This week we look first at Amtrak’s slow pace, then at continued nationwide wrong-think surrounding Amtrak’s new venture into high speed rail; and we wrap up with a guest commentary by our Andrew C. Selden.

“In the unlikely event of a cabin depressurization, oxygen masks will appear overhead. Reach up and pull the mask closest to you, fully extending the plastic tubing, fasten the straps, and begin breathing normally…  If you are seated next to a small child or someone needing assistance, secure your own mask first, then assist the child.”

– Airplane safety announcement

Consider a dramatization of the above starring Amtrak’s Joseph Boardman as the passenger, and network expansion as the child. Faced with the upcoming depressurization of its system through aging equipment, Amtrak is now in the process of securing its own mask with an equipment order.  This is no little feat, but Congress still holds the strings. The mask isn’t even on yet, and as the air drains away, what are the prospects for the little form in the next seat?

Readers of This Week have had plenty to say about Amtrak’s progress, or lack thereof. Charles McMillan wrote:

I just finished reading your March 31st issue and I have just visited the two universities in Montana, Meeting with Faculty/Students/Staff and interested local citizens who want to see the restoration of the North Coast Hiawatha reinstated. In fact the consensus is to pretty much take the bull by the horns and get America back to the forefront of technology and world leadership in all areas of Science and Business. They are very adamant about this!

Their desire for Amtrak to get off of this NEC mentality and get a nation wide rail passenger system in place is unparalleled. They are disgusted with Joe Boardman and the  attitude of the present board of directors in this regard, because they see no real growth on the part of Amtrak in the form of expanding routes around the country. They keep asking “how much growth in ridership can Amtrak realize just by operating their present routes without adding more trains,coaches or service”? “Can’t they (Amtrak) see that expansion is the key to real growth.”  These are some of the thoughts of the general public and our Univesity system students.

We are continuing to garner support for this N.C.H. train all across the northwest including Minnesota.

Jerry Sullivan echoes a sentiment of frustration at,

Amtrak’s absolute refusal to restore the Sunset, or even a connecting train, to Florida.  The only train I rode regularly was the Sunset prior to August 2005, and I have not been on a train since, except for excursions.  Amtrak has become irrelevant; although I despise flying, Southwest Airlines is now my forced choice until Amtrak gets off their backside on the Sunset issue.

Until last year’s flawed Gulf Coast report is revisited and corrected, and until enough new — not just replacement — equipment is available, probably nothing will happen. Amtrak may be the only company whose product is desperately wanted by everyone but refuses to offer more of it.

As to markets and expansion, Christopher Parker noted, in reference to the speed comparison table:

[At that time,] top speeds were held by limiteds that were mostly overnight sleepers, a market [ceded] to the airlines… You should be comparing today’s trains to the stopping [all-stop local] trains of old.  The other factor is we live in a more open and safety conscious world – routine disregard of speed limits is impossible now, as are top speeds over 79mph without automatic train-stop.

I wonder if railroads had the regulative freedom to run very fast if the fate of the passenger train would have turned out differently.  Speed makes a huge difference in staying competitive.  With some exceptions (IC), today’s top speeds aren’t much different.

True, after a number of accidents fifty years ago, legislation was passed that did limit train speeds.  Modern safety devices warrant revisiting those speeds, as does the pending implementation of Positive Train Control, along with satellite, GPS, wireless technology, and computer control. There must be an equilibrium point of higher speeds versus construction and maintenance costs.  How to implement a mixing of relatively high speed passenger trains in an era of double-stack containers and long unit coal trains is no easy task, but a worthwhile one. Mr. Parker suggests, that with good track and “cheap technology to detect open switches, dark territory should be good for 70-79 mph.”

And while railroads no longer have the monopoly on business travel, but European experience suggests there is plenty of market here for a slogan like “we are your rolling hotel.”  A businessman at a conference in Phoenix could have a late dinner, board the midnight sleeper, and be in downtown Los Angeles by morning in plenty of time for a 9am meeting.  Mr. Parker responds, “Let’s start by getting sleepers back on the [Washington-Boston] Night Owl or whatever they call it now.” Could not be repeated across the country?

Amtrak’s newest focus is on high speed rail.  As yet they have little involvement in most of the pending projects, so let us see the fine mess they are getting into.

Over the last few weeks we have compared Wisconsin’s pragmatic expansion approach to Florida’s Bullet Train That Doesn’t Connect (Daniel Carleton, 23 March 2010).  We will look at Colorado’s venture into high speed rail in a moment, but first consider the California high speed project, which started some years ago along the lines of the Florida fiasco. Each refinement, we are pleased to report, generally tended toward a more logical approach. Maglev was eliminated in favor of compatible steel-wheel technology, permitting shared rights-of-way and stations. Nevertheless, room for improvement still exists in the “Plays well with others” department:

In a letter dated 23 March 2010, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) ask the California High Speed Rail Authority (CAHSRA) to please revisit and consider “a rational shared use option in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment of the CAHSRA project… In November of 2009, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued its first High Speed Passenger Rail Safety Strategy which provides a strategy for the development of shared use corridors. We believe this safety strategy has direct applicability to” the L.A.-Anaheim corridor and they point out that “reports prepared by the CAHSRA staff and consultants did not contemplate any discussion of the rationalization of passenger services in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment… [part of] the second busiest passenger rail corridor in the nation… we would like to make these services more coordinated and integrated.”

One could well read this as a formal, polite way of saying, “You’re doing it wrong,” and one does wish that high speed trains, where they are built in this country, integrate with local trains and transit as well as they do in Germany, for example.  In Germany they have even figured out how to run a streetcar into a regular train station, where you might see one on the platform alongside an ICE high-speed train.  If the Germans can master the engineering and those safety features to give easy cross-platform transfers, why can’t we?

Meanwhile at the northern end of that California corridor, the San Francisco Chronicle reported on April 3rd that Caltrain, facing “plummeting sales tax revenues and shrinking ridership” could be forced “to eliminate its midday, night and weekend service, and return to its roots as a commuter-only railroad.” Yet an article there the previous day noted of the new High Speed project, “New numbers put the price of the Anaheim-to-San Francisco segment alone at $42.6 billion.”

Why are we spending millions on high-speed rail studies to the detriment of existing services? Why are we further planning new trains that will hurt, instead of complement, the few successful ones we have spent decades building? Cannot even railroad people work together or has too many years of fighting the highway lobby fractured the passenger train industry?

Colorado is poised to make the same mistake. Railway Track and Structures on March 30th reported,

A study of possible high-speed, intercity rail for Colorado has found that lines between Fort Collins and Pueblo and between Denver International Airport and Eagle County have the best “operating and cost-benefit results” of the options evaluated… The full system carries a $21.1-billion price tag, but Harry Dale, chairman of the Rocky Mountain Rail Authority, which produced the study, said the rail system would probably be built in phases…

The feasibility study… took 18 months to complete and cost $1.4 million… “It might be 10 to 20 years before we actually build anything,” [Dale] said…

The study identifies a $3.32-billion rail segment from DIA to downtown Denver and then south to Colorado Springs as a likely first phase [,which Dale said] would not compete directly with [the] Regional Transportation District”s planned East Corridor commuter train that will link the airport and Denver’s Union Station.

“This [HSR] is not meant to be fare-subsidized,” Dale said of the proposed high-speed rail system. “Average speeds must be superior to travel by car, or nobody will ride. There have got to be time savings to make it worthwhile.”

Does it not matter that almost every new well-planned light-rail and regional-rail system in the West has met, exceeded, or far exceeded ridership expectations? Why spend money planning a second “high speed” system paralleling a regional train we haven’t even built yet?  Why do we keep having to fight the superfast fallacy? Frequency, dependability, and the matrix of connections are what attract people to trains — not high speeds.  Dr. Adrian Herzog’s Matrix Theory, despite being proven repeatedly, continues to be ignored.

— William Lindley, Scottsdale, Ariz.

p.s., Mr. Selden’s guest commentary follows.

Why Joseph Boardman Can’t Succeed

By Andrew Selden

Joe Boardman is a fine fellow, and an experienced rail administrator, but his tenure is doomed to be another failure as CEO of Amtrak, for the simple reason that his strategy for the company is to pour ever more capital and effort into the exact same business strategies and plans that have failed the company consistently for four decades. This is evidenced by Amtrak’s latest strategic “plan” released late this winter.

“Amtrak Planning” has come to be as much of an oxymoron as “Amtrak Accounting.” Key elements of the latest plan:

• Upgrade interiors and add WiFi on Acela trains, with leather seats, new tray tables and improved at-seat power outlets.
• NEC infrastructure enhancements such as a new Niantic River drawbridge in Connecticut, new power supply equipment for New York – Washington, new switches at Chicago Union Station, new car shops at Los Angeles, station renovation at Wilmington, Delaware, fire safety improvements in the Hudson River tunnels, car renovation at Beech Grove, NEC track and wire maintenance, etc.
• Study its “poorest performing long-distance routes” to identify possible changes. These routes include the Sunset Limited, Eagle, Cardinal, Capitol Limited and California Zephyr. (No mention of chronically underperforming short routes.)
• Expand state-funded short corridors.
• Install PTC on Amtrak-owned track.
• Increase security.
• Replace large parts of the company’s locomotive and car fleet.

Now, this all sounds wonderful, and many observers leapt on the last item as proof that “Amtrak was home free and the Age of Aquarius was upon us.” No one paused to ask, “With the U.S. trillions of dollars in debt and piling on new debt just as fast as we can sell bonds to the Chinese, how is Amtrak going to pay for all this?”

Even worse, no one seemed to notice that Amtrak’s plans were nothing more than a reshuffle of the same tired 40-year-old business plan that has put Amtrak into a financial black hole. (Amtrak’s net loss worsened again last year, proving once again that the billions “invested” so far into the NEC, Acela, and all the other infrastructure projects has produced a negative rate of return on investment.) No one asked: “Based on 40 years of consistent failure and steadily worsening financial results, why should we continue pouring billions of new dollars of federal support down the same old black hole?”

This ultimately is why Mr. Boardman cannot succeed: recycling failed business strategies is not “planning.” Doubling the bet on a losing position is a poor strategy.

When Amtrak released its wish list of new engines and rolling stock in March, it took independent analysis by URPA professionals to point out that the “new fleet” strategy reflected a net shrinkage of lift capacity in the national system.

But, there may be a growing awareness inside Amtrak that they are missing out in their long distance markets. At an Amtrak conference in Chicago in March, some interesting ideas were surfaced. A URPA attendee reported:

“Amtrak made official their intent to restructure the Sunset and Texas Eagle routes by operating a daily Los Angeles-San Antonio-Chicago train with a connecting San Antonio-New Orleans train. Amtrak has divided their 15 long-distance trains into three groups of five. The five worst performers – including the Sunset and Eagle – will be addressed this year, the middle five in 2011, and the five best – such as the Empire Builder and Southwest Chief – will be tweaked beginning in 2010. The undesirability of tri-weekly service on any route was noted.

“Amtrak seems to be grasping – and willing to emphasize publicly – the importance of their long distance trains. One of the slides in a presentation : ‘Long Distance Trains are Fundamental to Amtrak’s Mission and Future.’ The slide’s charts showed that long distance trains provided 15 percent of Amtrak’s riders, but 24 percent of revenue, and 39 percent of Amtrak’s train miles but 46 percent of passenger miles.”

As promising as this is, it still fails to reflect any understanding of how explosive growth could be if Amtrak were to address two simple questions:

1. What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak actually added capacity to existing trains, especially in peak periods? Long distance capacity and available seat miles have been flat, if not down, for two decades. Since these trains run nearly full much of the year, no growth is even possible without added capacity.
2. What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak better interconnected its routes, so that its trains could serve hundreds of new origin-destination city pairs? Examples: extend a Missouri state corridor train to Omaha, to connect St. Louis, Kansas City and intermediate points to the Central Transcontinental Corridor – Denver, Salt Lake City, Reno, Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay area; or, drop a coach and sleeper from the Chief, at Barstow, to run over Tehachapi Pass to Bakersfield, connecting to a San Joaquin, linking the entire Southwest Transcontinental Corridor to the Central Valley and the San Francisco Bay area.

Even if one assumes that these new services perform no better than the known performance of the existing trains, these small increases in operations, by opening up many hundreds of new long distance city pairs, will triple output, and revenue. Now there is a capacity issue, and a growth strategy, all in one.

1. If you are an airline, which pays landing and takeoff fees, plus user fees at every airport, plus user fees for the federal and international air traffic control systems, you make the most money operating long haul flights, preferably international long haul flights. As an airline, you stuff as many passengers as will fit in a tiny, tiny space known as “coach” class, and you make sure everyone knows you’re giving them peanuts, allegedly because so many people are allergic to peanuts and they don’t know it. You sell these people their “meals” and drinks, and hope many passengers purchase alcoholic beverages because you make a fortune from them, but – at the same time – don’t want any particular passenger to purchase too much and become drunk and disorderly.

   Up front in the aircraft, you have first class and business class passengers, who willingly pay huge extra dollars for larger seats, better food (which is included in the price of the ticket), and a higher level of service. On the long, profitable, overnight international flights, if you are a foreign flag carrier, you now provide something of a cocoon for seating, which has all sorts of technological gadgets and a slightly heightened sense of privacy as the space converts to what allegedly passes for sleeping space.

   You operate some short haul flights to feed your profitable long distance flights, but, in as many cases as possible, you take advantage of smaller, more efficient commuter airlines to feed your long haul flights. Sometimes these feeder airlines operate under your name using your reservations system, and sometimes they operate under their own names. Either way, the more expensive, short flights feed your true money-making long haul flights.

   If you are a cruise line, which pays docking fees every time your ships are connected to land in any way, plus government inspection fees, plus all sorts of other interesting, yet, arcane taxes no one knows about, you have several classes of passengers on your huge ships, most of which host over 2,000 passengers per sailing.

   Way down below the water line, next to the engine room, you have “economy” class interior “staterooms” (really, large closets with bath facilities and no windows) which provide cruise passengers with a place to sleep, bathe, and change clothes. You do provide these passengers with at least four major meals a day (including the always popular midnight buffet), and several small meals a day, all included in the price of your ticket. These same passengers are highly encouraged throughout the days at sea to purchase expensive alcoholic beverages, gamble in the onboard casino, shop in the gift shops, and pay lots of money for shore excursions.

   The higher you go on the ship, the more expensive the accommodations, the more money the cruise line makes, and the more affluent passengers through very high fares for cabins with balconies, subsidize the passengers traveling in interior cabins next to the engine room way down in the bowels of the ship.

   And, then, there is Amtrak, which is determined to never understand any of the economics of passenger travel, and do things as expensively as possible, with the lowest possible return on investment, and the least ability to create an enterprise which can support itself. Just like the airlines and the cruise lines, Amtrak pays a user fee to its host railroads for use of tracks and dispatching; in fact, this fee is so small and so below market, it’s almost a crime the host railroads don’t make a better return on their investment for their privately owned infrastructure, which Amtrak uses for next to nothing.

   Amtrak runs 15 long distance routes throughout the country, and feeds those routes with 26 short distance routes. The 15 long distance route generate 2,609,387,000 revenue passenger miles, and the 25 short distance routes in comparison generate only 1,754,039,000 revenue passenger miles.

   Here is what Amtrak brags about, but really doesn’t matter. The long distance routes carried 4,170,300 separate passengers, and the short distance routes carried 13,605,800 passengers. Wow! Amtrak will tell you; look at how wonderful we are because we carried all of those people.

   Who cares? The average length of trip of a long distance passenger was 625.7 miles, and for short distance passengers it was only 128.9 miles. Which passenger would you rather have? The long distance passengers coughed up total revenues of $416,284,100, while the many more short distance passengers spent $362,294,100. Whoopee.

   Amtrak’s short distance trains would be fine if there was enough capacity and enough long distance routes to carry more passengers. But, as we have seen in the recent reports issued by Amtrak for restoration of long distance service east of New Orleans and for the Pioneer route, Amtrak has little – if any at all – enthusiasm for long distance trains.

   To back this up, one only has to look at Amtrak’s business plan. Whoops! We can’t do that, because Amtrak doesn’t have a business plan; it only has an indication it is more interested in taking money from states for short distance trains than for expanding the long distance network.

   Amtrak’s short distance trains – little more than a series of Greyhound busses on steel wheels hooked together – are expensive to operate, and, as we see above, don’t generate nearly the transportation output of the long distance trains. But, Amtrak loves body counts, so it likes to brag how many individuals step onto an Amtrak train. This, of course, doesn’t matter, because 1,000 passengers only traveling 10 miles doesn’t mean nearly as much as 100 passengers traveling 150 miles each. Any rational manager will always take the 100 passengers traveling 150 miles because you get a much better return on investment and actually accomplish more good. Moving 1,000 passengers 10 miles is a job for transit or commuter services, not intercity rail passenger trains. It was all of the freight railroads’ big city and regional commuter services – such as those of the Pennsylvania Railroad, New Haven Railroad, Chicago Northwestern, and many others – which ultimately led to the downfall of private passenger service, because by federal regulation the railroads had to run those trains (at huge losses) and the dwindling long distance trains trying to compete with the new glamour of jet aircraft and new, four lane Interstate highways with Holiday Inns could not cross-subsidize the commuter services.

   If Amtrak had not been created, and at the same time the Staggers Act had deregulated the railroads as it did a decade after the creation of Amtrak, and the railroads could have found a way to shed their expensive branch line passenger milk runs and various commuter services, there is more than half a chance private passenger rail would not only have survived, but eventually flourished as it has the opportunity to do so today.

   Had Amtrak not been created and the railroads deregulated, there probably would still be a healthy rail passenger car building business in this country, a much stronger national network of long distance trunk line trains, and CSX would be running stainless steel silver trains in and out of Florida and Union Pacific would be running armor yellow trains with red striping in and out of California. Had deregulation happened in the Nixon Administration instead of the Carter Administration, it’s quite possible the railroad corporate map would be very different today, because many of the mergers which took place merely for corporate survival may have been put off, or never have occurred if deregulation had happened and the free market place had acted a decade or more earlier.

   But, well, today we do have Amtrak, a company which doesn’t seem to want to bestir itself for much more other than its annual begfest for funding on Capitol Hill for more and more free federal monies.

   Everybody but Amtrak seems to realize the Obama Administration has handed Amtrak the biggest challenge of its corporate life by saying, “okay, you whined about money for decades, so, here it is. What are you going to do with it?” Amtrak’s answer so far is, “not much.”

   Perhaps Amtrak’s apathy is because it seems to be a company at war with itself. It has an interim president and chief executive officer who refuses to speak with the news media. It has a general counsel who seems to think Amtrak – and, herself – are pretty much above the law. It has an interim inspector general who is totally unqualified to hold the position. It has a chief operating officer who is obviously loyal to the guy who hired him – two Amtrak presidents ago (three if you count one other short term interim who was forced out, too).

   We know there are a number of good people at Amtrak; we’ve named many of them in this space before. These are senior managers who show up for work everyday, and try to throw off the various shackles which are hung around them on a routine basis and create something worth bragging about. But, these same good people run into incredible roadblocks and bureaucracies which close ranks together and block any type of meaningful change. If you want to fire any of these particular bureaucrats putting up the roadblocks, you’re blocked from that, too, because of what can only be mildly referred to as the “good old boy network.”

   What to do?

   A new board of directors is forming. The White House announced two appointments to the board this week, and there are still two vacancies to fill. We have a new FRA administrator who serves on the board, too, and whenever a permanent Amtrak president is named, he/she will also be a board member.

   It’s time to clean house. Give some of these good people at the top of Amtrak who want to do better the ability to do that. Get rid of the deadwood, and all of the folks with the old allegiances, and replace them with a new, dedicated team that wants to succeed, not merely survive until retirement. Give somebody – and Amtrak – a fighting chance.

   If Amtrak keeps going much long the way it is going today, the bankruptcy of New York City back in the Ford Administration is going to look like a romp in the park. Amtrak is also headed down the nearly identical path of the inglorious Penn Central Railroad, which, at the time, created the Enron financial disaster of its day in the last half of the 20^th Century. The only way Penn Central eventually was saved and turned into a profitable Conrail was to get rid of so many of its internal antagonists and start with a fresh group of people. Amtrak needs to do that right now, before it becomes as helpless as Penn Central did so many years ago.

2. As promised, and promised, here’s William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona.
   

   By William Lindley

   Let’s look at one scenario for creating the full matrix of passenger trains in the United States.

   Please understand, the continuation of much of the existing “long distance” train network is helpful, but not required, for this scenario. A single daily train handing a handful of passengers at each station is very close to an irrelevancy compared to the volumes the eventual network will create.

   We begin with perhaps a half-dozen local turnkey train operators. Each of these would be, at the beginning, in a fairly sizable region of the country and attached to a single Class I railroad, acting as a single point of contact between the railroad and the governmental agencies for all services.

   The local trains act as the catalyst to bring cities and towns, large and small, on board with modern passenger rail.  Providing local service gives direct benefit to monies spent rebuilding local stations, upgrading rights of way, eliminating grade crossings, and generally providing the “terminal services” that the later express and limited trains will require. The goal with the first phase is to begin laying groundwork so that, as in Europe, when a train leaves the station it can accelerate directly to full speed without creaking through miles of ancient switchwork.

   Once these local trains have built political support through an expanding ridership base, express services will be added on longer routes, between the major cities… gradually connecting the matrix of local trains. Then the limited trains, on much longer routes, will be upgraded and dramatically expanded from whatever “long distance” trains still exist.

   Looking at the beginning phase – Each turnkey local train operator would follow steps like these:

   First, line up an equipment manufacturer – Bombardier, Talgo, or US Railcar which is planning to start building on the former Colorado Railcar’s DMU production plans.

   Second, bring aboard an insurance company which is willing to work with the railroads. Then, select one of the Class I railroads – and only one – to start with. It is this single railroad with whom you will be a single point of contact. Indeed, it might be beneficial to have a five-year exclusive agreement that “all commuter and short-distance passenger services” on their lines be provided through such a single point of contact.

   Finally, and only after these are all at least tentatively aligned, go to the states, counties, and municipalities all along the one carrier’s lines. Each region will have different needs – from sidings and double-track, to restoration of missing segments, to grade crossing and station issues; but every city will be getting a uniform and well-understood arrangement. In short, this sort of turnkey operation benefits both the railroads and the cities.

   The basic plan for the turnkey local operator in each region is to start with two trainsets, offering three or four daily round-trips. Service will provided not just into destination downtowns, but, to the suburbs on either side, and to most every town of any size along the route. These are true basic transportation, local trains. And they will act as feeders – the base matrix – to the express and limited train networks which will follow.

   Generally these first trains will run on routes of between 150 and 200 miles, either centered on one large city or between two cities, with one-way times of about three to four hours, and about a dozen stations. Each trainset will operate about sixteen to eighteen hours a day, maximizing return on investment while permitting sufficient time for servicing.

   Let’s look at two examples.

   In the Tampa, Florida, metro area, two trainsets could provide four daily round-trips. The first train from St. Petersburg could leave at 6:30 A.M., arriving Tampa at 8:05 and Sarasota at 9:45; the first train from Sarasota leaving at 6:30, arriving Tampa at 7:55 and St. Pete at 9:45. The first three trains would leave each terminus every four hours on a “memory schedule” with the exception that the 2:30 P.M. trains, which both would arrive Tampa at about 4 P.M., would wait there an hour until a little after 5 P.M. for the evening rush; then the last trains would depart each terminus at 7:30 P.M. Each train would stop at Pinellas Park, Largo, Clearwater, Oldsmar, Carrollwood, and Sulphur Springs west of Tampa, and Gibsonton, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Palmetto, and Bradenton on the way to Sarasota. Total population of these is over 950,000. Today’s Silver Star calls at Tampa at 12:34 P.M. southbound and 2:17 P.M. northbound, and these local trains would provide excellent connections in all  directions.

   In Georgia, Atlanta and Macon are less than a hundred miles apart, so four or five daily round-trips should easily be made with two trainsets. Indeed the initial local route should at least connect Warner-Robins, south of Macon, with some of the suburbs beyond Atlanta. Atlanta is an excellent connection point, if a train station at the Five Points MARTA subway stop can be constructed – MARTA acting as the local feeder. These local trains would then serve commuters as well as all-day regional travel. Later, express service to Chattanooga to Savannah would overlay these local trains, followed by a further overlay of limited-stop service from Chicago via Indianapolis and Louisville to Florida.

   Similar opportunities exist all across the country. Duluth to Minneapolis. Green Bay to Milwaukee. Anywhere there are cities under 150 miles apart is a prime candidate for comprehensive local train service.

   Again, first we bring the states, counties, and cities on board with three or five daily trains that serve not just commuters, but, tourists and residents all day long. Much needs doing to upgrade the existing tracks, signals, and bridges to accommodate relatively fast passenger trains along with today’s freight trains; much needs doing to restore stations, station tracks, and re-integrate the passenger train facilities with today’s bus, streetcar and subway networks.

   The improvements made possible by the local trains is what makes the later express and limited trains work smoothly. By building ridership and political support, all is possible.

3. Found on the internal United Rail Passenger Alliance Intranet:
   

   When your doctor works for the folks who created Amtrak:

   • Office hours are from 2:10 A.M. to 2:25 A.M., Sundays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
   • He knows the more patients he sees, the more money he loses.
   • You’ll have to ride an hour on a bus to the middle of nowhere, because the downtown location was closed “to save money.”
   • Everything takes longer than it did in 1951, and the furniture looks it.

4. And, this missive from a TWA reader.
   

   Hello, once again, URPA,

   I’m glad that others share my view on letting other companies operate long-distance routes in this country. Even though a lot of people in the rail community are (deservedly) excited about the aspect of high speed rail coming to their states, they should also remember competition also applies to the long-distance trains as well, and pressure needs to be kept on Amtrak. After reading some of the more recent TWA articles, it’s obvious to me certain people in Amtrak’s management need a wake-up call (Whether it’s by losing out on the majority of the HSR corridors, or by watching some of its long-distance routes return to the freight railroads, something big needs to happen to shake them up.). After all, the poorly handled Sunset Limited report, a failure to drastically upgrade the overnight fleet, and demanding states to pay for long-distance routes have all happened on their watch.

   Division B, Title II, Section 214 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 says:

   (a) In General – Within 1 year after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, the Federal Railroad Administration shall complete a rulemaking proceeding to develop a pilot program that –

   `(1) permits a rail carrier or rail carriers that own infrastructure over which Amtrak operates a passenger rail service route described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of section 24102(5) or in section 24702 to petition the Administration to be considered as a passenger rail service provider over that route in lieu of Amtrak for a period not to exceed 5 years after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008

   Now, with all the talk about whether Amtrak is really disinterested in operating long-distance trains in the long-term, why don’t some of the friendlier host railroads contemplate bidding for some of the overnight routes? Pullman may be gone, but the hosts could talk to a manufacturer like the revived Colorado Rail Car company about acquiring some real dining cars and sleepers.

   At last year’s Railway Age conference, railroad author Frank Wilner advocated returning intercity passenger trains to the freight companies because he thought “a sound business model” would win over anti-Amtrak politicians in Congress (Source: January 2009 Railfan & Railroads). While it sounds tempting, I’m not sure all passenger routes can be returned to the host railroads. Instead, I propose the hosts talk to the likes of Herzog, First Group America, and some of the foreign bidders for HSR and get them to run the trains. I would definitely like to see routes like the Crescent and Silver Star be supplemented with daytime counterparts so I don’t have to go from the Carolinas to Atlanta or Florida in the middle of the night.

   The hosts would work out a three or four-way partnership with each other and the new entity operating the route (for example, a daily Sunset Limited could have an agreement with BNSF, CSX, Union Pacific, and First Group America) as a way of avoiding the problem of changing trains. Meanwhile, BNSF could run the Southwest Chief by itself and add routes and branches like a spur to Phoenix (a similar situation would apply to Norfolk Southern with the Crescent).

   One more thing, the Auto Train concept could be added to other markets by the host railroads (after all, those empty auto racks currently seen on freight trains could be very useful). It may not have been feasible to have a Midwest-Florida Auto Train route 26 years ago, but if gas ever returns to September 2008 levels, it would be more than practical for the Auto Train concept to be extended to other parts of the country.

   – Anonymous

   P.S. Based on the discussion in the URPA Intranet group during the Labor Day weekend, states like Florida should contact Veolia or any of the companies which fail to get HSR bids to operate conventional speed routes as a precursor to high speed service.

5. More reader mail.
   

   Mr. Richardson,

   This latest Pioneer (a splendid route serving “rich pickings” territory, lots of greens, etc) issue reminds us that Amtrak sees itself not in the passenger service business at all, but, as a candid porter once told me, as a “jobs program.” Sad to say, that’s the kind of people you have “managing” it, though “managing” is probably the wrong word. “Showing up at the office to get the benefits and the pension” is more like it.

   Pity a private operator can’t pick this one off.

   Always value reading your (depressing) reports.

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1. Good ideas never go bad, they just sometimes are put on a shelf.

   Over a full decade ago in 1998, the late Adrian Herzog, Ph.D., one of the original bright lights of United Rail Passenger Alliance, compiled a long term plan for the expansion of Amtrak.

   Dr. Herzog, who by profession was a rocket scientist and university physics department chair professor, died far too young of a heart attack at his home in Northridge, California in February of 2001 at the age of 52.

   Outside of the classroom, Dr. Herzog was a business partner with the late Byron Nordberg, also an original bright light of URPA. Dr. Herzog and retired United States Marine Corps Colonel Nordberg were the proprietors of NHA, Inc., a highly successful rail consulting firm based in Oceanside, California. NHA was the engine which brought the UTDC (now Bombardier) bi-level commuter passenger cars to Southern California for both Metrolink and the Coaster services. A very young Noel Braymer, now editor of the Western Rail Passenger Review and luminary in California passenger rail circles, and also an early associate of URPA, worked with Colonel Nordberg and Dr. Herzog.

   The amount of work coming from Dr. Herzog was nearly unparalleled. He was one of the first, using early desktop computers, to create computer modeling for Amtrak passenger trains to measure performance and successfully predict future needs. Much of Dr. Herzog’s work has been featured on URPA’s web site, www.unitedrail.org and remains today as relevant as when it was created. Perhaps one of Dr. Herzog’s greatest accomplishments was the creation of the matrix theory, demonstrating how hubbing and end point connections are critical to the success of any passenger rail system.

2. One of the documents left by the untimely death of Dr. Herzog in this writer’s care was his plan of how a successful Amtrak would look in 2010, based on several presumptions made for 2000. Alas, those presumptions were not to be at that time, but it is fascinating to see Dr. Herzog’s vision for the future of Amtrak.

   Dr. Herzog believed passenger rail was viable on three levels: as a carrier of leisure travelers, as a carrier of regional travelers moving about for any number of reasons, and as a carrier of business travelers seeking an efficient way to travel making the best use of their time in trips under five hours. Remember, in 1998 when this plan was conceived, things like Wi-Fi connections were not yet common, laptop computers were still bulky and heavy, and cellular telephones were in use by a far smaller percentage of the population.

   Dr. Herzog and Colonel Nordberg also believed in two basic principles. First, every route should have at least three frequencies, and more if viable. One frequency would be as existing, a second frequency would follow six to 12 hours later so every city or town would have service at marketable times, and a third frequency mimicking the old milk run local trains, where every station had a stop. As you look at Dr. Herzog’s plan below, and see a train with a route name such as the North Coast Limited, imagine a flip schedule train such as the Mainstreeter providing the second frequency, and perhaps another named train for the local.

   In some instances, the local train may better serve the route by being a series of shorter trains, such as on the Southern Crescent route between Washington, D.C. and New Orleans, where two separate day trains may provide the best level of service versus one longer train, by providing one train operating between Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, and a second day train operating between Atlanta and New Orleans. The first two trains, the Southern Crescent and the (to pick a name) Peach Queen would run the entire route, and the two day trains serve as the “local” option on two separate ends of the route.

   Second, they believed passenger train routes did not always have to be in a straight line. They both favored “L” shaped routes where possible, such as taking the Lake Shore Limited from New York City to Chicago, and extending the western terminus of this train south to Memphis, Tennessee to make maximum use of equipment, and build as many city pair combinations as possible into the matrix theory.

   Dr. Herzog’s plan focused primarily on a robust long distance network. Some of today’s short distance trains would be replaced by long distance trains (more efficient in many ways), but some regional services as we know them today would continue. Since this was a broad blueprint, many of the minor, regional services were not mentioned, but Dr. Herzog implied each would be retained based on productivity and cost.

3. Here is Dr. Herzog’s plan, with some updates for changes which have taken place in the last 11 years.
   

   Strategic Routes for Amtrak

   A Planning Document

   October 25, 1998 • Updated 2008

   Prepared by Dr. Adrian Herzog, URPA • Northridge, California

   Strategic Goal: Output equal to five times the revenue passenger miles produced in FY 2000, achieved by Year 7 of the strategic plan.

   This document was originally prepared by the late Adrian Herzog, Ph.D. in October 1998, and updated a decade later in 2008. The breadth of the document demonstrates the foresight of Dr. Herzog in his quest to make passenger rail in his adopted country subsidy-free.

   The planning concepts for this document came from several sources, including historic successful passenger train routes and connectivity points, current travel patterns in the United States for both leisure and business travel, and travel to and from major vacation destinations. As an example, more travelers come to New Orleans from Houston, Texas than any other location.

   Other factors taken into consideration are population shifts and population growth in new areas, military installations, and locations of major colleges and universities. Additional factors, such as cruise ship terminals were also considered.

   Tactical Goal: Maximize network density of flow by maximizing route inter-connectivity, and multiple frequency (2 to 4) trains per route, per day.

   National Corridors

   • Southern Transcontinental Corridor
   • Southwest Transcontinental Corridor
   • Central Transcontinental Corridor
   • Northern Transcontinental Corridor
   • Atlantic Coast Corridor
   • Pacific Coast Corridor
   • Southwest Corridor
   • Central California Corridor
   • Pacific Northwest Corridor
   • Chicago-Midwest Corridors
   • Florida Corridor
   • Gulf Coast Corridor
   • Texas Triangle
   • International links to Canada and Mexico
   • Northeast Corridor low level long distance trains

   Equipment Types

   Superliner Service

   California Car Service

   Use of the successful daylight California Car/Superliner compatible bi-level equipment for non-overnight trains

   Talgo Service

   Viewliner Service

   Conversion of existing fleet single level cars. This Includes: Viewliner, Amfleet, and Horizon

   Power Types

   • Genesis (Long distance trains)
   • F59PH (Corridors)
   • AEM-7 (NEC Long distance trains)

   Crew Bases

   • Seattle
   • San Jose
   • Los Angeles
   • San Diego
   • Denver
   • Fort Worth
   • Chicago
   • New Orleans
   • Tampa
   • Sanford (Auto Train T&E only)
   • Miami
   • Charlotte
   • Newport News
   • Norfolk
   • Philadelphia
   • Boston
   • Vancouver/VIA Rail Canada

   Maintenance Bases and Principal Commissaries

   • Vancouver, British Columbia/VIA Rail Canada
   • Seattle
   • Eugene, Oregon
   • San Jose
   • Los Angeles
   • San Diego
   • Denver
   • Fort Worth
   • Chicago
   • New Orleans
   • Tampa
   • Sanford (Auto Train/racks only)
   • Miami
   • Charlotte
   • Newport News
   • Philadelphia
   • Boston

   Turn Maintenance and Commissary Support

   • Vancouver, British Columbia/VIA Rail Canada
   • Toronto/VIA Rail Canada
   • Montreal/VIA Rail Canada
   • Boston
   • Washington
   • Lorton
   • Newport News
   • Norfolk
   • Cleveland
   • Detroit
   • Chicago
   • Eugene, Oregon
   • Seattle
   • San Francisco
   • Lancaster, California
   • Redding, California
   • Reno
   • Santa Barbara
   • Las Vegas
   • Nogales
   • Duluth
   • Kansas City
   • St. Louis
   • Memphis
   • Birmingham
   • Charleston, South Carolina

   Southern Transcontinental Corridor

   Sunset Limited	Los Angeles, Tucson, El Paso, San Antonio, Houston, New Orleans, Jacksonville Orlando, Tampa	Superliner Service
   Golden State	Los Angeles, Phoenix, Tucson, El Paso, Abilene, Fort Worth, Dallas, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Toronto	Superliner Service
   Southern Crescent	New Orleans, Atlanta, Washington, DC	Superliner Service
   Gulf Breeze	New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, Birmingham, Atlanta, Washington, DC, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Gulf Wind	Houston, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Tallahassee, Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa	Superliner Service
   Continental	Los Angeles, Phoenix, Tucson, El Paso, Abilene, Fort Worth, Dallas, Atlanta, Washington, DC	Superliner Service

   Southwest Transcontinental Corridor

   Southwest Chief/Capitol Limited	Los Angeles, Albuquerque, Kansas City, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Washington DC, Newport News	Superliner Service
   San Francisco Chief	San Jose, Oakland, Bakersfield, Albuquerque, Kansas City, St. Louis, Chicago	Superliner Service
   Grand Canyon Limited	Los Angeles, Albuquerque, Denver	Superliner Service
   Zia	Denver, Albuquerque, Las Cruces, El Paso	Superliner Service
   El Capitan	Chicago, Kansas City, Flagstaff, Phoenix, Tucson	Superliner Service

   Central Transcontinental Corridor

   California Zephyr	Los Angeles, San Jose, Oakland, Reno, Salt Lake City, Provo, Denver, Chicago	Superliner Service
   Overland Limited	Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Provo, Salt Lake City, Ogden, Laramie, Denver, Omaha, Chicago, Cleveland, Boston	Superliner Service
   Pioneer Zephyr	Vancouver BC, Seattle, Portland, Ogden, Salt Lake City, Provo, Denver, Newton, Oklahoma City, Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, New Orleans	Superliner Service
   George Washington	Kansas City, St. Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Charleston WV, Charlottesville, Richmond, Newport News	Superliner Service
   Cavalier	Fort Worth, Dallas, Little Rock, Memphis, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Roanoke, Lynchburg, Charlottesville, Washington	Superliner Service
   The Memphian	Fort Worth, Dallas, Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, Louisville, Cincinnati, Charleston WV, Charlottesville, Richmond, Newport News	Superliner Service

   Northern Transcontinental Corridor

   Empire Builder	Vancouver BC, Seattle, Yakima, Spokane, Minneapolis, Chicago, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Newport News	Superliner Service
   North Coast Limited	Seattle, Spokane, Missoula, Butte, Bozeman, Billings, Bismarck, Minneapolis, Chicago	Superliner Service
   Hiawatha	Eugene, Portland, Spokane, Minneapolis, Chicago	Superliner Service
   Broadway Limited/Three Rivers	Duluth, Minneapolis, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Pennsylvanian	Kansas City, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, Philadelphia	Viewliner Service
   New England States	St. Louis, Chicago, Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, Springfield, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Pacemaker	Chicago, Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Philadelphia	Viewliner Service
   Lake Shore Limited	Memphis, Chicago, Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Steeler	St. Louis, Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, Philadelphia Crew Base: Philadelphia	Viewliner Service
   Columbian	Denver, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Washington DC, Newport News	Viewliner Service
   Oriental	Vancouver BC, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit, Toronto (Seasonal)	Viewliner Service

   Atlantic Seaboard Corridor

   Silver Meteor	Miami, Orlando, Jacksonville, Charleston, Rocky Mount, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, St. Albans, Montreal	Viewliner Service
   Silver Star	Miami, Ocala, Jacksonville, Columbia, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   The Sunland	Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Columbia, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Everglades	Miami, Daytona Beach, Jacksonville, Columbia, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Buffalo, Toronto	Viewliner Service
   Auto Train, (Passenger section)	Tampa, Orlando, Sanford, Jacksonville, Savannah, Charleston, Rocky Mount, Richmond, Lorton, Washington, Pittsburgh, Cleveland (All station stops)	Superliner Service
   Auto Train	Sanford, Lorton	Car carrier section
   City of New Orleans	Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Mobile, New Orleans, Chicago, Detroit, Toronto	Superliner Service
   City of Miami	Miami, Orlando, Jacksonville, Charleston SC, Rocky Mount, Richmond, Charlottesville, Charleston WV, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Chicago	Superliner Service
   Flamingo	Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Savannah, Macon, Atlanta	California Car Service
   Silver Comet	Miami, West Palm Beach, Daytona Beach, Jacksonville, Savannah, Macon. Atlanta, Birmingham	Superliner Service
   The Resort Special	Miami, West Palm Beach, Daytona Beach, Jacksonville, Savannah, Columbia, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Champion	Miami, West Palm Beach, Daytona Beach, Jacksonville, Savannah, Charleston, Rocky Mount, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Long Island	Viewliner Service
   Gulf Coast Special	Tampa, Orlando, Jacksonville, Savannah, Charleston, Rocky Mount, Richmond, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Long Island
   Tidewater	Charleston, Florence, Fayetteville, Rocky Mount, Franklin, Suffolk, Norfolk	California Car Service
   Piedmont	Charlotte, Raleigh, Rocky Mount, Franklin, Suffolk, Norfolk	California Car Service
   Southern States	Tampa, Ocala, Jacksonville, Savannah, Columbia, Hamlet, Charlotte	California Car Service
   Palmland	Miami, West Palm Beach, Orlando, Jacksonville, Savannah, Columbia, Hamlet, Charlotte, High Point, Greensboro, Danville, Charlottesville, Washington, Philadelphia, New York, Boston	Viewliner Service
   Rue Orleans	New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, Birmingham, Nashville, Louisville, Cincinnati, Columbus, Cleveland, Buffalo, Syracuse, Montreal	Superliner Service
   Southwind	Miami, Orlando, Jacksonville, Savannah, Columbia, Raleigh, Richmond, Washington, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit	Superliner Service

   Pacific Coast Corridor

   Coast Starlight	Los Angeles, San Jose, Oakland, Sacramento, Eugene, Portland, Seattle	Superliner Service
   Shasta Daylight	Los Angeles, Bakersfield, Fresno, Sacramento, Eugene, Portland, Seattle, Vancouver BC	Superliner Service
   Columbia Starlight	Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Provo, Salt Lake, Ogden, Pocatello, Portland, Seattle	Superliner Service

   Southwest Corridor

   Pacific Surfliners	San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Jose, San Francisco	Joint Talgo and California Car Service
   High Desert	San Diego, Los Angeles, Palmdale, Lancaster	California Car Service
   Las Vegans/South	San Diego, Santa Ana, Riverside, San Bernardino, Barstow, Las Vegas	Talgo Service
   Las Vegans/North	Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, El Monte, San Bernardino, Las Vegas	Talgo Service
   Arizonan	Los Angeles, Riverside, Palm Springs, Indio, Yuma, Phoenix, Tucson, Nogales	Talgo Service
   Grand Canyon	Nogales, Tucson, Phoenix, Williams Junction, Grand Canyon	Talgo Service

   Central California Corridor

   San Joaquins I	San Jose, Oakland, Fresno, Bakersfield, San Bernardino, Santa Ana, San Diego	California Car Service
   San Joaquins II	Bakersfield, Fresno, Sacramento, Redding	California Car Service
   Capitols	San Jose, Oakland, Sacramento, Reno	Joint Talgo and California Car Service

   Pacific Northwest Corridor

   Cascades

   Eugene, Portland, Seattle, Vancouver BC

   Talgo Service

   Chicago-Midwest Corridors

   Train of the Saints	St. Paul (Minneapolis), La Crosse, Galesburg, Fort Madison, St. Louis	California Car Service
   The Motor City	Kansas City, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit	California Car Service
   The Midwesterner	Omaha, Chicago, Cleveland	California Car Service
   The Brewer	Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Chicago, Detroit	California Car Service
   The City of Nashville	Chicago, Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville	California Car Service

   Florida Corridor

   Seminole	Pensacola, Tallahassee, Jacksonville	California Car Service
   Tampa Bay	Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa	California Car Service
   Henry Flagler	Jacksonville, Daytona Beach, West Palm Beach, Miami	California Car Service
   Citrus State	Jacksonville, Ocala, West Palm Beach, Miami	California Car Service
   Florida Palm	Tampa, West Palm Beach, Miami	California Car Service

   Gulf Coast Corridor

   Gulf Coast Limited	Houston, New Orleans, Mobile	California Car Service
   Iron Mountain	New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, Birmingham	California Car Service
   Louisiana Eagle	New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, Dallas, Fort Worth	California Car Service

   Texas Triangle

   Texan

   Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio, Houston, Dallas

   California Car Service

   Northeast Corridor (Extended Service Area, in addition to NEC Acela and Regional Service)

   Mid Atlantic	Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington DC, Richmond, Newport News	Viewliner Service
   Maple Leaf/Montrealer	Boston, Albany, Toronto, and New York, Albany, Montreal (Cross Platform at Albany)	Viewliner Service
   Royal Blue	Newport News, Washington DC, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Long Island	Viewliner Service
   Bostonian	Boston, New York, Allentown, Harrisburg	Viewliner Service
   Shenandoan	Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Charlottesville, Cincinnati	Viewliner Service

   * Note: Viewliner Service implies any low level conventional long distance and intermediate distance trains including Amfleet, Horizon, and Viewliner

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1. Let’s continue our conversation about ways Amtrak can help itself – using current assets – to generate more revenue than expenses, widen its route matrix to provide a more appealing transportation product for its passengers, and lessen its long standing dependence on annual doses of free federal monies.The rules of this exercise are simple: Expand travel offerings by altering existing routes, terminals, and destinations without creating a need for many new stations (very expensive), or pioneering complete new routes (while desirable, new routes are an exercise for another time with another set of criteria and a lot of money), or creating a need for new equipment. A large part of this exercise consists of putting existing equipment to better use, or bringing warehoused equipment out of storage to become a product asset versus a stagnant asset.

   Looking at Amtrak’s route map, we see a lot of long trunk lines, with relatively few hub opportunities. Each current Amtrak route seems designed for travelers going in only one direction, with little thought that someone may independently want to get there from here, beyond where Amtrak believes they should travel.

   Dallas and Houston, Texas are a prime example. Amtrak serves both cities, which are the two largest cities in Texas. While Amtrak does offer a convoluted Thruway bus/train connection between the two cities, the choice is not only unappealing, but clumsy, and involves a 15 hour overnight layover in Longview, Texas.

   Essentially, to get from Dallas to Houston by train, one must travel 315 miles from Dallas, at 12:20 P.M., to San Antonio on the Texas Eagle, arriving at San Antonio at 10:35 P.M. On Tuesday, Friday, and Sunday mornings (since the Sunset Limited is only operated tri-weekly) our Dallas to Houston traveler boards the Sunset in San Antonio at 1 A.M. and continues on an additional 210 miles to Houston, arriving at 5:45 A.M. Our traveler has gone 525 miles during a period of almost 17 and a half hours. Driving the route, according to the American Automobile Association, would take a few minutes less than four hours, and be a distance of 238 miles. Only the most fanatical rail fan would consider a trip such as this instead of finding an easier and more productive way to travel.

   One of the greatest challenges for reforming Amtrak’s corporate thinking is to eliminate the urge to create new long lines, and, instead start connecting the existing lines at more places.

   The Northeast Corridor is another prime example of this thinking. Here’s a startling statement: the Northeast is actually under-served by Amtrak. The bulk of Amtrak’s northeast service goes only north and south, with little consideration for east and west (although, granted, it’s tough to go east when you’re living in an Atlantic Ocean port city). The same holds true in the Northeast as it does for much of the rest of the country for Amtrak: a passenger railroad which boasts over 500 destinations, and you often “can’t get there from here” seems to be the norm.

   The Sunset Limited filled a great part of Amtrak’s historic gap between New Orleans and Florida from 1993 until the fateful day in 2005 Hurricane Katrina roared ashore and devastated everything in its wake. The hardy souls of the Gulf Coast and immediate surrounding areas have worked hard in these intervening months rebuilding their homes and businesses. CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Canadian National railroads raced against the clock to restore their infrastructures to help in the rebuilding of the region. An amazing amount of work was completed as railroads played their historic role as the primary movers of a nation when crisis arose. But, wait, one railroad, which could play a vital role in helping reshape the travel market to this region has been absent without leave. Yes, Amtrak has given the Gulf Coast a cold shoulder and refused to restore the Sunset Limited to its route east of New Orleans, citing a number of “the dog ate my homework” reasons for not participating in this process. Private enterprise and charitable organizations rolled up their sleeves and made things happen on the Gulf Coast. Amtrak stole quietly away into the night. Have these people no shame?

   Amtrak apologists and cultists are the first to whine about Amtrak’s skeletal national system. They want more. There should be more, but the skewed traditional thinking that Amtrak “is doing the best it can under the circumstances” is wrong. Also, even worse, “just give Amtrak more money and everything will be fine,” is such a false mantra the phrase should be banned from the national lexicon. Amtrak doesn’t need more money, it needs more vision and “can do” spirit to help itself.

   Despite uninformed opinion to the contrary, the best steward and leader Amtrak ever had was the late Graham Claytor in the 1980s and early 1990s. Under Mr. Claytor, Amtrak operated more trains to more places at more times than any other period in Amtrak’s history. More new equipment came online and more routes were expanded than ever before, or since then.

   Since his retirement, every succeeding Amtrak president (Except the present one, Alexander Kummant) has found a need to shorten or eliminate trains, close stations, downgrade services, or need more free federal monies and state monies.

   Amtrak’s current leadership seems to be breaking free from the destructive planning shackles of the past. There is a need for passenger trains across America, but more than ones going short distances in and out of major cities.

2. Look first at the original Seaboard Air Line Railroad route through Florida, that in 2005 then-president David Gunn abandoned north of Winter Haven in favor of Thruway bus connections to the current route of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star. This historic route, which goes south from Jacksonville to Waldo (Gainesville), Ocala, Wildwood, Dade City, Winter Haven, Sebring, Okeechobee, West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, and into Miami, travels through some of the fastest growing areas of Central Florida. The Ocala/Gainesville and immediate surrounding counties host a population of over 700,000, plus the tens of thousands of students of the University of Florida. This is also the rail line the State of Florida is kicking in money to CSX to upgrade to handle increased freight traffic in quickly coming years when the old Atlantic Coast Line route through Orlando is sold and turned into a mostly passenger line to create an exciting new regional commuter rail system in Central Florida. Travel time on this Jacksonville – Miami route is less than eight hours. Ideally, a set of daytime passenger train equipment should run 14 to 15 hours a day to receive full value from its use.Create a new/restored/different route in Florida from Miami to Ocala to Jacksonville to Columbia, South Carolina via Savannah, also on the old Seaboard Air Line route. Why this way, and not straight up the CSX I-95 corridor to Florence, South Carolina, which would also fit the time criteria (and train and engine crew change point, too)?

   The needs of CSX must be taken into account along with the viability of marketing any route. The CSX I-95 corridor route through Florence is one of the busiest pieces of railroad in the country. By creating a route that only uses that railroad for 148 route miles, it creates a much less demanding scenario on the CSX infrastructure. Just as important, Columbia, South Carolina, that state’s capital city, has been grossly under served for passenger business since the beginning of Amtrak in 1971. The metro area population of Columbia is 576,000, and project to grow over 7% annually for the next five years.Since this train would be a run of only less than 14 hours, the ideal consist would be one locomotive, one baggage car, one premium coach, one food service car, and three to five coaches, depending on demand. This would be an inexpensive train to operate in terms of crew and equipment, since only two trainsets would be required, both maintained in Miami, the current Florida maintenance base. Columbia, like today’s Savannah which has a small turn maintenance and cleaning base for today’s Palmetto, would need these minimal services.

   In 1993, before the dreaded days of the common consist in Florida and reduced train capacity, the Central Florida stations did well.

   Statistics for passengers entraining and detraining at the stations are:

   Dade City	4,911
   Wildwood	7,679
   Ocala	22,624
   Waldo	15,723

   Other stations served by this route and also the routes of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star included:

   Jacksonville	121,352	(includes passengers from the Sunset Limited)
   Winter Haven	51,435
   Sebring	17,228
   Okeechobee	3,650
   West Palm Beach	56,583
   Delray Beach	11,579
   Deerfield Beach	29,314
   Fort Lauderdale	51,306
   Hollywood	31,431
   Miami	96,843

   Today, those same stations, with a combination of only the Silver Meteor and Silver Star from Winter Haven, south (plus Jacksonville to the North) have these ridership figures:

   Jacksonville	54,370	(No Sunset Limiteds operated in 2006)
   Winter Haven	17,882
   Sebring	13,939
   Okeechobee	2,858
   West Palm Beach	40,304
   Delray Beach	6,822
   Deerfield Beach	19,997
   Fort Lauderdale	34,413
   Hollywood	26,156
   Miami	61,158

   Here are the differences between FY 1993 and FY 2006 for those same stations:

   Jacksonville	-66982	-55.2%	†
   Winter Haven	-33553	-65.2%
   Sebring	-3289	-19.1%
   Okeechobee	-792	-21.7%
   West Palm Beach	-16279	-28.8%
   Delray Beach	-4757	-41.1%
   Deerfield Beach	-9317	-31.8%
   Fort Lauderdale	-16893	-32.9%
   Hollywood	-5275	-16.8%
   Miami	-35685	-36.8%

   † Includes loss of Sunset Limited passengers; data not available to break out Sunset counts.

   Total passenger loss measuring FY 1993 versus FY 2006: 192,822 passengers just from the state of Florida – a 41% decrease.

   These are passengers Amtrak has willingly abandoned and said it is not interested in their patronage or revenue. The number of passengers lost only on this route is comparable to today’s passenger count for the entire route of the Capitol Limited between Washington, D.C. and Chicago.

   We are contemplating re-establishing a route of 643 miles, of which 452 of those route miles are currently in use for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and the stations on the remaining 191 miles of former trackage through Ocala are all still in operation for Thruway bus connections. Therefore, this proposed service would require no new stations or station personnel because the trains would operate during daylight hours.

   Estimated operating costs for this train (locomotives, cars, maintenance, crews, etc.) are $11,265,360. Estimated passenger revenue for this train, based on revenue passenger mile income on a similar train, the Palmetto, average length of trip, load factors, and backing out possible Sunset Limited passenger counts in the figures above are $11,585,000, which would put the train at breakeven or into a small profit. Further benefit from this train would include the lowering of infrastructure expenses for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star (sharing of station and maintenance facility costs), plus the expansion of offerings of more travel times on the joint portions of the route, and the opening up of South Carolina stations to daylight travel times. Considering the normal jump in business when a second or third frequency is offered, and a larger travel matrix is created, it is not unreasonable to consider another $2 million in ticket revenues for all of the Florida trains as a result of the addition of this one route. Therefore, this route would contribute to lowering Amtrak’s annual assigned operating loss on the national system, provide more travel opportunities at better times for many formerly busy stations, and use all existing stations and existing surplus equipment.

3. Take the same idea as above, but add another twist to it. It’s important to expand the route matrix, connecting various points on the overall route map that haven’t recently been connected, or connected before.Most people consider Florida to be a destination state, but often overlook the 12 million people who live in Florida, many of which have a desire to travel to many places up and down the Eastern Seaboard. Most travel planners look at states such as North Carolina and South Carolina and incorrectly presume most travelers to and from those states want to travel to northern destinations from there. The existence of the Palmetto and Carolinian routes confirm that suspicion. These trains connect New York City and the Northeast with the Carolinas. The needs of any other traffic are presumably met by the Silver Meteor and Silver Star.

   In addition to the suggestion in the last issue of TWA to extend the Palmetto to Tampa, how about – again, using existing stations and maintenance bases used for other purposes – creating a new route which connects the busy area of North Carolina around the metropolitan Charlotte area with Columbia, South Carolina, Savannah, Jacksonville, the vacation hotspot of Orlando, and Tampa? This would be an all daylight run of about 14 hours.

   Charlotte already has a turn maintenance and crew base for the Carolinian and Piedmont trains, so that problem is solved. CSX has good track that runs about 75 miles from Charlotte to Hamlet, North Carolina, a station stop on the route of the Silver Star. Following the logic of above, continue south down the former Seaboard line from Hamlet to Columbia, over to Savannah, travel the 148 route miles between Savannah and Jacksonville on the busy CSX main line, and then take the current route of the Silver Star from Jacksonville to Tampa, via Orlando. All but 75 miles of the route between Charlotte and Hamlet would be existing route miles of the Silver Star, and would all be run in daylight, which would provide a welcome additional frequency between expanding areas of the Carolinas with the tourism areas of Florida, plus all of Florida’s most densely populated areas outside of South Florida.This route would consist of 675 miles connecting six major metropolitan areas. The size and makeup of the train, and marketing and expense and revenue characteristics would be very similar to the scenario outlined above for the restored train via Ocala and Columbia. The only difference would be the need to establish a full maintenance base in Tampa (where, if the Palmetto is extended to this needed destination, turn maintenance would already be performed there, so upgrading to full maintenance would not be significant or expensive).

   Again, the same variables come into account: the more frequencies on a route, the greater the multiplication factor for new passengers kicks in because of greater travel choices and more destinations.

   By opening up the route of the Crescent with a direct connection to Florida’s best destinations via Charlotte and Columbia, a number of factors automatically come into play which drives higher passenger counts, creates a better route matrix, and more revenue opportunities at lower expenses.

4. One last scenario for Florida (for now), that has been needed since the days of the loss of the Floridian. There has always been strong demand for a Chicago-Florida train. The best routes available, via Louisville or Atlanta are either unaccessible today or impractical because of lost trackage.

   A reasonable substitute – which, again, uses all existing stations and only requires two extra sets of equipment – is extending the Capitol Limited to Tampa via Raleigh, Columbia, and Orlando.

   This extension would require six sets of equipment (versus three for today’s Capitol Limited between Chicago and Washington), with no real alteration in the Capitol Limited schedule. A train would depart Chicago about 7 P.M. on a Monday night, and arrive in Orlando and Tampa on Wednesday morning well before noon. This would entail two nights of running in each direction, totaling about 38 hours for a run, not much more than the City of Miami or South Wind took via Birmingham or Louisville. The difference is those trains departed Chicago in the early morning hours, 12 hours before the Capitol would depart today.This new route made of two existing routes, which could be run with all Superliners, includes a host of major markets by combining the Capitol Limited and Silver Star routes, plus adds additional frequencies to the Star route, providing even greater opportunities, and requires no new stations or additional station personnel.

   Tampa, again, serves as an ideal turn maintenance terminal. When the Sunset Limited finally returns to Florida, it could easily be naturally extended from Orlando to Tampa, joining the Capitol Limited at a Florida Superliner maintenance turn base.The economics for this extension are strong. Nine hundred and ninety-eight additional route miles are added to the Capitol’s running in each direction, but these miles are covered by only three additional trainsets (two additional sets would not provide sufficient turn time in Tampa if a train was remarkably late). The new, extended train would cost an estimated $23,300,000 a year to operate. It would have estimated revenues of $30,000,000, including the current Capitol and the extended portion. All of the equipment needed to add the three additional trainsets is currently in the Amtrak active pool of equipment.

   An alternate suggestion is a long-sought URPA concept of extending the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando and Tampa. This would require two additional sets of Superliner equipment. To make the transformation complete, the City should be extended on the north end from Chicago to Detroit.

   The extension of the Capitol Limited, because of the major metropolitan markets it serves on its present route, make this train a first choice to extend to Florida in front of the City of New Orleans, from a strictly marketing standpoint. In an ideal world, both trains should run into Florida, serving Orlando and Tampa, without question or hesitation.

5. To summarize the impact of these three improvements in Florida service, Amtrak, without adding any new stations, or activating any equipment out of storage, can improve its bottom line by an estimated $10 to $15 million and serve a much higher number of national system passengers, making Amtrak a stronger company with a more robust route matrix and less dependent on annual doses of free federal monies. The three trains would mostly stay away from the busiest routes of CSX.
6. One last proposal to put one of Amtrak’s most under-used assets to work, plus provide better use of Amtrak’s most scenic route east of Chicago.The Cardinal, operating between Chicago and New York City via Indianapolis, Cincinnati, and Washington is a disgrace in the manner in which it is run. Operating today only three days a week, it also consumes three full trainsets of low level equipment, including Viewliner sleeping cars. It travels to Indianapolis and Cincinnati at nocturnal times.It’s time for a complete revamp of this potential diamond in the rough.

   First, make it a daily train, and extend the eastern terminus from New York City to Boston. On the eastern end on the NEC several things can quickly be accomplished.Instead of an eastbound departure from Chicago at 5:45 P.M., move that departure back to about 9 P.M. This would create a better marketing time at Cincinnati, run through all of the attractive mountain scenery in West Virginia and Virginia during daylight hours, and put the train into Washington, D.C. about 9:15 P.M. Remember, this is a train with Viewliner sleeping cars. Have the Cardinal replace today’s NEC regional train number 66, which operates from Newport News, Virginia to Boston.

   Operate 66 from Newport News to Washington on its present schedule, arriving in Washington at 8:25 P.M. Attach 66 to the back of the Cardinal, and have the combined train follow the current schedule of train 66 to Boston, arriving in Boston at 7:52 A.M. This will recreate an overnight train with sleeping cars between Washington and Boston, eliminate duplicate running, crew, and other operating costs between Washington and New York City of the Cardinal, and extend the reach and desirability of the Cardinal to Boston without changing any station hours or adding other expenses. As suggested in the last issue of TWA, if the Silver Star is logically extended from New York City to Boston, this would place two trains with Viewliners into the same maintenance base for shared costs and needs.

   The reverse schedule would put the Cardinal out of Boston on train number 67′s current schedule at 9:45 P.M., and into Washington at 7 A.M., again breaking away the Newport News section of the train and sending it on its way as a separate train. The ongoing Cardinal would again spend the day going through the scenic mountains of Virginia and West Virginia, into Cincinnati before midnight, and return to Chicago before 9 A.M.

   By taking the Cardinal daily, the Hoosier State, the Cardinal’s companion train which operates between Chicago and Indianapolis on days the Cardinal does not run, could have a restrung schedule which would put it out of Chicago earlier in the afternoon, and run all the way to Cincinnati instead of Indianapolis before midnight. The return train would be an all daylight train, providing a second frequency schedule between Chicago and Cincinnati. This will only serve to increase traffic demand on both trains by providing more travel options through a second frequency on this part of the route.

   The Cardinal carried only 95,100 passengers in FY 2006, based on tri-weekly service. That amounts to only 305 passengers per departure. Taking a train daily from tri-weekly does not dilute the present passenger base, but, instead makes it stronger because of the availability of more travel options. By making the Cardinal daily, the annual ridership would probably soar to at least 223,000 passengers (not counting the enhanced passenger base from the addition of passengers from train numbers 66 and 67, which is not made available).

   Based on FY 2006 revenue of $5,552,700, new revenue projections would go to an estimated $13,000,000, if not higher. Expenses for the route would not increase at the same level as revenues because most base costs, such as station costs, would not increase. The additional train miles of 922 miles for the Washington-Chicago part of the trip for four additional days of operation, plus the costs of one additional trainset will not dramatically increase the expenses of the route. The loss of the costs of operating an entire train between Washington and Boston, train numbers 66 and 67, greatly reduce the expense of extending the Cardinal up the NEC. Making the Cardinal daily, replacing the current train numbers 66 and 67 with a train with sleeping cars and a diner, and restringing the schedule to make it more appealing to viewing mountain scenery in the daytime, plus adding a second frequency between Chicago and Indianapolis and Cincinnati make this proposal one which can again add to the company’s bottom line by creating more revenue than expenses.

Part II