaucrat, disdains individual discussions with media editors and freelance photojournalists concerning Amtrak’s strategic plans and initiatives, and has refused to acknowledge communications from citizens and customers regarding Amtrak’s Photo Ban.

   Change must start from the top, and there are a number of great rail executives who stand ready to lead Amtrak out of its chaos this fall, when Acting President Joseph Boardman’s term is finished. These luminaries include Gene Skoropowski, managing director for California’s Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, the agency responsible for intercity passenger rail service linking Sacramento with the Bay Area. Skoropowski has spearheaded growth and development of intercity and corridor passenger rail in California, including implementation of CalTrain’s “Baby Bullet” trains. Peter Cannito, former Executive Vice President of Engineering at Amtrak, and retired president of Metro North Railroad, brings a wealth of engineering expertise. Dennis F. Sullivan, former Amtrak Executive Vice President, is a seasoned Operations railroader who will bring customer focus to Amtrak. These three individuals form the backbone of a team that will inspire performance among Amtrak employees and get the company moving forward.

   While politics is a necessary aspect of Amtrak’s presidency, it cannot be the only aspect. It is essential now to rebuild Amtrak’s management team, to run the company as a railroad and as a business, to achieve a vibrant and growing national system.

   The U.S. had an extensive passenger rail system until the 1960s, when financial losses caused for-profit railroads to jettison their passenger services. Now that Federal and State governments have begun to accept responsibility for funding a national passenger rail system, there is growing support for breaking the 38-year old Amtrak monopoly on intercity passenger service, and allowing freight railroads and/or private operators to take over Amtrak routes, or even launch new services. This may be the Amtrak Board’s last chance to install competent, growth– and customer– oriented management, or the current groundswell of public and political support for passenger rail— and Amtrak’s monopoly of it— may soon come to an end.

Okay, Amtrak, more and more people in the non-Amworld are wondering what you’re up to; the “business as usual” status quo is no longer acceptable. Do something. The days of laying around and whining about the world being so terribly unfair are over. You’re expected to perform, just like everyone else.

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Volume 6, Number 31

1. The lack of intellectual honesty when preparing reports apparently goes far beyond Amtrak. We know Amtrak’s P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report for restoring passenger rail service east of New Orleans and into Florida was fatally flawed and intellectually dishonest in addition to being insulting to anyone who is serious about passenger rail. Everyone is waiting to see what Amtrak will come up with for the Pioneer route restoration report which was originally due last week, and the North Coast Limited route restoration report which should also be due in the next few months.

   Amtrak has other reports in the hopper, but keeps putting off the release of them declaring they are just too very busy and just can’t get them completed, mostly because the dog ate their homework.

   This space frequently features the work of Ken Orski through Innovation NewsBriefs, from www.innobriefs.com. Here is Volume 20, Number 15, hot off the presses. While Mr. Orski does not specifically refer to Amtrak in his important report, he does reflect what is going on in Washington overall in transportation and the alarming trend of intellectual dishonesty in reports which are allegedly done for the public good.

   August 18, 2009

   A Tendentious Report Has the Transportation Community Up in Arms

   While the nation at large and the political community are consumed by the current debate about health care, another controversy is being played out on a smaller stage but with no less intensity. The object of the controversy is a recently released report entitled “Moving Cooler.” The report, unveiled with great fanfare on July 28 before a large gathering of the Washington environmental community, purports to estimate the potential reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that can be achieved from surface transportation. The report’s authors conclude that a combination of strategies and policy actions involving changes in vehicle and transportation system operations, travel behavior, land use patterns and level of transit service could reduce annual GHG emissions by up to 24 percent from the expected baseline levels in 2050. The authors further maintain that with “strong economy-wide pricing measures” (read, VMT fees and PAYD insurance), annual GHG emissions could be reduced by up to 47 percent.

   The report was commissioned by a group of sponsors and written by a well-known transportation consulting firm, Cambridge Systematics. Sponsors included two environmental advocacy groups (Environmental Defense Fund and Natural Resources Defense Council), several foundations, the American Public Transportation Association, the Urban Land Institute, ITS America, Shell Oil Company and three government agencies – Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit Administration and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), one of the original sponsors, withdrew its support after concluding that the study “did not produce results upon which decision-makers can rely.” Specifically, AASHTO expressed concern that decision-makers could be led to rely on the study’s conclusions “without understanding the drastic steps that would have to be taken” to achieve the promised reductions.

   At an August 13 meeting convened by AASHTO to discuss the report, many of the study assumptions were described as “extreme, unrealistic and in some cases downright impossible.” A list of 37 specific issues challenging the report’s methodology and requiring clarification was presented by a team of researchers that analyzed the study. Transportation professionals reached after the meeting were equally blunt. “This is an advocacy document pure and simple, couched in the form of a pseudo scientific analysis,” one state DOT official told us. Other transportation professionals, speaking on background, criticized the study as “not meeting scientific standards,” “using implausible assumptions,” “failing to adequately disclose key analytical assumptions,” “lacking in objectivity,” ” a deeply flawed analysis,” and “following a questionable peer review process.”

   Precisely what kind of assumptions did the report use to warrant such a severe condemnation? Here is a partial list of measures assumed by the report’s authors that would be needed to achieve the estimated reductions:

   • Institute tolling of all interstate intercity highways throughout the U.S. by next year (2010). Minimum toll would be 5 cents/mile. As the presentation to AASHTO pointed out, this would require immediate Federal legislation to authorize tolls and a massive crash effort to install toll equipment on these highways within the next year. The tolls would likely shift some traffic to other roads and hit rural areas hardest. According to the analysis, a 5 cent/mile toll would be equivalent to increasing the gas tax for interstate trips by $1.10/gallon for vehicles that get 22 MPG and $1.75/gallon for high-efficiency vehicles.
   • Impose congestion pricing in 125 metropolitan areas, at 65 cents per mile. The presentation to AASHTO pointed out that a 20-mile round-trip commute trip would cost an additional $26 each day . Service workers and delivery vehicles could face much higher increased costs. The top 125 metro areas where congestion pricing would be imposed include such small urban areas as Canton, OH; Jackson, MS; Flint, MI; Modesto, CA; Greenville, SC; and Lancaster, PA.
   • Impose or significantly increase parking fees in the CBD and require $400 biennial residential on-street parking permits
   • Reimpose a national 55 mph speed limit
   • Invest $1.2 trillion over 40 years in expanding urban transportation. Increase transit operating subsidies by next year to allow transit fares to be cut by 50% in all regions.
   • Increase highway capacity above the baseline by either $640 billion (“aggressive deployment”) or $1.2 trillion (“Maximum deployment”) over 40 years.
   • Add bike lanes and paths at 1/4 mile intervals in high density areas (more than 2,000 persons/square mile.)
   • Require at least 90% of new development to be in compact, pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly neighborhoods with high quality transit. The report notes that the land use measures “may require strong regional land use planning and oversight agencies,… may result in higher housing prices and…some people might need to live in smaller homes or on smaller lots than they would prefer.”

   While the report’s authors acknowledge in the body of the report that implementing the strategies at their “maximum deployment level” would require a major shift in national attitudes and political will, the presentation and press releases distributed at the July 28 report rollout ignored this caveat. They also ignored the report’s conclusion that lower emission reductions would be achieved at less intensive — and more realistic– levels of deployment. Thus, an impression may have been created, says Allen Biehler, Director of PennDOT and AASHTO’s President, that emission reduction targets in the range of 24 to 52 percent are reasonably achievable. This, in turn, could lead to their adoption in EPA rulemaking and legislation pending in Congress.

   Environmental sources contacted for this story allege that the threat of climate change is no less urgent than the threat of air pollution was 30 years ago, and the means to combat it happen to be largely the same: reduce reliance on and volume of automobile travel, greatly expand public transit, support nonmotorized travel (biking and walking), and change development patterns to achieve more compact “walkable” communities. They had to be reminded that improvements in air quality over the last 30 years have been almost entirely achieved through changes in vehicle and fuel technology and not through changes in travel behavior and land use patterns. Indeed, urban air pollution has been substantially reduced from its 1970s levels despite rising vehicle-miles of travel (VMTs) and continued dispersal of homes and jobs.

   Be that as it may, the present controversy is not about challenging the legitimacy of the emission reduction strategies advocated in the “Moving Cooler” report. It is, rather, about using allegedly flawed analysis and unrealistic assumptions that could mislead policymakers and the public and raise unreasonable expectations about how much progress can be achieved using these strategies. Evidence from the last 30 years shows that “travel demand management” and “smart growth” have been largely ineffective as a means of reducing auto dependency and automobile trips. There is thus good reason to question whether these two strategies, applied in a reasonable manner, would be any more effective in reducing future vehicular-based GHG emissions.

   Lance Neumann, President of Cambridge Systematics, the consulting firm that authored the report, responds:

   Unfortunately, there has been considerable misinformation circulated regarding the Moving Cooler study. Contrary to some reports, Moving Cooler does not advocate for any particular approach to reducing GHGs, nor does it assess the political feasibility or the overall merit of the strategies examined. Rather, it presents estimates of how much GHGs might be reduced for a very large number of measures and under a very wide range of assumptions about how aggressively they are implemented. For Moving Cooler, organizations with varying perspectives were invited to join the steering committee, and members collaborated in selecting the specific measures and the range of implementation assumptions for each measure to estimate strategy effectiveness in reducing GHGs. It is intentional that the implementation aggressiveness of each measure reflected a wide range of assumptions.

   Given the range of measures and implementation scenarios examined, it is not surprising that AASHTO disagrees with some of the assumptions used. Many members of the Steering Committee also disagreed with some of the implementation assumptions that were evaluated. However, there was consensus among Steering Committee members that exploration of the strategies under the range of assumptions defined was a worthwhile exercise to inform public debate. We believe that Moving Cooler provides additional objective information to inform the debate, whether you agree with all of the assumptions or not.

   It should also be noted that, although the study did not explicitly analyze fuel efficiency, it did use for its baseline forecasts more aggressive estimates of future fuel efficiency improvements than were used by the Department of Energy in its forecasts of future fuel efficiency. So, Moving Cooler analyses clearly acknowledge the absolutely critical role of fuel efficiency improvements in reducing GHG emissions.

   Ed. Note: The Steering Committee that Mr. Neumann refers to included representatives of the American Public Transportation Association, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, ITS America, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Shell Oil Company, the Urban Land Institute and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Additional sponsors (but not members of the Steering Committee) included the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Rockefeller Foundation, the Surdna Foundation and The Kresge Foundation.

   Mr. Orski paints a bleak, but factual picture. As anyone who has dealt with Amtrak over the years knows, question everything, challenge everyone, accept nothing at face value. Everyone has an agenda, and the days are gone when reports and other public documents can be factually made without an agenda shining through.

2. More mail continues to come into This Week at Amtrak’s e-mail box. Here is the latest; some of our correspondents like to share their thoughts on what would make Amtrak a better passenger rail system.
   

   Bruce: Report on my recent and annual round trip to Denver from Eugene on the Starlight and Zephyr. I left Eugene on the 2nd of August and left Denver to return on the 9th. I had sleeping car accommodations on all legs. Standard bedrooms (roomette) out and deluxe room on the return.

   Crews: All crews were pleasant, efficient and available when needed. I’d give the crews a 90% plus rating. Dining car crews 95%

   Food: Adequate all things considered, the fish entree was especially good. Am still tired of the plastic plates and paper tablecloths. On the return Starlight on the 11th, I had lunch in the Pacific Parlour Car. A field greens salad with cold steamed green beans, marinated artichoke hearts and a very generous portion of sliced cold beef, well seasoned. Cloth tablecloth, plastic plate. This salad would make the grade at a very good restaurant.

   Equipment: Diner lounge subbed for Parlour Car on the 2nd of August. Wine and cheese tasting now open to anyone on the train, $5 for sleepers and $10 for others. Changes the ambiance a bit, or maybe the idea of first class service.

   On the return trip on the 11th Parlour Car on board. The 24/32 seats at the 6/8 tables for four (can’t remember if its six or eight tables) are not available for card play or other seating until after lunch. They are set for breakfast the night before and set up for lunch as soon as breakfast is over. This only leaves the six cozy chairs and the benches with little bar tables (10 adults max) in the middle, or seating for 16 people until 1:30 or 2 in the afternoon. The car was cleared for the wine and cheese tasting people only on one trip, but not on another trip I took. When a friend and I sat down in mid morning at the tables for four we were informed of the seating ban. The same six people staked out the comfy chairs and sat in them most of the day. The attendant later offered to un-padlock the theater downstairs for us to use.

   We were told at 11:00 P.M. the car was closed until 7:00 A.M. Some card players reluctantly went to their rooms, I went to the “comfy chairs” and read till 1:00 A.M. and was not asked to leave. We were told that after 11:00 P.M. we could go to the lounge car which was open all night (no attendant present). I asked why it closed, was told something about the attendant needing to do paperwork and company policy said it couldn’t be done with passengers present.

   NOW to the main question. If I have my dates correct, the first run of Superliner sleepers were completed in the late 70′s, the second run in maybe 1983? Why has Amtrak not been able correct the problem on a number of the sleepers so the toilets will work above 3,000 feet in elevation? The middle sleeper on both trips had this affliction. A weary attendant a few years ago showed me how to reset the system by turning off the breaker for the waste system in the 480 volt panel, counting to 30 and turning it on again. This will get you from one to eight flushes before the system shuts down again. So I made it a habit to reset the system every time I left my room for some reason, so as to keep passenger dissatisfaction to a minimum.

   Some attendants are good about regularly resetting the system, but others in the past have just told the folks to go to the downstairs toilets in the next car. OK, so I pay $2,000 or so for a long Chicago to Los Angeles trip in the family room downstairs, with an elderly parent, or the handicapped room for that matter. We are leaving Denver at 5,280 feet. I go into the toilet in my room and well you know … I hit the flush button and nothing happens. I am supposed to live with the smell as well as go to the next car the next time all the way to California?

   I wonder over the years how many tickets were refunded and other monetary concessions have been made to compensate for the problem? MY guess is that the money given to folks who will likely never travel by rail again and will bad mouth Amtrak, might have easily paid for the fix of the problem. On my return, the attendant in the middle sleeper told me that for the 15 years he has worked, this particular car has had only one vacuum pump instead of the designed two and a reset will give you just one flush. From what he said, I think he quit writing it up years ago.

   On the positive side, ALL the cars on all four trains were adequately clean and fresh with just a couple of notable quirks. One of the doors in the cafe part of the lounge car didn’t want to stay closed and latched. The attendant came out and hit it with his hip hard enough to latch it, which bowed it in at the latch at least four inches, I was surprised the door still fits at all. The other is a door issue also, on one of the doors to access the mechanism that operates the sliding door between cars, it wouldn’t latch either. Well, I took a photo of the door, but it seems to have disappeared from the camera. It was a list by the attendants who had reported the door and for how many years.

   On time status: Eugene to Martinez: Down 15 minutes to Martinez. I always ride south as far as the schedule allows and my attendant will OK, so I am not in the Sacramento station for as long of a layover. It is about 2.5 hours each way, so that is five less hours layover in Sacramento if you are taking the Zephyr east.

   Martinez to Denver: one hour twenty minutes early into Denver. Detour through Wyoming because of track work in Colorado. I was notified in June for an August trip of the detour which misses the Colorado Rockies. I prefer the Wyoming route because as a kid I was a frequent rider of the City of Portland, Boise to Laramie. Arrived Denver one hour twenty minutes early, would have been close to three hours early if the wandering around the Denver yards to back in hadn’t taken forever.

   Denver to Emeryville: one hour early into Emeryville. Again, through Wyoming. Left Denver Union on time at 8:05 A.M., returned to Denver Union 30 minutes later after the dispatcher in Omaha started us up the track to the regular route. We finally left the Denver yards about 1.3 hours late, but arrived in Salt Lake four hours early with quite a few disgruntled passengers who weren’t told they would miss the Colorado Rocky mountains, though the scenery through Wyoming and the Wasatch Mountains is amazing. Left Salt Lake City on time, were an hour an a quarter early into Winnemucka. Early into Reno about 45 minutes. Held the same over the top and ended up an hour early into Sacramento. We left Sacramento 45 minutes EARLY. Apparently they can do that because of the Capitol Corridor service that gives folks an option south every 20 minutes or so. Into Emeryville an hour early.

   Emeryville to Eugene: On time or early all the way to Oakridge where we lost about 45 minutes, so were a bit late into Eugene.

   On the whole, it was a very pleasant trip for most everyone, I guess except for the folks in the car with the toilets with the altitude challenges. Again, the crews were great, good sense of humor, many with 25 plus years of service. The on time was good for most people, though for myself as long as I don’t miss a connection and they don’t charge me for the extra time onboard, I don’t really care if I am late.

   Post Script: Is the report on the Pioneer that was released on August 10th available on the web somewhere? The Pioneer is the obvious missing diagonal link for passengers from the northwest to the southeast. All we need is a rail link from Denver to LaJunta and the hub would in place.

   The report, originally believed to be out August 10^th, still has not been released.

   Here is a later addition to the above e-mail, from the same correspondent.

   … Actually I started riding the City of Portland when I was six days old in September of 1950. Boise to Laramie two or three times a year ’til 1965. Then back and forth from the University of Wyoming when in college. Liked the Portland Rose also since it took longer.

   My return of the Pioneer dream from years ago was the refurbish of the rest of the El Capitan high level coaches that Amtrak still owned in the 80′s I think? An all coach train would be OK if not great. But, those coaches were full recliners, only, I think, 54 seats per car, Superliners are 70 something I think, but I digress as those cars are long gone.

   I have traveled a lot of Amtrak miles since 1971. Such as it is, it is the only civilized way to travel. I just returned from a Eugene, Oregon (home) to Denver round trip that I take at least once or twice a year. This year the train was routed through Wyoming due to track work in Colorado. That cuts nearly 5 hours off the time to Denver. UP’s track through Wyoming and Utah to Salt Lake City is mostly double tracked and is in fine shape. The scenery is pretty fine.

   OK, my thoughts about the Pioneer (rename it the Portland Rose). It should have guaranteed connections to Portland from Seattle (with checked baggage) to Denver with a RAIL connection to La Junta, Colorado or Raton, New Mexico. This would allow a connection to the Southwest Chief. Currently that connection is made by a bus that leaves Denver at about 6:30 A.M., arrives in Raton at about 10:00 A.M. for an 11:30 departure on the Chief west to Los Angeles at around 11:30 A.M. East at maybe two in the afternoon if I remember right. Going the other way, the Zephyr gets to Denver from the east just a little too late to make the transition to the Chief. Depending on schedules, it then becomes the diagonal link for Seattle to Florida assuming the service east from New Orleans is returned. A note on the Raton, New Mexico/La Junta connection. I was told the New Mexico Rail Runner which currently goes from south of Albuquerque to Santa Fe explored the trackage right with BNSF up through Denver and into Montana. Don’t know how true that is, but the possibilities are great since the north/south routes with Amtrak in the west are almost zero.

   The most important points I see are:

   1. Daily Service
   2. Seattle all the way to Denver through Salt Lake City and Wyoming
   3. Schedules that allow for reasonable connections at Denver with the Chief (via Raton?) and the Zephyr either in Salt Lake City or Denver or both?
   4. Sleepers and full service dining.
   5. Easy access from Nampa to Boise. I think the tracks from Orchard junction to Boise are gone.

   If you look at Amtrak’s U.S. map, the obvious missing link for the whole western system is Seattle to Denver. For me, a trip to Denver takes 50 hours counting layovers through California; 53 hours if I left from Portland. Looking at my 1968 copy of the Official Guide, on the City of Portland, Portland to Denver would be 25 3/4 hours assuming no train changes. If I add in 2.25 hours for Eugene to Portland, that would make 28 hours, making that trip about 25 hours faster. Not really a fair comparison because my old route does not go through Salt Lake City, but takes the Granger cut off, so I shall recalculate. Using the City of St. Louis for Denver to Cheyenne, that is 2.75 hours for 106 miles average speed 38.5 MPH, then Cheyenne to Salt Lake City on the City of Los Angeles, 10.25 hours/519 miles/50.6 MPH, Salt Lake City to Pocatello on the old No. 35 milk train 4.5hours/134 miles/29.7 MPH, Pocatello to Portland on the City of Portland, 13.25 hours/726 miles/54.8 MPH for a total trip, Denver to Portland of 1,585 miles in 30.75 hours for an average speed of 51.5 MPH.

   Just for giggles, I looked up the same route that Amtrak uses today from Portland to Sacramento and Sacramento to Salt Lake City and Salt Lake City to Denver for miles and actual on train time. The results were surprising. We have all heard how padded the Amtrak schedules are and so on. So:

   • Amtrak,  Portland to Sacramento, 637 miles, 16 hours
   • Southern Pacific “Cascade,”  Portland to Sacramento, 715 miles, 15.5 hours
   • Amtrak, Sacramento to Salt Lake City, 745 miles, 16 hours
   • Southern Pacific, “Overland Route,”  Sacramento to Salt Lake City, 18 hours
   • Amtrak, Salt Lake City to Denver, 570 miles, 15.5 hours
   • Denver and Rio Grande “California Zephyr,” Salt Lake City to Denver, 570 miles, 14.25 hours
   • Amtrak – Total Trip, 1,952 miles, 47.5 hours train time, speed 41 MPH
   • SP-D&RGW – Total Trip, 2,014 miles, 47.0 hours train time, speed 42.8 MPH

   I have been curious and wanting to do these calculations for some time, … gave me the impetus to do it. So, then the Pioneer will connect with the Zephyr at Salt Lake City for those connections to Chicago. If there is a checked baggage connection from Denver to Raton or La Junta, that makes Seattle/Denver/St. Louis/New Orleans possible. To me, the eastern missing diagonal link would be St. Louis/Atlanta/Savannah, which makes a decent routing from Seattle to the southern Atlantic coast. Do we dare hope?

   That was fun.

   And, one other TWA correspondent brought up this subject, referring to a TWA published earlier this spring regarding quick fixes to Amtrak’s system.

   Speaking of long-hanging fruit – I mean, really low-hanging fruit – I never understood why the regional trains which terminate in downtown Chicago don’t simply extend their service to O’Hare airport.

   This mainly applies to the Illinois regional trains (but not the Hiawatha), as well as to the Michigan routes which currently terminate at Union Station.

   The trains, which enter the south side of Union Station, could use the tracks at Union Station which are by the river, which then continue north until the tracks connect to the northbound tracks out of Union. From there the trains could follow the Metra route to the O’Hare station, which then requires passengers to take either a short bus ride to the terminals or a shorter ride to the people-mover.

   One would think that there would be quite a market for one-seat service to O’Hare. If inbound Amtrak passenger currently wish to go to O’Hare, they have to detrain downtown and then either take mid-day Metra service (which is generally hourly), take a cab, or hoof it over to the subway. If Amtrak explicitly marketed “One-seat direct from Springfield/Champaign/Grand Rapids/Detroit to O’Hare,” which only adds about 20 minutes to the train trip, I bet ridership would increase, and I bet that the cost would be minimal.

   There has to be a really good reason why Amtrak can’t do this – it seems obvious. If I was running Amtrak I would figure out a way to do this. I wondered if you had any insight.

   For those of us not completely familiar with Chicago and Chicago Union Station, well, this is an interesting idea. Any comments from other readers?

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