It was the last line in the last paragraph which really matters the most. “Amtrak plans to seek other places throughout the country where it can launch other Auto Train services.”

Wow.

Auto Train, in concept and operation, has consistently been a winner, and has huge potential. Apparently, now that Amtrak is out of full-retreat mode, it thinks so, too.

Today’s Auto Train, with daily service between the Washington, D.C. suburb of Lorton, Virginia, and the Orlando suburb of Sanford, has a “cost recovery” ratio at the farebox of 121%, in Amspeak. In the real world, it makes a profit. The current load factor for the Auto Train is 63.6%, up from 50% where it was for years. Considering this train has no intermediate stops, 63.6% makes this train – even though it is (gasp!) profitable – underperforming. Mostly this is due to seasonal migration of cold-weather states denizens and Canadians coming to the warmth of Florida, or those same people escaping our intolerable heat and humidity of the summer for the cooling breezes of northern climates.

Yes, we need more of this, and good for Amtrak to be looking for other route opportunities.

But, now, some thoughts on Amtrak and some opportunities to prove it’s really an organization dedicated to the proliferation of passenger rail and being an honest provider of transportation, not just dedicated to extracting maximum rents from gullible public agencies.

That question has a number of good answers, but we’re going to focus on several easy choices, including extending the Palmetto south from Savannah, Georgia to Jacksonville, Florida; pushing the former Kansas City Mule/current Missouri River Runner services to Omaha, Nebraska; extending the California Zephyr from Emeryville, California to Los Angeles, taking the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, and Crescent to Boston; extending the Capitol Limited to Florida; and turning the pretty-much wasted Heartland Flyer into a real route, extending it on both ends to form a Chicago-Oklahoma City-Fort Worth-San Antonio route.

Originally, the Amtrak planning department opposed the move, saying the only traffic which would be picked up by an extended Palmetto was local traffic between Jacksonville and Savannah, never taking into account the realities of extra frequencies and how much of a traffic generator going from two trains a day to three trains a day produces. The extension started off with a bang, and much to the dismay of Amtrak planners, Jacksonville passengers wanted to go other places than just Jesup, Georgia or Savannah, they wanted to travel to every station along the route, even all the way to New York City! The extension did well for a period of time, and then came the realignment of Florida service, and the Palmetto was extended to Tampa, and given a new name, the Silver Palm. Despite a number of changes, the train continued to do well for over a decade, until yet another realignment and cuts, including the end of Amtrak Express and mail haulage, which was big business for the Silver Palm (Remember, Amtrak managers are judged on how much money they save in a budget, not how much revenue they produce.), and the Silver Palm went away, and the Palmetto returned, this time only to Savannah. The reason, as quoted by an Amtrak spokesman, was Savannah produced better crew turns than Jacksonville, so the train ended there instead of Jacksonville.

Essentially, Amtrak said the needs of passengers were not important, but the needs of the operating department were paramount.

Moving the southern terminus of the Palmetto would cost relatively little; there is already the required crew base in Jacksonville for the train and engine crew and the onboard services crew, no extra equipment would be required, and the only inconvenience would be abolishing the car cleaner jobs in Savannah and moving those jobs to Jacksonville. Also, the hours the Jacksonville station is open would need to be extended. So, the 296 extra train miles a day, and a few extra hours for the Jacksonville station to be opened are the only large considerations. The route matrix of stations increases from 20 stations (including terminals) to 22 stations, adding Jesup, Georgia and Jacksonville. The possible city pair combinations leap from 190 city pairs with 20 stations to 231 city pairs with 22 stations, nicely increasing the travel possibilities. In the final days before the Palmetto was extended to Tampa and renamed the Silver Palm, it was not unusual for the Palmetto to board up to 40 or more northbound passengers in Jacksonville on a daily basis.

As reported in the last edition of TWA, Amtrak says the Palmetto has a cost recovery ratio of 96%; no doubt, with the additional addition of the two new stops that ratio would easily go into the black, which would make the Palmetto profitable, even under Amtrak’s arcane accounting system. The Palmetto has a 51.3% load factor, using only two train sets of one club-dinette, four coaches, and one baggage car.

To recap:

• No extra equipment
• Only 148 additional route miles in each direction
• No extra train and engine crews or onboard services staff (T&E crews on the Silver Meteor already run between Jacksonville and Florence, South Carolina, where the Palmetto’s southernmost crews board on their way to Savannah.)
• Minimal costs to keep the Jacksonville station open longer hours
• Southbound and northbound schedule can remain as is with additional time added in the evening and the morning to accommodate run to Jacksonville
• City pair combination possibilities jump from 190 to 231 city pairs
• Increased frequency makes train travel more attractive for every city along the route because two more stations have been added, including the Jacksonville metropolitan area market of over 1 million souls

What’s not to like about this proposal?

Too many of Amtrak’s current routes begin and end a hubs like Chicago or Los Angeles, but you “can’t get there from here” from anywhere but endpoint hubs, making Amtrak virtually useless for anyone who dares to want to travel in anything but a straight line.

The current fad (as in, hopefully, will go away, like all fads) for Amtrak is to milk money from state governments to run trains which come to a screeching halt at state borders. There is no thought of federalism, or (horrors!) of reducing costs to states (after all, it’s only taxpayer money) by extending state routes and turning them into regional routes. Taking the Missouri River Runners and letting them sprint all of the way from Omaha to Kansas City to St. Louis (and, even into Chicago) creates viable regional connections which provide feeder service from one long distance route to other long distance routes.

Today’s Kansas City-St. Louis service, despite having two daily frequencies, boasts of a depressing 37.4% load factor, carrying 151,700 passengers a year, or just 104 passengers on average per departure. That 37.4% load factor, believe it or not, is based on a train consist of two Horizon coaches and one club-dinette car for one train consist, and three Horizon coaches for the other train consist. Train consists this small are designed for failure and constant government dependance.

If you’re comfortable spending other peoples’ money, and not really caring about financial accountability, it doesn’t matter to you what kind of load factor trains have, just as long as trains run on a route. The three routes involved with hubbing in this concept, the California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, and Texas Eagle, all have better than average load factors, but all have room for improvement. The Zephyr’s is the lowest, at 52.3%, followed by the Chief and Eagle, both at 63.8%. While technically a long distance route is sold out at 65%, both of these trains today are suffering from short equipment consists, so adding a single car to each consist could produce a great amount of revenue for new travelers with better hubbing opportunity and a greater number of city pair combinations.

To recap:

• Create a regional route connecting three (or four) major long distance routes for greater hubbing and matrix benefits; a poor performing, state sponsored route expands into a greater money maker and provides more transportation output
• Route extension is less than 200 miles

Today’s California Zephyr westbound arrives in Emeryville, California from Chicago everyday at 5:10 P.M., and departs eastbound the next morning at 9:10 A.M.

The Coast Starlight makes the run between Emeryville and Los Angeles in just a tad over 12 hours. Adding that travel time onto the schedule of the Zephyr, plus allowing from some station dwell time, would permit the westbound Zephyr to depart Emeryville at 6 P.M., and arrive in Los Angeles before the morning rush hour, anywhere from 6:30 to 7:30 A.M. Departing eastbound, the Zephyr could depart Los Angeles in the middle of the evening sometime beyond 7:30 P.M., and be in Emeryville for the scheduled departure back to Chicago at 9:10 A.M., allowing a full 12 hours in Los Angeles for the train to be cleaned and maintained, all during daylight hours.

One extra train set would be required for this extension. The major benefit from this extension would be a full second frequency, offering overnight service, between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area, two giant California markets. Not only would this relieve some pressure from the Coast Starlight, but it would also increase travel possibilities, opening up a huge vista of passenger opportunities.

The city pair combinations for single train travel skyrocket from 561 city pairs on the current California Zephyr route to 946 city pair possibilities when you add the 10 stations in California south of Emeryville and down to Los Angeles. The California Zephyr has a load factor of 52.3%, with plenty of room to grow. It runs with one baggage car, one transition dorm/sleeper, two sleepers, one lounge car, a diner, and three coaches.

To recap:

• One extra trainset
• Second frequency, providing desirable overnight service on a highly popular route with high revenue potential on a full service train
• No new stations, but many stations will have to extend hours for an overnight stop
• Two additional train and engine crews, one additional onboard services crew
• Allows California Zephyr to have turn maintenance and restocking at full Los Angeles maintenance base instead of smaller maintenance base in Emeryville
• Existing California Zephyr schedule remains as is, with additional running added before and after present schedule times

Take the whole bunch, and push them each to Boston, including the Lake Shore Limited, while keeping the separate Boston section, but setting it up as it’s own Boston-Chicago train as a second frequency between Boston, Albany/Rensselaer, and Chicago. All cities along the Northeast Corridor are horribly under served by Amtrak trains going east-west. It would require no extra equipment for any of these trains.

Boston is already servicing the Boston section sleepers of the Lake Shore, and has a full turn maintenance base today, so moving each of these trains to Boston from New York will only impact the onboard services crews of the Lake Shore and Crescent, as the Meteor and Star are staffed by the Miami Crew Base.

Since all of the track on the NEC between New York and Boston is either owned by Amtrak or Metro North, pushing these trains north is not a major consideration, and each train can keep its current schedule, just adding time before and after the current schedule for running between Boston and New York.

Amtrak for decades has had an unsavory habit, except during the Christmas season, of running long distance trains on the NEC as “receive” or “discharge” only, preventing local business between New York and Washington. No matter what excuse may be given about time keeping, quick movement on the corridor, or, Amtrak’s favorite – the dog ate its homework – the only reason this is done is to funnel local revenue to Acela and Northeast regional trains instead of the long distance trains. With proper yield management in place, this receive/discharge system could be abolished, and passengers wishing to travel on a full service train with a complete dining car and private sleeping car accommodations could be filling empty spaces (particularly northbound) on these trains and adding to both food and beverage revenues and accommodations up charge revenues.

As with other routes, the city pair combinations for same train service, by adding either the Shore Route or the Inland Route between Hartford, Connecticut and Boston go up dramatically.

On the matter of sending the Lake Shore from Penn Station in New York directly to Boston, this merely creates a desirable “L” shaped route, which suddenly provides the passengers along the New York-Boston section of the NEC with more travel choices without having to change trains.

On the other side of the coin, by creating a new train between Boston and Chicago via Albany/Rensselaer (such as the old New York Central train, the New England States), this ploy requires only additional dining cars, and, most likely, more coaches to keep up with the increased demand in business because of a second frequency along the current Lake Shore Limited route. The current consist of the Boston section of the Lake Shore is one baggage car, one sleeper, one Horizon food service car, and two coaches.

Today’s Lake Shore Limited sits for 12 hours in Chicago before it heads back east, and the Boston section lays over for 14 hours on the east end. By keeping the current Lake Shore schedule (or, perhaps, departing Chicago 60 or 90 minutes earlier, the new Boston train could depart Chicago an hour later, providing the major metropolitan city of Cleveland, Ohio with a more marketable eastbound train time, from the current 5:05 A.M. to a slightly more civilized 6:00 A.M. and still arrive in Boston before late night because of eliminating the extra time in Albany for switching from one train to two trains. The same theory holds true westbound; by leaving Boston a bit earlier than its current noon departure, and eliminating the switching time of combining two trains into one, the new train from New England could be in Cleveland closer to midnight than 3:27 A.M., and still be in Chicago after 7:00 A.M.

Let’s stop for a moment, and veer to the right. If you’re a resident of Cleveland, and want to ride the train, you better be a night owl. Cleveland’s Terminal Tower downtown station at one time was one of the busiest stations in the country, with dozens of trains serving this major northern city. Today, Cleveland is only served by the Lake Shore Limited and the Capitol Limited. The Capitol’s Cleveland times aren’t much better than the Lake Shore’s, arriving westbound at 1:55 A.M., and eastbound at 2:48 A.M., all at a relatively small Lakefront station. Even though the Ohio legislature and governor’s office are working on creating a new Three C Corridor of Cleveland-Columbia-Cincinnati, that will only provide daylight service, and the southern terminus of that route will be in Cincinnati, which at the moment is only served (you guessed it) in the middle of the night by the tri-weekly Cardinal running between New York, Washington, and Chicago. Cleveland and Ohio all deserve better than what Amtrak has provided lo these many years.

As said before in this space, the most efficient answer to the problem of providing any type of adequate service to Cincinnati is to do what the Commonwealth of Virginia has done with its two new trains – extend an existing NEC train over the route of the Cardinal between Washington and Cincinnati. Amtrak has two daily trains which originate in New York before 6 A.M.; either of these trains extended to Cincinnati would arrive well before the Cardinal does at 1:03 A.M., not only providing a second frequency along this very scenic route, but bolstering the fortunes of the Cardinal, which Amtrak has indicated next year it will look at making a daily train. A return eastbound train from Cincinnati could launch from its terminal anytime after 7:00 A.M. and provide good daylight service until close to arriving in Washington, D.C.

On the west end of the route in and out of Chicago, the Hoosier State operates on days the Cardinal does not, on the same schedule. Once the Cardinal goes daily, again, an opportunity opens for the Hoosier State to operate from Chicago earlier in the afternoon than it does now (about mid afternoon) and still arrive in Cincinnati before midnight, with the return westbound train leaving Cincinnati early in the morning during daylight hours and arriving in Chicago mid afternoon. This also provides the major city of Indianapolis with much improved passenger train service.

But, back to the issue at hand, moving the northern terminus of all east coast long distance trains from New York City to Boston.

To recap:

• No additional equipment needed, except for fleshing out a new Boston-Chicago train by adding a diner and a couple of coaches because of added passenger demand
• Minimal changes in crew bases; moving the Crescent food service crew base from New York to Boston, and moving the Lake Shore Limited crew base from New York to Boston. Boston already has a major crew base. No additional onboard services crews on existing trains, and only minimal additions for new Boston-Chicago train
• Additional train and engine crews needed between New York and Boston, and 231 route miles added to each train between New York and Boston
• Better equipment utilization instead of train consists having long layovers in New York’s Sunnyside Yard. No schedule changes south of New York City
• Passengers better served by single train service for entire east coast to Boston; elimination of receive/discharge restrictions north of Washington allows for these trains to be better financial performers, and provide a new array of choices for local passengers on NEC
• No additional stations costs

Extend the train down the former Atlantic Coast Line route of CSX via Rocky Mount, North Carolina and Charleston, South Carolina, and terminate the train at Orlando (Tampa would be better), making use of the excellent Auto Train maintenance facility in adjacent Sanford, just as the Sunset Limited in brighter days used the Auto Train maintenance facility.

Keeping close to the current Capitol Limited schedule would provide a civilized 9 A.M. or so arrival in Orlando, perfect for starting the day in America’s family vacation capital. The return train would leave Orlando after 9 P.M., and resume the northbound Capitol schedule in Washington. Since the current misuse of equipment for the Capitol Limited takes three trainsets, this change would only require one extra trainset, and would most importantly resume through train service between Chicago, the Midwest, and Florida without blazing any new trails (or having an expensive reopening of any old trails). Since the route between Washington and Orlando is already served by both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star as well as the Palmetto (see above), the addition of a Florida-bound Capitol Limited would provide and additional popular frequency feeding passengers into Orlando from the Midwest with through-train service.

An extended Capitol Limited would provide good marketing hours for major stops south of Washington, such as Richmond, Virginia; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Florence, South Carolina.

To recap:

• Requires one additional set of equipment, and makes more efficient use of current three sets of equipment which now have long, unprofitable layovers; also more efficient use of onboard services crews
• No new stations or new routes
• Provides single-train service from Chicago and the Midwest to Orlando, Florida
• Makes more efficient use of Auto Train maintenance facility
• Adds to frequencies on popular east coast routes to Florida
• Combined with previously mentioned concepts such as extending the City of New Orleans east and south to Orlando, extending the Capitol Limited, too, would create a pair of strong services between the Midwest and Florida, with each train complementing the other, and creating huge matrix theory opportunities

It takes one trainset of two Superliner coaches and one Superliner snack coach for this toy route, and the State of Oklahoma pays Amtrak millions of dollars to operate this train on its behalf. The Heartland Flyer generates $1,680,500 in revenue, with ridership of 80,900 passengers per year, or an average of 111 passengers per departure. The load factor, typical of a short run such as this, is 43%, even with a very short consist of equipment.

There has been a good movement afoot, including the state governments of Oklahoma and Kansas, to expand this microcosm of passenger railroading to something useful that has half a chance of being financially successful in the process.

The Heartland Flyer needs major surgery, in two easy steps. Get rid of its base in Fort Worth, and extend the southern terminus of the train either southwest to San Antonio (providing a much-needed second frequency between Fort Worth and San Antonio), or southeast to Houston via Dallas, restoring a long-lost Amtrak route which would reconnect by rail the two largest metropolitan areas in Texas.

The second easy step is to extend the Heartland Flyer northward to Newton, Kansas (on the route of the Southwest Chief, and, coincidentally the near exact middle of the continental United States) and take the train to Kansas City or, even better, to Chicago or St. Louis.

These two easy steps turn the Heartland Flyer from a nearly-useless and tragically expensive stub route into a powerhouse route serving major metropolitan markets and important intermediate stops, and, just as importantly, connects discreet existing routes with new travel opportunities so “you can get there from here” without having to go around the Horn of Africa.

Concepts such as this take money-losing routes like the Heartland Flyer and turn them into real transportation providers, ignoring invisible boundaries falsely built by near-sighted executives who only seek to raid government treasuries instead of completing Amtrak’s real mission of being a truly national passenger railroad company.

To recap:

• Expands a poor-performing local route into a strong regional route
• Connects two other long distance routes and major metropolitan areas through hubbing which has not previously been possible
• Provides real transportation alternatives in lieu of what is essentially a high cost local train which provides no real transportation output
• As a stand-alone route, the Heartland Flyer has 21 possible city pair combination. Combining the Heartland Flyer and its present connection to the Texas Eagle brings the city par combinations up to 1,128; extending this train and connecting it to the Southwest Chief route in Kansas explodes the number of city pair combinations to 3,160, a huge jump from the 21 combinations on the present route.

Here are a couple of ways to look at this.

First, Amtrak has taken a proactive approach to ending the days of the Sunset being an unacceptable tri-weekly train, stuck with most of the overhead of a daily train but not with the earning potential. The extension of the Texas Eagle to Los Angeles and making it daily all the way with a new name such as resurrection of the respected “Golden State” name (formerly of the Rock Island Railroad) makes senses, because, as Amtrak has said, that has the greatest potential for earning revenue.

While the creation of a second daily train on a daylight schedule to replace the Sunset between San Antonio and New Orleans is offensive to some because it will require a cross-platform change for those traveling all the way from Los Angeles to New Orleans, at least this – again – gets rid of unacceptable tri-weekly service and puts daily service on the line to important cities like Houston, Texas, and the many smaller cities between Houston and New Orleans. Amtrak has also speculated it will provide through-car service all the way from Los Angeles to New Orleans when more equipment is available through being rescued from the wreck line and re-manufactured at Beech Grove in Indiana. Since Amtrak has already restored the Boston sleeping car to the Lake Shore Limited, this bolsters confidence Amtrak is looking at concepts that work, and understands the strength of through-car business.

And, Amtrak openly saying it will take some of the surplus sleepers from today’s Sunset after it is reconfigured and put them elsewhere where strong demand exists so it can capture the revenue from these cars is not only revolutionary coming from Amtrak, but highly welcome.

The second way to look at this is Amtrak has cut and run from the constant bickering over the Sunset Limited name being used as a poster boy for bad management by both politicians and the news media, and is looking to replace what was once America’s only true transcontinental route with three trains (including whatever happens east of New Orleans) that has more consideration for Amtrak’s operating and maintenance departments than the comfort and convenience of its passengers.

A third alternative was offered this week by the prestigious and highly respected Passenger Train Journal magazine, with a full article on how to “fix” the Sunset Limited, complete with reroutings and restructuring so the train has more major metropolitan areas to serve, and better connections with other trains.

Since Passenger Train Journal, along with Progressive Railroading, are the two most important and credible national magazines regarding railroading, it’s tough to ignore what PTJ has to say without some serious discussions.

No matter how you choose to look at the fate of the Sunset, there have been howls of protest from some who simply want what is there now with some improvements, and nothing more. But, these howls overlook the fact Amtrak is taking a critical look at much of its long distance system and attempting to fix some problems which have long needed fixing. While almost any changes to the Sunset as we know it today other than taking it daily are sure to be painful, it’s important to look at the big picture regarding the Sunset and seeking what is the best solution from a combination of interests, including financial, passenger services, and the ability of Amtrak to offer a worthwhile service. The way the Sunset is today accomplishes none of those goals. A changed and/or reborn Sunset under a new name has a chance to accomplish those goals, even if it takes some getting used to by those of us on the ground.

Whereas the Rail Passenger Association of California is deeply concerned that there has been no new investment in rolling stock for the Coast Starlight, Sunset Limited, California Zephyr and Southwest Chief (the western overnight trains) since 1991, and

Whereas currently up to 95% of Amtrak’s capital investments go to the North East Corridor trains and infrastructure, and

Whereas there is a growing demand for rail passenger travel and these western trains are often sold out, and

Whereas old equipment is expensive to maintain, is subject to mechanical failure, and is unattractive to passengers, and

Whereas without new investment these trains and other routes will eventually be withdrawn for want of serviceable equipment,

Therefore the Rail Passenger Association of California calls upon the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) to meet its obligation to provide a national network by allocating a reasonable proportion of its capital investment budget to purchase new coaches, sleeping cars and dining cars for the western overnight trains, to a common design that can also be used for corridor services.

Amen.

Before you start any conversation about the above suggestions, keep in mind, even after Amtrak funds the repairs to wrecked equipment through stimulus funds, there will still be another 200 or so pieces of equipment which can be repaired and put into revenue service. It’s all just a matter of priorities and how much desire Amtrak has to fulfill its mandate to provide a true national system of passenger trains, or its present plan to suck as much money as possible out of government treasuries while providing the least amount of service.

Looking at Amtrak’s route map, we see a lot of long trunk lines, with relatively few hub opportunities. Each current Amtrak route seems designed for travelers going in only one direction, with little thought that someone may independently want to get there from here, beyond where Amtrak believes they should travel.

Dallas and Houston, Texas are a prime example. Amtrak serves both cities, which are the two largest cities in Texas. While Amtrak does offer a convoluted Thruway bus/train connection between the two cities, the choice is not only unappealing, but clumsy, and involves a 15 hour overnight layover in Longview, Texas.

Essentially, to get from Dallas to Houston by train, one must travel 315 miles from Dallas, at 12:20 P.M., to San Antonio on the Texas Eagle, arriving at San Antonio at 10:35 P.M. On Tuesday, Friday, and Sunday mornings (since the Sunset Limited is only operated tri-weekly) our Dallas to Houston traveler boards the Sunset in San Antonio at 1 A.M. and continues on an additional 210 miles to Houston, arriving at 5:45 A.M. Our traveler has gone 525 miles during a period of almost 17 and a half hours. Driving the route, according to the American Automobile Association, would take a few minutes less than four hours, and be a distance of 238 miles. Only the most fanatical rail fan would consider a trip such as this instead of finding an easier and more productive way to travel.

One of the greatest challenges for reforming Amtrak’s corporate thinking is to eliminate the urge to create new long lines, and, instead start connecting the existing lines at more places.

The Northeast Corridor is another prime example of this thinking. Here’s a startling statement: the Northeast is actually under-served by Amtrak. The bulk of Amtrak’s northeast service goes only north and south, with little consideration for east and west (although, granted, it’s tough to go east when you’re living in an Atlantic Ocean port city). The same holds true in the Northeast as it does for much of the rest of the country for Amtrak: a passenger railroad which boasts over 500 destinations, and you often “can’t get there from here” seems to be the norm.

The Sunset Limited filled a great part of Amtrak’s historic gap between New Orleans and Florida from 1993 until the fateful day in 2005 Hurricane Katrina roared ashore and devastated everything in its wake. The hardy souls of the Gulf Coast and immediate surrounding areas have worked hard in these intervening months rebuilding their homes and businesses. CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Canadian National railroads raced against the clock to restore their infrastructures to help in the rebuilding of the region. An amazing amount of work was completed as railroads played their historic role as the primary movers of a nation when crisis arose. But, wait, one railroad, which could play a vital role in helping reshape the travel market to this region has been absent without leave. Yes, Amtrak has given the Gulf Coast a cold shoulder and refused to restore the Sunset Limited to its route east of New Orleans, citing a number of “the dog ate my homework” reasons for not participating in this process. Private enterprise and charitable organizations rolled up their sleeves and made things happen on the Gulf Coast. Amtrak stole quietly away into the night. Have these people no shame?

Amtrak apologists and cultists are the first to whine about Amtrak’s skeletal national system. They want more. There should be more, but the skewed traditional thinking that Amtrak “is doing the best it can under the circumstances” is wrong. Also, even worse, “just give Amtrak more money and everything will be fine,” is such a false mantra the phrase should be banned from the national lexicon. Amtrak doesn’t need more money, it needs more vision and “can do” spirit to help itself.

Despite uninformed opinion to the contrary, the best steward and leader Amtrak ever had was the late Graham Claytor in the 1980s and early 1990s. Under Mr. Claytor, Amtrak operated more trains to more places at more times than any other period in Amtrak’s history. More new equipment came online and more routes were expanded than ever before, or since then.

Since his retirement, every succeeding Amtrak president (Except the present one, Alexander Kummant) has found a need to shorten or eliminate trains, close stations, downgrade services, or need more free federal monies and state monies.

Amtrak’s current leadership seems to be breaking free from the destructive planning shackles of the past. There is a need for passenger trains across America, but more than ones going short distances in and out of major cities.

The needs of CSX must be taken into account along with the viability of marketing any route. The CSX I-95 corridor route through Florence is one of the busiest pieces of railroad in the country. By creating a route that only uses that railroad for 148 route miles, it creates a much less demanding scenario on the CSX infrastructure. Just as important, Columbia, South Carolina, that state’s capital city, has been grossly under served for passenger business since the beginning of Amtrak in 1971. The metro area population of Columbia is 576,000, and project to grow over 7% annually for the next five years.Since this train would be a run of only less than 14 hours, the ideal consist would be one locomotive, one baggage car, one premium coach, one food service car, and three to five coaches, depending on demand. This would be an inexpensive train to operate in terms of crew and equipment, since only two trainsets would be required, both maintained in Miami, the current Florida maintenance base. Columbia, like today’s Savannah which has a small turn maintenance and cleaning base for today’s Palmetto, would need these minimal services.

In 1993, before the dreaded days of the common consist in Florida and reduced train capacity, the Central Florida stations did well.

Statistics for passengers entraining and detraining at the stations are:

Other stations served by this route and also the routes of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star included:

Today, those same stations, with a combination of only the Silver Meteor and Silver Star from Winter Haven, south (plus Jacksonville to the North) have these ridership figures:

Here are the differences between FY 1993 and FY 2006 for those same stations:

† Includes loss of Sunset Limited passengers; data not available to break out Sunset counts.

Total passenger loss measuring FY 1993 versus FY 2006: 192,822 passengers just from the state of Florida – a 41% decrease.

These are passengers Amtrak has willingly abandoned and said it is not interested in their patronage or revenue. The number of passengers lost only on this route is comparable to today’s passenger count for the entire route of the Capitol Limited between Washington, D.C. and Chicago.

We are contemplating re-establishing a route of 643 miles, of which 452 of those route miles are currently in use for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and the stations on the remaining 191 miles of former trackage through Ocala are all still in operation for Thruway bus connections. Therefore, this proposed service would require no new stations or station personnel because the trains would operate during daylight hours.

Estimated operating costs for this train (locomotives, cars, maintenance, crews, etc.) are $11,265,360. Estimated passenger revenue for this train, based on revenue passenger mile income on a similar train, the Palmetto, average length of trip, load factors, and backing out possible Sunset Limited passenger counts in the figures above are $11,585,000, which would put the train at breakeven or into a small profit. Further benefit from this train would include the lowering of infrastructure expenses for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star (sharing of station and maintenance facility costs), plus the expansion of offerings of more travel times on the joint portions of the route, and the opening up of South Carolina stations to daylight travel times. Considering the normal jump in business when a second or third frequency is offered, and a larger travel matrix is created, it is not unreasonable to consider another $2 million in ticket revenues for all of the Florida trains as a result of the addition of this one route. Therefore, this route would contribute to lowering Amtrak’s annual assigned operating loss on the national system, provide more travel opportunities at better times for many formerly busy stations, and use all existing stations and existing surplus equipment.

In addition to the suggestion in the last issue of TWA to extend the Palmetto to Tampa, how about – again, using existing stations and maintenance bases used for other purposes – creating a new route which connects the busy area of North Carolina around the metropolitan Charlotte area with Columbia, South Carolina, Savannah, Jacksonville, the vacation hotspot of Orlando, and Tampa? This would be an all daylight run of about 14 hours.

Charlotte already has a turn maintenance and crew base for the Carolinian and Piedmont trains, so that problem is solved. CSX has good track that runs about 75 miles from Charlotte to Hamlet, North Carolina, a station stop on the route of the Silver Star. Following the logic of above, continue south down the former Seaboard line from Hamlet to Columbia, over to Savannah, travel the 148 route miles between Savannah and Jacksonville on the busy CSX main line, and then take the current route of the Silver Star from Jacksonville to Tampa, via Orlando. All but 75 miles of the route between Charlotte and Hamlet would be existing route miles of the Silver Star, and would all be run in daylight, which would provide a welcome additional frequency between expanding areas of the Carolinas with the tourism areas of Florida, plus all of Florida’s most densely populated areas outside of South Florida.This route would consist of 675 miles connecting six major metropolitan areas. The size and makeup of the train, and marketing and expense and revenue characteristics would be very similar to the scenario outlined above for the restored train via Ocala and Columbia. The only difference would be the need to establish a full maintenance base in Tampa (where, if the Palmetto is extended to this needed destination, turn maintenance would already be performed there, so upgrading to full maintenance would not be significant or expensive).

Again, the same variables come into account: the more frequencies on a route, the greater the multiplication factor for new passengers kicks in because of greater travel choices and more destinations.

By opening up the route of the Crescent with a direct connection to Florida’s best destinations via Charlotte and Columbia, a number of factors automatically come into play which drives higher passenger counts, creates a better route matrix, and more revenue opportunities at lower expenses.

A reasonable substitute – which, again, uses all existing stations and only requires two extra sets of equipment – is extending the Capitol Limited to Tampa via Raleigh, Columbia, and Orlando.

This extension would require six sets of equipment (versus three for today’s Capitol Limited between Chicago and Washington), with no real alteration in the Capitol Limited schedule. A train would depart Chicago about 7 P.M. on a Monday night, and arrive in Orlando and Tampa on Wednesday morning well before noon. This would entail two nights of running in each direction, totaling about 38 hours for a run, not much more than the City of Miami or South Wind took via Birmingham or Louisville. The difference is those trains departed Chicago in the early morning hours, 12 hours before the Capitol would depart today.This new route made of two existing routes, which could be run with all Superliners, includes a host of major markets by combining the Capitol Limited and Silver Star routes, plus adds additional frequencies to the Star route, providing even greater opportunities, and requires no new stations or additional station personnel.

Tampa, again, serves as an ideal turn maintenance terminal. When the Sunset Limited finally returns to Florida, it could easily be naturally extended from Orlando to Tampa, joining the Capitol Limited at a Florida Superliner maintenance turn base.The economics for this extension are strong. Nine hundred and ninety-eight additional route miles are added to the Capitol’s running in each direction, but these miles are covered by only three additional trainsets (two additional sets would not provide sufficient turn time in Tampa if a train was remarkably late). The new, extended train would cost an estimated $23,300,000 a year to operate. It would have estimated revenues of $30,000,000, including the current Capitol and the extended portion. All of the equipment needed to add the three additional trainsets is currently in the Amtrak active pool of equipment.

An alternate suggestion is a long-sought URPA concept of extending the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando and Tampa. This would require two additional sets of Superliner equipment. To make the transformation complete, the City should be extended on the north end from Chicago to Detroit.

The extension of the Capitol Limited, because of the major metropolitan markets it serves on its present route, make this train a first choice to extend to Florida in front of the City of New Orleans, from a strictly marketing standpoint. In an ideal world, both trains should run into Florida, serving Orlando and Tampa, without question or hesitation.

First, make it a daily train, and extend the eastern terminus from New York City to Boston. On the eastern end on the NEC several things can quickly be accomplished.Instead of an eastbound departure from Chicago at 5:45 P.M., move that departure back to about 9 P.M. This would create a better marketing time at Cincinnati, run through all of the attractive mountain scenery in West Virginia and Virginia during daylight hours, and put the train into Washington, D.C. about 9:15 P.M. Remember, this is a train with Viewliner sleeping cars. Have the Cardinal replace today’s NEC regional train number 66, which operates from Newport News, Virginia to Boston.

Operate 66 from Newport News to Washington on its present schedule, arriving in Washington at 8:25 P.M. Attach 66 to the back of the Cardinal, and have the combined train follow the current schedule of train 66 to Boston, arriving in Boston at 7:52 A.M. This will recreate an overnight train with sleeping cars between Washington and Boston, eliminate duplicate running, crew, and other operating costs between Washington and New York City of the Cardinal, and extend the reach and desirability of the Cardinal to Boston without changing any station hours or adding other expenses. As suggested in the last issue of TWA, if the Silver Star is logically extended from New York City to Boston, this would place two trains with Viewliners into the same maintenance base for shared costs and needs.

The reverse schedule would put the Cardinal out of Boston on train number 67′s current schedule at 9:45 P.M., and into Washington at 7 A.M., again breaking away the Newport News section of the train and sending it on its way as a separate train. The ongoing Cardinal would again spend the day going through the scenic mountains of Virginia and West Virginia, into Cincinnati before midnight, and return to Chicago before 9 A.M.

By taking the Cardinal daily, the Hoosier State, the Cardinal’s companion train which operates between Chicago and Indianapolis on days the Cardinal does not run, could have a restrung schedule which would put it out of Chicago earlier in the afternoon, and run all the way to Cincinnati instead of Indianapolis before midnight. The return train would be an all daylight train, providing a second frequency schedule between Chicago and Cincinnati. This will only serve to increase traffic demand on both trains by providing more travel options through a second frequency on this part of the route.

The Cardinal carried only 95,100 passengers in FY 2006, based on tri-weekly service. That amounts to only 305 passengers per departure. Taking a train daily from tri-weekly does not dilute the present passenger base, but, instead makes it stronger because of the availability of more travel options. By making the Cardinal daily, the annual ridership would probably soar to at least 223,000 passengers (not counting the enhanced passenger base from the addition of passengers from train numbers 66 and 67, which is not made available).

Based on FY 2006 revenue of $5,552,700, new revenue projections would go to an estimated $13,000,000, if not higher. Expenses for the route would not increase at the same level as revenues because most base costs, such as station costs, would not increase. The additional train miles of 922 miles for the Washington-Chicago part of the trip for four additional days of operation, plus the costs of one additional trainset will not dramatically increase the expenses of the route. The loss of the costs of operating an entire train between Washington and Boston, train numbers 66 and 67, greatly reduce the expense of extending the Cardinal up the NEC. Making the Cardinal daily, replacing the current train numbers 66 and 67 with a train with sleeping cars and a diner, and restringing the schedule to make it more appealing to viewing mountain scenery in the daytime, plus adding a second frequency between Chicago and Indianapolis and Cincinnati make this proposal one which can again add to the company’s bottom line by creating more revenue than expenses.