This week we look first at Amtrak’s slow pace, then at continued nationwide wrong-think surrounding Amtrak’s new venture into high speed rail; and we wrap up with a guest commentary by our Andrew C. Selden.

“In the unlikely event of a cabin depressurization, oxygen masks will appear overhead. Reach up and pull the mask closest to you, fully extending the plastic tubing, fasten the straps, and begin breathing normally…  If you are seated next to a small child or someone needing assistance, secure your own mask first, then assist the child.”

– Airplane safety announcement

Consider a dramatization of the above starring Amtrak’s Joseph Boardman as the passenger, and network expansion as the child. Faced with the upcoming depressurization of its system through aging equipment, Amtrak is now in the process of securing its own mask with an equipment order.  This is no little feat, but Congress still holds the strings. The mask isn’t even on yet, and as the air drains away, what are the prospects for the little form in the next seat?

Readers of This Week have had plenty to say about Amtrak’s progress, or lack thereof. Charles McMillan wrote:

I just finished reading your March 31st issue and I have just visited the two universities in Montana, Meeting with Faculty/Students/Staff and interested local citizens who want to see the restoration of the North Coast Hiawatha reinstated. In fact the consensus is to pretty much take the bull by the horns and get America back to the forefront of technology and world leadership in all areas of Science and Business. They are very adamant about this!

Their desire for Amtrak to get off of this NEC mentality and get a nation wide rail passenger system in place is unparalleled. They are disgusted with Joe Boardman and the  attitude of the present board of directors in this regard, because they see no real growth on the part of Amtrak in the form of expanding routes around the country. They keep asking “how much growth in ridership can Amtrak realize just by operating their present routes without adding more trains,coaches or service”? “Can’t they (Amtrak) see that expansion is the key to real growth.”  These are some of the thoughts of the general public and our Univesity system students.

We are continuing to garner support for this N.C.H. train all across the northwest including Minnesota.

Jerry Sullivan echoes a sentiment of frustration at,

Amtrak’s absolute refusal to restore the Sunset, or even a connecting train, to Florida.  The only train I rode regularly was the Sunset prior to August 2005, and I have not been on a train since, except for excursions.  Amtrak has become irrelevant; although I despise flying, Southwest Airlines is now my forced choice until Amtrak gets off their backside on the Sunset issue.

Until last year’s flawed Gulf Coast report is revisited and corrected, and until enough new — not just replacement — equipment is available, probably nothing will happen. Amtrak may be the only company whose product is desperately wanted by everyone but refuses to offer more of it.

As to markets and expansion, Christopher Parker noted, in reference to the speed comparison table:

[At that time,] top speeds were held by limiteds that were mostly overnight sleepers, a market [ceded] to the airlines… You should be comparing today’s trains to the stopping [all-stop local] trains of old.  The other factor is we live in a more open and safety conscious world – routine disregard of speed limits is impossible now, as are top speeds over 79mph without automatic train-stop.

I wonder if railroads had the regulative freedom to run very fast if the fate of the passenger train would have turned out differently.  Speed makes a huge difference in staying competitive.  With some exceptions (IC), today’s top speeds aren’t much different.

True, after a number of accidents fifty years ago, legislation was passed that did limit train speeds.  Modern safety devices warrant revisiting those speeds, as does the pending implementation of Positive Train Control, along with satellite, GPS, wireless technology, and computer control. There must be an equilibrium point of higher speeds versus construction and maintenance costs.  How to implement a mixing of relatively high speed passenger trains in an era of double-stack containers and long unit coal trains is no easy task, but a worthwhile one. Mr. Parker suggests, that with good track and “cheap technology to detect open switches, dark territory should be good for 70-79 mph.”

And while railroads no longer have the monopoly on business travel, but European experience suggests there is plenty of market here for a slogan like “we are your rolling hotel.”  A businessman at a conference in Phoenix could have a late dinner, board the midnight sleeper, and be in downtown Los Angeles by morning in plenty of time for a 9am meeting.  Mr. Parker responds, “Let’s start by getting sleepers back on the [Washington-Boston] Night Owl or whatever they call it now.” Could not be repeated across the country?

Amtrak’s newest focus is on high speed rail.  As yet they have little involvement in most of the pending projects, so let us see the fine mess they are getting into.

Over the last few weeks we have compared Wisconsin’s pragmatic expansion approach to Florida’s Bullet Train That Doesn’t Connect (Daniel Carleton, 23 March 2010).  We will look at Colorado’s venture into high speed rail in a moment, but first consider the California high speed project, which started some years ago along the lines of the Florida fiasco. Each refinement, we are pleased to report, generally tended toward a more logical approach. Maglev was eliminated in favor of compatible steel-wheel technology, permitting shared rights-of-way and stations. Nevertheless, room for improvement still exists in the “Plays well with others” department:

In a letter dated 23 March 2010, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro) ask the California High Speed Rail Authority (CAHSRA) to please revisit and consider “a rational shared use option in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment of the CAHSRA project… In November of 2009, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) issued its first High Speed Passenger Rail Safety Strategy which provides a strategy for the development of shared use corridors. We believe this safety strategy has direct applicability to” the L.A.-Anaheim corridor and they point out that “reports prepared by the CAHSRA staff and consultants did not contemplate any discussion of the rationalization of passenger services in the Anaheim to Los Angeles segment… [part of] the second busiest passenger rail corridor in the nation… we would like to make these services more coordinated and integrated.”

One could well read this as a formal, polite way of saying, “You’re doing it wrong,” and one does wish that high speed trains, where they are built in this country, integrate with local trains and transit as well as they do in Germany, for example.  In Germany they have even figured out how to run a streetcar into a regular train station, where you might see one on the platform alongside an ICE high-speed train.  If the Germans can master the engineering and those safety features to give easy cross-platform transfers, why can’t we?

Meanwhile at the northern end of that California corridor, the San Francisco Chronicle reported on April 3rd that Caltrain, facing “plummeting sales tax revenues and shrinking ridership” could be forced “to eliminate its midday, night and weekend service, and return to its roots as a commuter-only railroad.” Yet an article there the previous day noted of the new High Speed project, “New numbers put the price of the Anaheim-to-San Francisco segment alone at $42.6 billion.”

Why are we spending millions on high-speed rail studies to the detriment of existing services? Why are we further planning new trains that will hurt, instead of complement, the few successful ones we have spent decades building? Cannot even railroad people work together or has too many years of fighting the highway lobby fractured the passenger train industry?

Colorado is poised to make the same mistake. Railway Track and Structures on March 30th reported,

A study of possible high-speed, intercity rail for Colorado has found that lines between Fort Collins and Pueblo and between Denver International Airport and Eagle County have the best “operating and cost-benefit results” of the options evaluated… The full system carries a $21.1-billion price tag, but Harry Dale, chairman of the Rocky Mountain Rail Authority, which produced the study, said the rail system would probably be built in phases…

The feasibility study… took 18 months to complete and cost $1.4 million… “It might be 10 to 20 years before we actually build anything,” [Dale] said…

The study identifies a $3.32-billion rail segment from DIA to downtown Denver and then south to Colorado Springs as a likely first phase [,which Dale said] would not compete directly with [the] Regional Transportation District”s planned East Corridor commuter train that will link the airport and Denver’s Union Station.

“This [HSR] is not meant to be fare-subsidized,” Dale said of the proposed high-speed rail system. “Average speeds must be superior to travel by car, or nobody will ride. There have got to be time savings to make it worthwhile.”

Does it not matter that almost every new well-planned light-rail and regional-rail system in the West has met, exceeded, or far exceeded ridership expectations? Why spend money planning a second “high speed” system paralleling a regional train we haven’t even built yet?  Why do we keep having to fight the superfast fallacy? Frequency, dependability, and the matrix of connections are what attract people to trains — not high speeds.  Dr. Adrian Herzog’s Matrix Theory, despite being proven repeatedly, continues to be ignored.

— William Lindley, Scottsdale, Ariz.

p.s., Mr. Selden’s guest commentary follows.

Why Joseph Boardman Can’t Succeed

By Andrew Selden

Joe Boardman is a fine fellow, and an experienced rail administrator, but his tenure is doomed to be another failure as CEO of Amtrak, for the simple reason that his strategy for the company is to pour ever more capital and effort into the exact same business strategies and plans that have failed the company consistently for four decades. This is evidenced by Amtrak’s latest strategic “plan” released late this winter.

“Amtrak Planning” has come to be as much of an oxymoron as “Amtrak Accounting.” Key elements of the latest plan:

• Upgrade interiors and add WiFi on Acela trains, with leather seats, new tray tables and improved at-seat power outlets.
• NEC infrastructure enhancements such as a new Niantic River drawbridge in Connecticut, new power supply equipment for New York – Washington, new switches at Chicago Union Station, new car shops at Los Angeles, station renovation at Wilmington, Delaware, fire safety improvements in the Hudson River tunnels, car renovation at Beech Grove, NEC track and wire maintenance, etc.
• Study its “poorest performing long-distance routes” to identify possible changes. These routes include the Sunset Limited, Eagle, Cardinal, Capitol Limited and California Zephyr. (No mention of chronically underperforming short routes.)
• Expand state-funded short corridors.
• Install PTC on Amtrak-owned track.
• Increase security.
• Replace large parts of the company’s locomotive and car fleet.

Now, this all sounds wonderful, and many observers leapt on the last item as proof that “Amtrak was home free and the Age of Aquarius was upon us.” No one paused to ask, “With the U.S. trillions of dollars in debt and piling on new debt just as fast as we can sell bonds to the Chinese, how is Amtrak going to pay for all this?”

Even worse, no one seemed to notice that Amtrak’s plans were nothing more than a reshuffle of the same tired 40-year-old business plan that has put Amtrak into a financial black hole. (Amtrak’s net loss worsened again last year, proving once again that the billions “invested” so far into the NEC, Acela, and all the other infrastructure projects has produced a negative rate of return on investment.) No one asked: “Based on 40 years of consistent failure and steadily worsening financial results, why should we continue pouring billions of new dollars of federal support down the same old black hole?”

This ultimately is why Mr. Boardman cannot succeed: recycling failed business strategies is not “planning.” Doubling the bet on a losing position is a poor strategy.

When Amtrak released its wish list of new engines and rolling stock in March, it took independent analysis by URPA professionals to point out that the “new fleet” strategy reflected a net shrinkage of lift capacity in the national system.

But, there may be a growing awareness inside Amtrak that they are missing out in their long distance markets. At an Amtrak conference in Chicago in March, some interesting ideas were surfaced. A URPA attendee reported:

“Amtrak made official their intent to restructure the Sunset and Texas Eagle routes by operating a daily Los Angeles-San Antonio-Chicago train with a connecting San Antonio-New Orleans train. Amtrak has divided their 15 long-distance trains into three groups of five. The five worst performers – including the Sunset and Eagle – will be addressed this year, the middle five in 2011, and the five best – such as the Empire Builder and Southwest Chief – will be tweaked beginning in 2010. The undesirability of tri-weekly service on any route was noted.

“Amtrak seems to be grasping – and willing to emphasize publicly – the importance of their long distance trains. One of the slides in a presentation : ‘Long Distance Trains are Fundamental to Amtrak’s Mission and Future.’ The slide’s charts showed that long distance trains provided 15 percent of Amtrak’s riders, but 24 percent of revenue, and 39 percent of Amtrak’s train miles but 46 percent of passenger miles.”

As promising as this is, it still fails to reflect any understanding of how explosive growth could be if Amtrak were to address two simple questions:

1. What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak actually added capacity to existing trains, especially in peak periods? Long distance capacity and available seat miles have been flat, if not down, for two decades. Since these trains run nearly full much of the year, no growth is even possible without added capacity.
2. What would long distance ridership, passenger miles and revenue be if Amtrak better interconnected its routes, so that its trains could serve hundreds of new origin-destination city pairs? Examples: extend a Missouri state corridor train to Omaha, to connect St. Louis, Kansas City and intermediate points to the Central Transcontinental Corridor – Denver, Salt Lake City, Reno, Sacramento and the San Francisco Bay area; or, drop a coach and sleeper from the Chief, at Barstow, to run over Tehachapi Pass to Bakersfield, connecting to a San Joaquin, linking the entire Southwest Transcontinental Corridor to the Central Valley and the San Francisco Bay area.

Even if one assumes that these new services perform no better than the known performance of the existing trains, these small increases in operations, by opening up many hundreds of new long distance city pairs, will triple output, and revenue. Now there is a capacity issue, and a growth strategy, all in one.

As Amtrak continues to say the right things, and to do a few as well, the logic of incrementalism is making inroads… but the “old-think” that stunted our passenger rail network for half a century hasn’t gone away yet.

Amtrak’s Fleet Plan (pdf), released at the end of February, is one of the most positive of their publications issued. Parts of it read almost as a reply to the calls to action reprinted in this column a few short months ago:

The modeling that has been undertaken to underpin this plan is based on anticipated growth in all major lines of Amtrak business, the Northeast Corridor (NEC), long distance services and state corridors (both existing and new). This approach is consistent with the goals that have been set within Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), which reauthorizes Amtrak and establishes new programs for the development of the intercity passenger railroad system within the United States, and the experience of recent years with the increase in demand for the current services.

It cannot be emphasized enough that new equipment is a vital pre-requisite to the process of delivering enhanced passenger rail as envisioned by PRIIA. Moreover, a sustainable passenger service requires regular investment in equipment. Rebuilding existing equipment is always a temporary solution and does not save money in the long term. If passenger rail service is to be sustained and grown, equipment investment has to be accepted as part of the process…

Based upon demand analysis and the defined [lifespan] policies, Amtrak needs to buy the following equipment over the next 14 years:

• 780 single level cars
• 420 bi-level cars
• 70 electric locomotives
• 264 diesel locomotives
• 25 high speed trainsets…

That certainly counts as “saying the right thing.” According to Business Week on March 23rd, Amtrak is proceeding apace with the plan:

Amtrak, the U.S. long-distance passenger railroad, asked Congress for $446 million to begin replacing locomotives and passenger cars…

Joseph Boardman, chief executive officer of Washington- based Amtrak, told a House Appropriations Committee panel today the railroad needs to raise its budget from the requested $2.1 billion for the next fiscal year…

“Between 2002 and 2008, Amtrak increased its ridership by 32 percent without buying a single piece of new rolling stock,” Boardman testified at the transportation subcommittee hearing. “That’s a remarkable accomplishment, but one that cannot be sustained indefinitely.”

In this space previously, we have opined that Amtrak has rarely gone to Congress with a request for specific growth targets. For the first time in recent memory, they have.

(Speaking of adding service, North Carolina announced yesterday a third daily train between Raleigh and Charlotte, creating basically a train leaving each endpoint of the corridor roughly every five hours between 7am and 5pm. Service begins June 5th.)

As Amtrak makes the first moves toward expanding capacity, the high speed rail advocates have begun speaking a little about the importance of the “conventional” train as part of a matrix.  Chicago’s WBBM reported this week:

Advocates for high-speed rail passenger service, meeting in Chicago, said Saturday that this is the year to seek what they want from Washington and laid out an ambitious agenda that calls for higher-speed passenger trains nationwide…

While Harnish’s immediate goal is a true high-speed, 220 mile-an-hour, rail link between Chicago and St. Louis by 2020, he wants to see a series of other steps funded that will make Chicago the nation’s high-speed rail hub.

“Four bullet train routes, upgrading the rest of the system to at least 100 miles an hour, filling in some very key gaps and at least doubling frequency on all routes. That’s what I’d like to see,” Harnish said.

Harnish’s last point is the strongest. Certainly it would be nice to have something like the ICE, TGV, or Thalys whizzing across the Midwest, in California or Florida, or one day between Georgia and Maine (though the concept of an Augusta-Augusta train is too much alliteration for this author to contemplate); but it is the raising of average speeds, the expansion of the route matrix, and the increase from daily to multiple frequencies that will create the need for the few high-speed trains.  As we have discussed here before, running trains between two cities (oh, say, Tampa and Orlando) without connecting to downtowns, local transit, the network regional or “conventional” train service, and all the airports on the route is a recipe for failure. Projects like Wisconsin’s, connecting Madison with the Chicago hub, are the sensible ones and should be the “immediate goals” because they start serving people in a relatively few months, not ten years from now.

As to the critics, Joseph Vranich, in his 1997 book “Derailed: What went wrong and what to do about America’s passenger trains”, writes:

Amtrak’s goal of operating at 100 mph outside the Northeast Corridor was a throwback to past railroading practices. Steam engines pulling passenger trains on the Milwaukee Road and Chicago & North Western Railroads more than fifty years ago [in the 1940s] were hitting that speed, and trains elsewhere were close to it. If 100-mph trains were unable to keep their customers when airports and highways were underdeveloped, then they sure won’t build traffic in today’s competitive environment.

Let us momentarily set aside modern railroad safety requirements that have limited top speeds.

Now, a dozen years after Vranich’s remarks, you can no longer re-enact Dinah Shore seeing the U.S.A. in your 1957 Bel-Air Chevrolet because your pothole-plagued Interstate is plugged from 5am to 9pm; and if you care to endure the traffic to the airport, the demand to see your papers please and the strip-search followed by sitting in a seat that feels nine inches wide for two hours with no peanuts let alone bathroom breaks while waiting for a takeoff slot, then you can fly. Seriously — No market for convenient train service between our towns and cities?

Ronald Sheck, in his 1982 report “Amtrak 90: A Route to Success” writes,

Amtrak trains outside of the Northeast Corridor are slow not only in comparison with passenger trains operated on main-line railroads in other parts of the world, but they are frequently slower than trains two decades ago on the same routes. While more than $2 billion has been spent in upgrading the 456-mile spine of the Boston-New York-Washington Northeast Corridor for 125-mile-per-hour operation, there is no need to make an investment of that magnitude in order to bring overall passenger train speeds up to competitive levels. Figure 12 shows target end-to-end travel speeds, and some sample journey times for 1990 illustrate goals for the planning period. Speeds in these suggested ranges are considerably above automobile trip times and for journeys of up to 300 miles may equal or better aircraft times if airport-to-downtown travel is included.

Note that, almost three decades later and even after the Acela project and its further billions, there are still few miles in the Northeast Corridor that see speeds higher than 125 mph.

From his Figure 12 let us excerpt these sample goals and examples:

Long Distance   50-55 mph   Chicago-Los Angeles  40 hours
Medium Distance 60-65 mph   Los Angeles-Tucson   8 1/2 hours
Short Distance  70-75 mph   Tampa-Miami          3 3/4 hours

In 1937, Santa Fe advertised its Super Chief as making the run from Chicago to Los Angeles in “39 3/4 hours.”  In 1956, with equipment not unlike today’s trains, performance was nearly the same, leaving Chicago at 7pm and arriving L.A. the following morning at 8:30. Today’s Southwest Chief departs Chicago at 3:15pm and arrives the following morning at 8:15 — three and a half hours slower than in 1956. Yes, there route differences (especially in greater Los Angeles) and station stops have changed somewhat, but we are talking endpoints here. Sheck’s 40-hour goal should be easy, if not inexpensive, equalling the 1937 schedule one with modern technology.  Building Harnish’s Midwest network of 100-mph corridors would be a start.

Similarly, the Sunset Limited, America’s oldest name train, likewise in July 1956 left Los Angeles at 07:30pm, arriving New Orleans on the third day at 4pm. Today, Amtrak’s version leaves Los Angeles at 2:30pm — five hours earlier than 1956 — and arrives on the same third day at 2:55pm — about one hour earlier. Today’s train is four hours slower than in 1956.

Here are comments submitted by Anthony Haswell — widely known as the “Father of Amtrak” — circa 1998 to the Surface Transportation Board (“under 49 USC §24308(a), Finance Docket 33469.”) The subject at that time was the addition of Express to Amtrak’s trains, but the facts remain:

Amtrak passenger trains over many of its route-miles outside the Northeast Corridor are anything but “modern”. Amtrak trains between many city-pairs are slower than the trains operated between the same points 45 to 60 years ago.

                   Railroads' Time/MPH  Amtrak Time/MPH
City-pair            December 1941        October 1997 

New York-Chicago         16:00 / 60        18:26 / 52
New York-Pittsburgh       8:25 / 52         9:20 / 48
New York-Miami           24:00 / 58        26:25 / 53
New York-New Orleans     28:30 / 49        30:10 / 46
Washington-Chicago       15:45 / 49        18:00 / 43
Washington-Pittsburgh     6:40 / 44         7:28 / 40
Chicago-Detroit           4:45 / 60         6:00 / 47
Chicago-Cleveland         6:00 / 57         6:46 / 51
Chicago-Cincinnati        5:15 / 58         8:45 / 37
Chicago-Carbondale        4:26 / 70*        5:30 / 56
Chicago-New Orleans      15:30 / 59*       19:25 / 48
Chicago-St. Louis         4:55 / 58         5:30 / 51
Chicago-Kansas City       7:00 / 64         7:55 / 53
Chicago-Omaha             8:00 / 62         9:00 / 56
Chicago-Milwaukee         1:15 / 68         1:32 / 57
Chicago-Minneapolis       6:45 / 62         7:59 / 52
St. Louis-Fort Worth     14:55 / 50**      16:17 / 46
St. Louis-Kansas City     5:00 / 56         5:30 / 51
New Orleans-Memphis       6:30 / 61*        8:35 / 47
New Orleans-Houston       7:30 / 48**       9:13 / 39
Fort Worth-San Antonio    6:23 / 50** %     7:22 / 39
Oakland-Los Angeles       9:47 / 47        10:45 / 43
Oakland-Bakersfield       5:40 / 56         6:05 / 52
Oakland-Portland         15:00 / 47**      18:50 / 39     

* June 1948   ** June 1953  % Dallas-San Antonio
Source: Amtrak October 26, 1997 timetable
Official Guide of the Railways, 12/41, 6/48, 6/53

In some instances, there are small differences in mileage between Amtrak routes and the earlier routes. These differences were taken into account in computing the average speeds.

Some of the Amtrak trains make more stops than the fast trains of earlier years. I submit that this is not of major significance. For people travelling between endpoints or larger intermediate cities, the fact is that their train is slower today than what would have been available to them two generations ago, while air and highway transportation has improved exponentially. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to expect that a half-century later, intercity passenger trains should be able to make more stops while at least equalling the earlier end-to-end schedule time. In at least two instances — Chicago-New Orleans and St. Louis-Kansas City — the impressive historical performance included more stops than Amtrak makes today.

Many of Amtrak’s trains have a poor on-time performance even on their slow schedules…

The timekeeping of trains like the Sunset Limited has happily improved from the dark first days of the Union Pacific – Southern Pacific merger. Amtrak can continue to improve performance by making sure their trains are always ready to leave on time; but it will be the incremental upgrades of a siding here, a straightened curve there, and a new automatic-switched station throat track to eliminate a five-minute delay, that will move the average speed upward, and whittle away the minutes between endpoints.

Stepping back to a broader picture — Passenger rail facing stiff competition from publicly subsidized highways and airlines; the need to repair and modernize the passenger fleet; a push to do more with existing trains and stations; and a productive relation with labor.  When are these headlines from? 2010? No — let us look back to 1947 and Robert R. Young, the “Populist of Wall Street” who, at that moment, controlled the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway and was poised to take chairmanship of the New York Central:

“Competition on land, sea, and in the air, the steady decentralization of industry, and the carriers’ inability [primarily through regulation] to increase the price of their product as much as other prices have increased, are again working to reduce their [the railroads'] share of the national income… They have got to make money the hard way. They have got to try to expand their passenger business, the only part of their business inherently expansible…”

“…Young himself is absolutely sure the unions will come his way [on reforms] ‘Labor is with me,’ he explains airily. ‘I told them it was a choice between an efficient low-cost operation and a high-cost dying operation. They said they understood it the same way, but could never get the management to go along.’” Fortune describes how Young’s team implemented suggestion boxes, long resisted by management, and how “employees identify themselves with Young… morale of the rank and file seems remarkably high.”

Another of Young’s controlled railroads, the Pere Marquette, inaugurated its “Detroit-Grand Rapids streamliner… in August 1946; the train reversed the national trend of declining passenger revenues, hauling 76 per cent more people between Grand Rapids and Detroit than its predecessor did in the same period of 1945…”

“[Young] wants to replace practically all the Central’s fleet of 2,100 cars, of which only some 700… are of the so-called lightweight type. This would cost no less than $100 million… The Central’s present management is, to put it mildly, distinctly cool to the whole notion. ‘If Governor Dewey puts through his $200-million superhighway from New York City to Buffalo,’ President Metzman says flatly, ‘we’re bound to lose still more people to the highways.’”

As to Young’s “almost endless inventory of ideas, some pneumatic and some substantive, about passenger service… most of [them] are a bit dusty; anyone who reads Railway Age, the industry’s excellent trade paper, will recognize them readily… Yet the fact remains that whereas others only talk about their wonderful ideas and then put them on ice, Young is doing something about them, and right on the C.&O.”

– Fortune magazine, May 1947, page 96, “Mr. Young and his C.&O.”

Hold the line, please! What was that quote again?

“They have got to make money the hard way. They have got to try to expand their passenger business, the only part of their business inherently expansible…”

There you have it — Fortune at the late date of 1947 suggesting that passenger trains, run properly, could make money for the railroads. With, indeed, the caveat about publicly funded superhighways.

The operative parallel between 1947 and now is that Amtrak is asking itself the question, How can we raise revenues faster than expenses? This we could call at least “cutting their deficit” while the more optimistic among us might postulate such an idea, sufficiently nurtured, eventually resulting in phrases like “small operating profit.”

If we can stop trying to build superfast toy trains that don’t connect to anything, and keep doing what Amtrak and states like North Carolina and Wisconsin have started these past few months, then we might finally be getting something done.

1. It’s that time, again. Amtrak has put out the Fall 2009/Winter 2010 national timetable, and these things just keep getting better with every edition. Amtrak’s timetables are one of the few bright spots in the company; each one becomes more user friendly than the previous edition, and the design – which was stagnant for years – shows some zip and imagination.

   Notable are the number of paid advertisements by outside agencies and vendors. These people are obviously interested in the business which can be created by Amtrak’s passengers, and they are reaching them in the most expeditious manner, plus helping reduce the cost of producing the timetables.

   Whoever is creating the timetables needs to keep doing whatever they are doing. It’s working, and working nicely.

2. It’s begun. Yesterday’s San Francisco Business Times reports the California High-Speed Rail Authority is submitting a business plan to state lawmakers increasing the price tag of the California bullet train between Los Angeles and San Francisco by $9 billion, from $33.6 billion last year to $42.6 billion now.

   Ridership estimates have also fallen, from 51 million riders a year down to 41 million; the Authority says the lower ridership estimate is based on projected higher fares, from $68 to $104, now almost $105 instead.

   The cost increases for construction are due to inflation, more right-of-way purchases, and additional track work required.

   The Authority expects the intrastate project will be funded by $9 billion for 2008′s Proposition 1A approved by California voters, local funding of $4 to $5 billion, private funding of $10 to $12 billion, and you and me as federal taxpayers will kick in $17 to $19 billion over the life of the construction project, which isn’t planned to be completed until 2020, 11 years from now.

3. This will give you an end-of-the year giggle. There is a mini-crisis brewing in Tallahassee, Florida’s capital. Senator Paula Dockery, who lost the battle to defeat SunRail this go round earlier this month is never saying “die.” Her new approach: Ask for all of the e-mails swapped between various government officials, departments heads, etc., relating to SunRail. Senator Dockery has particularly been gunning for the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.

   Here’s the fun part: Florida has very strong sunshine laws governing all public communications, including intra-governmental e-mails. It seems while the legislation was being formed, Florida’s Department of Transportation was in constant contact with CSX, the main beneficiary of the law; CSX is selling its right-of-way and infrastructure to the State of Florida to make SunRail in Central Florida possible.

   Horrors! says Senator Dockery. Florida DOT, as it was crafting legislation, was in contact with CSX, the beneficiary of the legislation. Something crooked must be going on!

   Most likely, it never occurred to Senator Dockery, in all of her vitriol and seeking revenge against CSX and Florida DOT, perhaps, since both parties are going to have to agree to this deal, if the parties communicate while the deal is going on, there will not be a prolonged period at the end for negotiations? Perhaps, if agreements are made incrementally, then upon final drafting of the deal, only signatures will be required instead of more and more negotiations?

   That’s what a reasonable person would think.

   The folks at Florida DOT didn’t help themselves, though, by creating what is now known as “Wafflegate.” It seems the DOT people MAY have wanted to avoid public records disclosure searches by labeling all of their e-mail pertaining to SunRail with the names of breakfast foods.

   Yes, you read that correctly. E-mails traded between DOT officials had subject headers of “pancakes,” and “French toast.” When the initial public records search was made using key words such as “SunRail,” “CSX,” and “commuter rail” the search engines somehow completely ignored “pancakes” and “French toast.”

   So, a tempest in a teapot has come to be. Somebody, drinking the breakfast tea, should have used better judgement in labeling e-mails. A very good commuter rail project is now mired in election year political backbiting and witch hunts because somebody was just being foolish.

4. Does everyone understand the concept of an unfunded mandate? This is what Congress and the federal government frequently do; laws are created everyone must follow, but no money is provided often for the billions of dollars it will cost for private industry or individuals to follow the new law’s mandate.

   Positive Train Control, as mandated for 30 of our nation’s railroads in the Amtrak reauthorization signed last year by President George W. Bush is an unfunded mandate, which the railroad industry estimates will cost $10 billion to comply, says ProgressiveRailraoding.com. The railroads (including Amtrak) will be required to install the monitor-and-control system. Industry benefits on the $10 billion investment are expected to be about $600 million, far, far short of the cost of installation.

   As a result of this, some railroads are looking at their track networks and trying to figure out how much of the networks have to have PTC by the mandated start date. Some railroads, such as CSX, are looking at lightly used main lines, like the Sunset route east of New Orleans into Florida, and making decisions not to upgrade that track, electing instead to move freight trains over a nearly parallel route further to the north, and dropping back into Florida for the gateway at Jacksonville to all of Florida’s peninsula.

   Other Class I railroads are correctly doing the same. With a mandated investment in the billions, and return on investment in the low millions, railroads have to take a rational approach to PTC. No track is being torn up, but routes are being downgraded until the long term business climate looks more favorable.

   This puts Amtrak in a bit of a difficult position. Any route expansions or restorations have to take into account for the first time whether or not PTC infrastructure is in place. If not, the cost of the expansion includes the addition of Positive Train Control on the new track.

   Some TWA readers have wondered what all of this is going to do to Amtrak as it shakily stands today.

   Most likely, the host freight railroads are going to look to Amtrak as much as possible to bear the cost of PTC on their lines, especially on routes which are lightly used for freight movements, but constantly used by Amtrak. Parts of the Southwest Chief route on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway qualify under this condition.

   The freight railroads will look at Amtrak like one of their investment bankers; Amtrak has less controversial access to cash from the federal and state governments than the private railroads. Don’t be surprised sometime in 2010 or soon after for Amtrak to make a large grant request to Congress, perhaps in the hundreds of millions of dollars, solely for the purpose of PTC upgrades along established routes.

   This only makes sense; it was Congress, in its rush to prove its chops after the many fatalities of the Metrolink crash in Southern California earlier in 2008, which said any line carrying passenger trains and certain hazardous freight loads must be PTC equipped if used in regular, scheduled service.

   If Congress believes its own publicity and believes it acted correctly with the Amtrak reauthorization in 2008 which included PTC mandates, then it should have little, if any, problems coming up with the big bucks it’s going to take to fund Positive Train Control.

   Since Congress mandates host railroads MUST handle Amtrak trains, and Congress mandates host railroads MUST offer the safety of PTC, the Congress MUST pay for all of this. It’s one thing to make railroads host passenger trains, it’s entirely another to penalize them with additional expense to create a multi-billion dollar mandate nearly 40 years after Amtrak was created.

5. Here is the latest from Ken Orski at Innovation NewsBriefs. This is Volume 20, Number 24; for further information, consult www.innobriefs.com.
   

   December 12, 2009

   Using the Jobs Stimulus to Reform the Transportation Program

   Writing recently in the National Journal’s Transportation blog, we observed the new Obama-proposed job stimulus might dim the prospects for an early enactment of a long-term surface transportation authorization. “The jobs stimulus,” we wrote, “or rather its infrastructure component, could be the death warrant for any foreseeable reform of the federal surface transportation program.” (“What Have We Learned from the Recovery Act”, December 9, 2009, http://transportation.nationaljournal.com)

   The crowded senate calendar, we reasoned, means congressional action on the second stimulus proposal — or at least its $50-70 billion component dealing with new infrastructure spending — must wait until next year and may not reach the President’s desk until late Spring 2010. With the newly authorized infrastructure funds added to the still unspent $16 billion left over from the Recovery Act (ARRA), federal stimulus spending for transportation projects could stretch well beyond 2010.

   Assuming the job stimulus becomes law, we asked, does any one think Congress would still have any appetite to enact a $500 billion multi-year authorization in 2010, on the eve of a congressional midterm election? Most likely, we concluded, a multi-year authorization would be delayed until 2011and some pessimists think that with a new Congress and an increased emphasis on deficit reduction, an even further slippage could occur. “Is the tradeoff worth it? You decide” we wrote.

   Well, the response is in and it largely supports our point of view. It came in the form of responses from fellow bloggers and in a December 9 Newsweek column by David A. Graham, entitled “Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Could a transportation-based jobs stimulus stymie infrastructure reform?” Wrote Graham: “The stimulus bill would spend tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure but do little to remake a flawed financing and planning system. That’s a missed opportunity, according to some observers, who are concerned a stimulus, while better than nothing, would fall short of its potential by ignoring the issues the surface transport bill aims to address.” The column goes on in a later paragraph to say: “The worry is that by pumping large sums into infrastructure this spring, Congress might kill any appetite for a meaningful overhaul of surface transportation funding any time soon.” It quotes my fellow National Journal Transportation blogger James Corless, director of the liberal Transportation for America coalition as “very concerned.” “We worry greatly,” the column quotes Corless, “that putting tens of billions of dollars into these existing stovepipes is not going to have the intended outcome,” i.e. a true reform of the surface transportation program.

   Meanwhile, the objectives of the proposed second stimulus are becoming more elastic as we speak. At a December 10 Brookings Institution forum on Infrastructure, U.S. DOT Secretary Ray LaHood said he sees no reason why some of the infrastructure funds in the stimulus program should not be allowed to be diverted to fund the operating expenses of transit systems which have been hard hit by the economic recession. It’s difficult to see how such a move would help to promote job growth, but then the entire rationale and objectives of the second infrastructure stimulus have been poorly articulated and, not surprisingly, are coming under increased scrutiny.

   Hopefully, by the time Congress is ready to act — most likely, only after the President’s State of the Union address in January — the hemorrhaging of jobs will stop and Congress will be able to shift its focus, as several of my fellow bloggers suggested, from “ready-to-go” maintenance projects (which seem more effective at preserving existing jobs than at creating new jobs) to a longer lasting goal of investing in infrastructure projects that improve national connectivity, increase metropolitan accessibility and enhance economic growth. Such action would make it less urgent to enact a multi-year transportation bill, whose prospects of passage in 2010, we still believe, are anything but certain.

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1. Finally, at last, after waiting oh, so very long (Too long, in fact.), SunRail, the 61 mile long commuter rail system in Central Florida serving the Metropolitan Orlando area is about to be a reality.

   Just hours ago, the Florida Senate, meeting in a special session, passed HR 1, a bill to create SunRail and to also permanently fund South Florida’s Tri-Rail system.

   Life is good.

   SunRail had failed twice before in the Florida Senate, two years in a row in the legislature’s regular annual sessions. The Florida House each time overwhelmingly passed the proposal, but a spiteful state Senator from the small city of Lakeland, Senator Paula Dockery, did her best to kill SunRail because she was mad her husband’s original, too-expensive, ill-advised bullet train scheme was made to go away by former Governor Jeb Bush almost a decade ago.

   In a rare change of places in politics, the Republicans were pushing for SunRail, and the Democrats were mostly against it. Senator Dockery, who is now running for governor in next year’s state elections, is also a Republican.

   Overall, SunRail had bipartisan support on many fronts, but the trial lawyers were originally against it because the original bill protected CSX, which is selling the track and infrastructure to the State of Florida for hundreds of millions of dollars wanted reasonable risk protection for any freight trains it would continue to run in off-hours when SunRail wasn’t running between Deland, a far northern suburb of Orlando in Volusia County (near Daytona Beach), through the heart of downtown Orlando via Sanford (home of Auto Train’s southern terminus), Casselberry, Longwood, and Winter Park all the way down to Poinciana, to the southwest of Orlando, near the theme park area of Orlando (Walt Disney World, SeaWorld, Universal Studios).

   There was a fuss by the unions, who claimed the Republican-ruled State of Florida government was union-busting. At the last moment, they came to an agreement through some sort of backroom deal, and the unions relented and allowed the Democrats to vote for SunRail.

   But, mostly, for the first two years, SunRail failed because of one Senator, Paula Dockery. She used every piece of disinformation and distortion she could find to kill SunRail out of spite, and she cut deals with as many other senators as she could on unrelated topics to buy their votes in her favor. It took the untimely death of a longtime Senator from here in Jacksonville, who supported the concept of SunRail, but voted against it due to a deal cut with Senator Dockery, for the bill to finally pass. The dearly departed Senator’s elected replacement was one of the chief paid lobbyists for SunRail the previous year, so his vote was an automatic “yes.”

   In the end, it all came down to politics and perception. SunRail was touted as a job creator (no doubt about that), and it was touted as a budget buster, taking money out of the mouths of babes and education opportunities away from school children, not to mention all of the alleged hospitals and clinics which wouldn’t be built because of the cost of SunRail.

   It was only when the Republican majority in the Florida Senate realized it wouldn’t be prudent to go against the Republican President of the Senate and the Republican Governor that some sense came into focus.

   In the mean time, United States Department of Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood came to Florida earlier this year and made it very, very clear if SunRail was not approved, and a funding source found for Tri-Rail, then Florida would be completely out of the running for any federal stimulus funds to build the proposed high speed rail routes in Florida. Added to Secretary LaHood’s admonishment were similar dire warnings from Republican Senator George LeMieux and Democratic Senator Bill Nelson (of NASA and space travel fame), as well as a varied assortment of Members of Congress.

   So, no matter how good the plan, how good the plan is for the citizens of Florida and Central Florida’s tens of millions of annual visitors from around the world, it all came down to a few votes and a lot of political pressure.

   Is that any way to run a railroad?

2. Here is who will benefit from the SunRail/Tri-Rail bill:
   • The majority of SunRail will run fairly parallel to Interstate 4, the main highway through the very middle of downtown Orlando. Interstate 4 is best described as a slow moving parking lot any time between 7:00 A.M. and about 8:00 P.M., and if there is a wreck, well, don’t plan on being home for dinner on time.

     As with all commuter rail systems, the sudden appearance of commuter trains will do nothing to alleviate traffic congestion; you couldn’t run enough trains with a two minute headway on a triple track mainline to take care of Central Florida’s driving problems. The benefit of SunRail is it will provide a reasonably priced, reasonable time alternative to driving on Interstate and surface roads, so almost every commuter in and out of downtown Orlando or commuters traveling from one side of Metropolitan Orlando to another will have the opportunity to take the train and possibly benefit.

   • The Orange Blossom Expressway, a second proposed commuter rail system in Central Florida will also benefit. This much smaller system will connect in downtown Orlando with SunRail, coming from far suburban counties to the north of Orlando. This system will travel over rails currently owned by a short line railroad. The start of SunRail could prompt this feeder system to get off the ground faster.
   • Everyone in the engineering and related fields, plus many in the construction industry will benefit, almost immediately.

     SunRail is probably one of the projects which is actually “shovel ready” and will have a relatively short construction window before beginning service. The current CSX infrastructure is excellent, and it won’t take much to upgrade what is already there to make it commuter-system ready. There will be some double tracking required, and the construction of local stations will take place, but none of those are years-long projects, especially with the year-round, construction friendly warm climate of Central Florida.

   • CSX will hugely benefit; it’s selling 61 miles worth of infrastructure it currently pays taxes on to the State of Florida for over $400 million, and it still gets to run as many freight trains as it wants over the tracks in off hours for – are you ready for this? – $1.00 a year. (Yes, one dollar.)

     Additionally, CSX gets more tens of millions of dollars to upgrade the former Seaboard Air Line Railroad main line through Ocala to divert trains from the former Atlantic Coast Line Railroad main line through Orlando it is selling to the State of Florida for SunRail. The money for diverting the traffic will go to more infrastructure improvements on the old SAL line such as grade crossings, more sidings, better signaling, and the construction of several highway and road overpasses in congested areas.

     CSX will also build a brand new Intermodal facility southwest of Orlando in Polk County, abandoning its older, smaller, more expensive to operate facility in Orlando that is currently on the SunRail route. The upgraded CSX/SAL line via Ocala will handle the diverted traffic from Orlando and the old Intermodal facility and take it all to the new facility.

   • Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties, the host counties of Tri-Rail, will all benefit from this legislation. In lieu of the desired $2.00 per day surcharge (A nice synonym for “tax”) on rental cars in each of the three counties, excess state transportation funds will be used for Tri-Rail. Each of the three counties will still contribute to Tri-Rail finances on an annual basis, but the three counties will not be solely responsible for funding the commuter rail system.

     This will also most likely clear the way for a huge expansion of Tri-Rail into a “Y” shaped system. The former inland SAL main line Tri-Rail now calls home parallels – in some cases just by a matter of city blocks – the current main line of the Florida East Coast Railroad (FEC), a private subsidiary of RailAmerica, based here in Jacksovnille. The FEC for years has been hoping for a similar deal CSX received over two decades ago to sell its track and infrastructure to an expanded Tri-Rail system, while retaining similar rights as CSX has to run over Tri-Rail in off hours.

     As with CSX, the FEC would be relieved of the tax burden of ownership and the costs of maintenance and insurance on about 75 or so miles of very expensive, urban track and infrastructure if Tri-Rail buys its line from the north of West Palm Beach (Around Jupiter, Florida.), south all the way into downtown Miami.

     Since Henry Flagler and the FEC in the late 19^th and early 20^th Centuries were the original builders of all of the East Coast of Florida south of St. Augustine for all practical purposes, the FEC line has a superior route through the middle of downtowns and urban areas than the old SAL line which was not completed into South Florida until the Florida Land Boom in the 1920s. The FEC had all of the downtowns and track which hugged the South Florida beaches, and the Seaboard was forced to build further to the west in the suburbs and swamplands on the edge of the Florida Everglades south of West Palm Beach where the line swung east from its route through Winter Haven, Sebring, and skirting Lake Okeechobee.

     Tri-Rail plans to keep its current system, and add trackage to the north and south of West Palm Beach on the FEC. This is the same trackage which is part of Amtrak’s high speed rail proposal for Florida, vying for part of the $8 billion in stimulus money to be awarded later this Winter.

   • Every other proposed commuter rail system in the country will benefit from the passage of the SunRail bill because from the beginning, the bill has been a model of rational, reasonable planning, with no pie-in-the-sky ridership figures, too-conservative costs, or too-extravagant revenue figures. SunRail was conceived and planned using real world numbers and real world expectations. Like the Northstar system in Minneapolis, and the Trinity system in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, SunRail most likely will exceed expectations on opening day.

     The deal struck with CSX, similar to the deal the Commonwealth of Massachusetts struck with CSX to expand its state commuter system outside of Boston, most likely will become a model for all future deals with CSX, which is good. CSX will receive huge benefits from the deal, which is to be expected as CSX acts on behalf of its shareholders. While CSX will benefit, the public will also benefit in any number of ways, not the least of which is access to private railroad infrastructure CSX has no duty to share with anyone else it doesn’t choose to do business with on any particular day. But, both the SunRail and Massachusetts projects demonstrate how everyone can win, and life goes on with everyone benefitting.

   • Amtrak will greatly benefit from SunRail; it will have the benefit of the upgraded infrastructure necessary for SunRail, plus the upgraded shared station facilities, and more friendly dispatching since there will be very little freight train activity south of Jacksonville (Where ALL freight trains came into Florida to be funneled south into Florida’s peninsula) on the former ACL line/now SunRail line for 61 miles in Central Florida. For about 210 miles from Jacksonville to the Auburndale cutoff where Amtrak trains turn from the former ACL line onto the former SAL line for the run into Miami, Amtrak trains should have a mostly clear shot of clean dispatching with very little freight train interference. This could lead to a shortening of Florida schedules since the northbound Silver Meteor and Silver usually arrive into Jacksonville ahead of schedule.

     Another benefit to Amtrak will be a heightened awareness of passenger rail travel by the commuters on SunRail; passenger-train-aware people are more likely to be receptive to long distance train travel. Hopefully, Amtrak will make the most of this by heavily promoting Amtrak trains at commuter stations.

   • U.S. Railcar, which is now the proud owner of the former Colorado Railcar designs for both single and bi-level commuter trains should benefit greatly from today’s vote. The original plan, when Colorado Railcar was still a viable company, called for that company’s DMUs to provide all of the motive power and consists for SunRail, and it’s highly likely any expansion of Tri-Rail in South Florida will also use these same DMUs which have undergone field tests on Tri-Rail in the past few years. Perhaps this will help U.S. Railcar with its request for a federal grant to construct a factory in Ohio to build these self-propelled railcars.
   • Transportation planners in Jacksonville to the northeast of Central Florida, and in the Tampa Bay area to the southwest of Central Florida have won a major victory. In addition to the creation of SunRail and the funding of Tri-Rail, the enabling legislation also creates two new state programs to deal with all present and future commuter rail systems in Florida. As far as state government is concerned, commuter rail in Florida “has arrived.”
   • Real estate developers and entrepreneurs will benefit greatly. Even though Central Florida is very densely built-out and populated, look to new mixed use housing and retail and office developments to spring up within walking distance (Even in the Florida heat and rain in the Summer.) of the new SunRail stations.
3. Here is who will not benefit from the SunRail/Tri-Rail bill:
   • Anyone who intentionally buys or builds a home near an existing railroad track which has been in place since the late 19^th Century. The NIMBYs lost; the train tracks which were built to handle traffic will continue to do so, and those opposed to trains will have to find a life elsewhere.
   • The anti-rail talking heads who make careers out of making arguments which are usually a couple of French fries short of a Happy Meal against commuter rail and any other type of rail. Often, what’s old is new, and commuter rail is making a comeback in this country and will have a happy life alongside the automobile and sport utility vehicles of the world. While the return on investment in SunRail and Tri-Rail may not happen in exactly the same way or following the same formula which works for building more and more roads and highways, the ROI on commuter rail has a proven record of success beyond the tired “green” and “sustainability” arguments which are – by themselves – no complete arguments at all for huge projects such as commuter rail.
   • Asphalt and concrete manufacturers. Instead of laying literally miles and miles of asphalt and concrete on new roads, these folks will have to settle for acres of new asphalt and concrete on new commuter rail station parking lots and access roads.
4. As a final note, we should examine Amtrak’s role in all of this. Some had suggested in order to go around various liability questions with CSX and other issues before this bill was passed Amtrak should simply be the operator or SunRail, and many of those issues would go away.

   Amtrak is consistently the most expensive commuter system operator in the country, with a less than stellar record (See the immediate previous issue of TWA to this issue and the discussion of Amtrak’s failures in California operating the Pacific Surfliner service on behalf of California.).

   Here is something to think about: If Amtrak were no longer America’s best kept secret, and the company promoted itself like any other American company, more Americans would know of and understand passenger rail.

   Reading the online news articles about SunRail and the accompanying idiotic, knee-jerk reactions to SunRail by uninformed readers was a tragic exercise. It appears a certain element of our society absolutely hates anything to do with passenger rail, and think it should be consigned to museums and Third World countries. These people have no idea, nor rational concept of the many economic and social benefits of passenger rail. Many of these people would rather give up their firstborn child than their automobiles.

   There is nothing wrong with choice, just as there is nothing wrong with someone choosing to only travel in their personal vehicle. That’s the kind of choice we take for granted in this country, and we cherish to right to make that choice.

   But, while keeping that same right to choose, we should not be taking away the rights of others who choose to travel by a means other than a personal vehicle.

   Amtrak carries two tenths of one percent of America’s travelers, which is hardly a blip on anyone’s screen. Amtrak is – and remains – statistically irrelevant to American transportation.

   If Amtrak chose to be a healthy, relevant passenger carrier, then many of the arguments made against SunRail out of ignorance simply would not have added anything beyond puffs of hot air to the discussion. That was not the case, however; SunRail failed twice because no one knew how to make a rational argument for passenger rail against a determined foe, because no one knows about passenger rail.

   That is something Amtrak can do something about; it can stop being statistically irrelevant, and create a vision for the future which includes conventional passenger rail as part of our domestic transportation network. Until that happens, more prospective commuter rail systems are going to be delayed or shot down in flames because no one can talk intelligently about the sins and virtues of passenger rail in America.

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see also: (Wikipedia)SunRail, Orange Blossom Expressway

1. Here is the text of a speech delivered to the Florida Coalition of Rail Passengers here in Jacksonville, Florida on Saturday, November 7, 2009 by this writer.
   

   It’s been an interesting week for the railroad business; changes we couldn’t imagine a decade ago have suddenly become true. America again has a “railroad robber baron” – but, this time, it’s a benevolent man who may be the smartest businessman in the world.

   Warren Buffett said he would cheerfully pay $34 billion for the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, and BNSF said they would cheerfully accept his offer.

   While many people agree this is not going to launch a series of mergers – there isn’t much left to merge other than creating a transcontinental railroad – this is a game changer. BNSF under private ownership no longer has to act by the dictates of Wall Street.

   Think of the BNSF deal as a giant-sized version of what happened to our own Florida East Coast Railroad: going private allowed it to think radically outside of the box.

   The FEC – after over a decade of waiting – has partnered with the Florida Department of Transportation and Amtrak to restore passenger service on its coast route between Jacksonville and Miami. Now, start thinking about BNSF and passenger service – they have already publicly indicated if the right business opportunity comes along, they will talk about it.

   Reading the FEC/FDOT proposal – which is part of the national grab for high speed rail stimulus money – gives any reader respect for the Florida DOT.

   Amtrak has its usual equipment demands, because both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star will again be split here in Jacksonville, and half of the consists will go to Miami via Orlando, and half go on the FEC.

   The best part is the request for additional local regional trains running between Jacksonville and Miami to provide a higher level of frequencies. The most obvious part left out is extending the Palmetto south of Savannah and running it down the FEC or perhaps over to Tampa.

   The only part of Florida’s rail plan found wanting is mention of doing something to bolster Tampa’s conventional train service. In the Tampa Bay area we have Florida’s second largest metropolitan area, and its level of train service is less than that of Sebring and Palatka.

   If you really want to look at the unfairness of it all, take a look at Florida’s panhandle. The people living there pay all of the same taxes we pay, but their train – the Sunset Limited – went away because Amtrak doesn’t want to bother restoring the train after a hurricane that happened over four years ago temporarily tore up some track.

   As I join you today on behalf of United Rail Passenger Alliance, my late friend and predecessor, Austin Coates, was no stranger to this group or many of you personally. We’ve never forgotten Austin’s most famous line regarding Amtrak – “it’s just business as usual.”

   More than half a decade after Austin’s passing, we need to help Amtrak stop its continuing “business as usual.”

   Let’s look at how Amtrak has treated us here in Florida over the past 25 years or so.

   Going back to the pre-Amtrak days, Florida had so many passenger trains you couldn’t walk very far without tripping over one. Florida was a state built by the passenger train.

   We had the Seaboard’s Silver Meteor, Silver Star, Palmland, Sunland, and Gulf Wind. Not only did we have service to Miami, but we also had service down the middle of the state and from Tampa down the west coast to Venice.

   The Atlantic Coast Line provided us with service on the East Coast Champion, West Coast Champion, Gulf Coast Special, seasonal Florida Special, and the Everglades. The ACL on the west coast would take you to Fort Myers.

   From Chicago and the Midwest, you could catch the City of Miami, South Wind, Seminole, or Dixie Flyer.

   Until just a couple of years prior to Amtrak, the Florida East Coast even operated its daily two car train between Miami and Jacksonville.

   Then came Amtrak Day in 1971.

   Amtrak Day wasn’t as bad for Florida as elsewhere, for we still had the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, Champion, and South Wind. We lost the Gulf Wind, and that huge – and currently unfilled gap – between Jacksonville and New Orleans opened up. We lost service south of Tampa on the west coast. But you could still get to Florida from Chicago with single train service, and you had three choices from New York to Florida, and both coasts and the middle of Florida through Ocala were still served.

   We all know what has happened since then.

   The once busy crew and maintenance base in Tampa is gone, with just a single daily train remaining. Naturally, this occurred only after the City of Tampa decided to spend a king’s ransom on the breathtaking restoration of Tampa Union Station.

   Miami, once the golden goose of passenger railroading, now has two trains a day.

   The South Wind, then the Floridian, with direct Chicago service, is gone.

   The Cross Florida service between Tampa and Miami came and went.

   The extended Palmetto from Savannah to Jacksonville, and eventually to Tampa, and then turned into the Silver Palm to Miami – is gone.

   We now have Auto Train, but unless you’re taking along your car and only have a destination of Northern Virginia or beyond, it’s not the most useful service in Amtrak’s stable.

   Then, there is the sad saga of the Sunset Limited. We all worked hard in Florida to bring the Sunset to us in 1993. The State of Florida ponied up over $7 million to help upgrade the CSX line in the panhandle.

   We knew prior to the Sunset’s extension, there was an average of 75,000 calls per year into the Amtrak res centers seeking a train between New Orleans and Florida.

   Now, the Sunset is almost history. I say “almost” because it never officially went away, just in reality went away. As [FCRP member] George Bollinger often asks, “what if it had been the Seaboard and L&N that had suddenly decided to stop running the Gulf Wind, just because it was inconvenient?”

   For a while, unknowing people tried to blame our friends – yes, make no mistake about it, at CSX they are our friends – for not allowing Amtrak to resume service on the Sunset. But, we know CSX gave Amtrak written notice the line was available for the Sunset on April 1, 2006.

   By law, when Amtrak cancels an entire train route, it is supposed to post a 180 day notice of cancellation. This minor technicality to Amtrak has never been honored, with the ongoing excuse of not only did the dog eat Amtrak’s homework, but Amtrak merely “suspended” the service due to conditions wrought by the hurricane.

   A number of union jobs on all levels were lost by the suspension of the Sunset. Yet, Amtrak’s unions have chosen to do nothing about this. No union filed a lawsuit, no union screamed at the top of its organized lungs about this flagrant abuse of the law.

   Congresswoman Corrine Brown put $1 million into last year’s Amtrak reauthorization to study the restoration of the Amtrak route. We know the result of that; a lot of paper with a lot of excuses and reasons why Amtrak doesn’t want to restart the service.

   The quickest, cheapest, cleanest way to restore service is to extend the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando.

   Because of bad equipment scheduling, the City trainsets sit for a full day in New Orleans before they return to Chicago. On any given day there are two trainsets in Louisiana, the one just departing New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal and the one about to arrive at NOUPT. By extending the route to Orlando, only one extra trainset would be required to bring the train to Florida.

   Amtrak will instantly whine about stations; the only real station problem is at Mobile, where the Eisenhower-era relic of the L&N Railroad’s poor choice of architect station building was mercifully torn down after Katrina. The only problem for Mobile is finding a new spot for a platform and placement of a temporary Amshack.

   Remember, the only manned stations between New Orleans and Jacksonville were Mobile, Pensacola, and Tallahassee. Everything else was just a platform and city-run shelter.

   Many of my readers of This Week at Amtrak know I talk about the Sunset and the City of New Orleans a lot, and there’s a reason for that. From 1996 to 2000, I was a paid consultant to the Gulf Coast Business Group, working with both of those trains, plus the Crescent. My late business partner and I specialized in marketing for these trains, creating onboard services programs, the highly successful 24 hour dining car test runs on the Sunset, and handled special events, such as station openings and helped with the inaugural of the Gulf Coast Limited. Even today, those are still my trains.

   From 1999 to 2000, we ran the Sunset Limited and City of New Orleans Promotional Office for Amtrak from our offices here in Jacksonville. We worked a number of projects that brought new riders to the Sunset and City through radio and television station promotions, worked with local media, and even hosted a dining car gathering in Memphis for local and regional media food critics.

   Like any large company, we found white hats and black hats inside of Amtrak. Some very good people left because of the constant problems caused by the black hats, and others left merely because Amtrak was not the most pleasant place to work if you weren’t part of the good old boy network.

   But, there is a shrinking core group of dedicated people who are there because they like running passenger trains.

   What can we do to help those at Amtrak who want the company to succeed?

   First, everyone must realize there is more than one answer to Amtrak’s problems. Those who constantly plead “we all have to work together” generally mean we all have to agree with them, and forget about any other solutions.

   Second, we have to realize the reality of passenger rail around the world. Amtrak constantly wants us to believe no passenger rail system in the world makes money. This is only an excuse to enable Amtrak’s dysfunctional behavior.

   I invite you to do your own research; scan credible publications like the International Railway Journal and read the stories about passenger rail systems in The Netherlands, Germany, and Japan which make money.

   Doubters say this isn’t true, these companies are still propped up by their governments. Wrong. Some of these systems may operate over government owned right of way – just as trains do on the Northeast Corridor – but they still pay a train mile fee. Some of the systems share the rails with freight trains – just like Amtrak – and they receive a benefit – just like Amtrak – from the shared cost of infrastructure.

   For years, URPA has been crunching numbers and seeing almost every long distance train in the Amtrak system makes money “above the rail.” This is the same system used by other countries – based on operating costs, not full infrastructure maintenance costs – and revenue passenger miles.

   One thing URPA has talked about for decades is Amtrak’s erroneous use of warm body counts in the form of ridership instead of the real world metrics of load factor and revenue passenger miles. Amtrak wants us to be wowed by warm body counts, which are meaningless. What matters is how far you carry a passenger, and what revenue you derive from a passenger, not how many passengers.

   Which passenger would you rather have: one passenger traveling the 608 mile average length of trip on the Silver Meteor at 15.7 cents a revenue passenger mile … or four passengers on Oklahoma’s Heartland Flyer, traveling an average length of trip of 175 miles at 12 cents a revenue passenger mile? That one passenger on the Meteor not only makes Amtrak more money than the four passengers on the Heartland Flyer, but that one passenger will also spend more money onboard in the diner and lounge, had less cost to the national reservations system, less to reach through marketing, and tracks all the way through Amtrak’s accounting system with less costs because Amtrak is handling one passenger instead of four.

   When the late Graham Claytor – without a doubt Amtrak’s best president – retired from Amtrak in 1993, the company was generating internally enough money to cover 72% of its 1989 $1.7 billion operating budget, up from 48% in 1981. Today, that number has slipped dramatically, down to about 60%.

   Since Mr. Claytor retired, we have seen a virtual parade of permanent and semi-permanent interim chief executive for Amtrak, from Tom Downs to George Warrington to David Gunn to David Hughes to Alex Kummant to today’s Joe Boardman.

   Every new Amtrak president seems to have made the company worse in so many ways. We’ve seen the Heritage fleet – which is highly valued and treasured by VIA Rail Canada today – sold off. The original Pennsylvania Railroad Metroliners were scrapped. The Turboliners were rehabbed with someone else’s money, and then suddenly hidden and stored, and are now for sale.

   We have seen the delivery – and subsequent running off the wheels – of the too small order of Viewliners, with a promise, but no firm order for any more. We’ve seen a more than decade old order of Superliners, but those numbers are thinning due to neglected maintenance. We’ve seen the much heralded arrival of the Acela trainsets, but their mechanical troubles, too, have become legendary.

   In short, Amtrak has no reserve equipment pool it can activate quickly to expand or create new services. Even though there are still nearly 200 cars sitting in the wreck line, most of that is needed just to restore existing consists to previous levels of productivity, or put a service back east of New Orleans.

   During all of this while we have seen meaningless ridership numbers rise, we’ve also seen abysmal systemwide load factors; during some years more than half of Amtrak’s highly perishable inventory goes unsold.

   We have seen train consists shrink and shrink.

   So, Amtrak is running fewer seats miles for occupancy, creating less of a chance for success. Its equipment is old and getting more worn out by the hour. We know some equipment is being rehabbed by this year’s stimulus money, but it’s only token amounts for the national system.

   Which brings us back to, what can you do to help change Amtrak?

   I urge everyone in this room to start a new campaign.

   The Cardinal is the only train in Amtrak’s entire system which is run by federal mandate. Senator Robert Byrd slipped into federal law that his train – the Cardinal running through his home state of West Virginia – has to be operated. Amtrak uses and abuses this train, but it’s helpless to cancel it the way it did the east end of the Sunset Limited.

   My conservative soul is tortured by this next suggestion, but it may be necessary until Amtrak can be made to run like a real business. FCRP needs to convince the Florida Congressional Delegation the Silver Meteor, Silver Star, and an extended Palmetto south from Savannah to Jacksonville and beyond, and some sort of restored service east of New Orleans, must be mandated to be operated by federal statute.

   Your sister organizations in other states need to do the same with their trains. Remember – if it happened to the Sunset Limited east of New Orleans – it can happen to any train. Most of you know the very most basic rule of railroad safety: when on railroad property, be prepared for a train to be coming towards you at any time, from any direction. You know the second most basic safety rule – the one which separates real railroaders from rail fans – never, never, never, step on top of the rail; always step over the rail.

   Florida – and every other state – is currently standing on top of the rail, unaware a train is bearing down from an unknown direction. Amtrak’s management is much more interested in seeking free federal monies than in operating trains.

   We’ve seen no new equipment orders to date – just promises of a single-level order for Viewliner cars – and the just released update of Amtrak’s ongoing five year plan calls for no new cars.

   If Amtrak is serious about keeping its system intact, it would be at least talking about a new car order, especially for Superliners. But, the silence is all we need to know.

   Paul Dyson, President of the Railroad Passenger Association of California and Nevada, has openly raised the question of whether or not Amtrak is actually planning to exit the long distance route business because of a lack of equipment order.

   A few weeks back, one of our URPA associates was attending a rail fair in the Northeast. He ran across an Amtrak Engineering Department intern who wanted the world to know how important he was – after all, he was an intern at Amtrak.

   The question of equipment orders came up, and this young man offered a glimpse into Amtrak’s corporate thinking. He said, “Amtrak isn’t interested in slow trains, it’s only interested in fast trains.”

   Just shortly after that, Tom Carper, Amtrak’s Chairman of the Board, gave a presentation to the Midwest High Speed Rail folks touting Amtrak as the logical and national operator of all of the nation’s high speed systems. When you read Mr. Carper’s presentation, you realize the young intern wasn’t just whistling “Dixie.”

   So, if you’re [FCRP member] Jerry Sullivan and you want to travel west to visit your grandchildren in Texas, it’s not likely to happen any time soon on a restored Sunset Limited. If you’re George Bollinger and you just want to ride trains, you better plan your trip early, because too often you can’t get there from here.

   Until Congress mandates Amtrak must operate its long distance trains, every one of those trains is in danger. The train may not go away today, but it’s consist will be constantly shrinking, the level of service will deteriorate worse and Amtrak will remain – as Union Pacific’s official spokesman labeled it – “novelty transportation.”

   Amtrak today accounts for only two tenths of one percent of America’s transportation output, hardly enough for anyone to take seriously. Even worse, Amtrak isn’t doing much to change that.

   The only people Amtrak listens to is Congress, when it mandates Amtrak do something. It’s time for Congress to mandate – without exception – Amtrak must run all of its long distance trains, and throw in some restorations like the Sunset back to Florida, the Pioneer, with a full second frequency operating all the way between Chicago and Denver, the North Coast Hiawatha, and take the Sunset and the Cardinal daily.

   Amtrak will kick and scream and whine everyone is being mean to it by making it run trains it doesn’t want to run. But, if someone doesn’t do something this drastic soon, long distance passenger rail in America will be only a memory like steam locomotives, dome cars, and Pullman berths.

   Thank you so much for allowing me to be with you today; it’s a pleasure to be here.

2. Warren Buffett’s privatization of the venerable Burlington Northern Santa Fe rocked the railroad world. Here is what William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona had to say.
   

   Warren Buffett’s offer for BNSF the first week in November might prove to be a pivotal event for intercity passenger rail, having come at a time when, as Don Phillips in his recent Trains magazine column recently highlighted, dissatisfaction over Amtrak’s seeming refusal to participate in a renaissance of train travel is at a peak.

   Undoubtedly, Buffett has a record of making sound business decisions; and BNSF, being among the best managed and progressive of large railroads, does fit a motif of acquiring something good and making it better.

   Over the next weeks we will look at some of the synergies (much as that word is overused, it does apply here) and economies of scale that could apply to an enlarged role for BNSF in the passenger train business. But right now a single move would signal a positive direction. Words and attitude cost little but mean much; as you may know, trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, are most defensible when they are in continuous business use. BNSF could gain much publicity, and build on its widespread and long standing – even if subconscious – recognition, by reviving its classic red, yellow, and silver “Warbonnet” scheme.

   A new interpretation of their classic corporate symbol would show a revived interest in being a participating citizen in every railroad town and city. Not to mention the free advertising garnered from rolling under practically every child’s Christmas tree. Renewing interest in today’s youth will perpetuate the recent industry rediscovery that trains are good for more than just hauling coal – they are the future of transportation, as well as the history.

   Yes, we undoubtedly will consider details in our upcoming columns here, but for now, Mr. Buffett, we simply convey – Welcome to the world of railroading.

3. Professor James McCommons of Northern Michigan University has a new book out this month, and it’s required reading for anyone interested in the business of passenger railroading.

   For full disclosure, this writer was interviewed for the book here in Jacksonville by Mr. McCommons. The interview was full of serious, well thought out questions and observations; it’s very clear the product of all of his interviews and research has led Mr. McCommons to creating a book far any beyond anything else on the market today regarding passenger rail as it stands in America.

   “Waiting on the Train: The Embattled Future of Passenger Rail Service – A Year Spent Riding Across America” is much more succinct than its title, and presents a wide variety of honest opinions and thoughts about passenger rail. More than just the usual viewpoints are presented with conclusions both obvious and left for the reader to determine.

   The book is actually too short; Mr. McCommons reports his publisher, Chelsea Green (www.chelseagreen.com) had him remove about 40,000 words of his original text to fit into a predetermined format. What a shame; when you read the book, you are wanting more, and another brief 40,000 words would be welcomed by any reader.

   There is a lengthy review of the book in the current issue of Passenger Train Journal magazine by Karl Zimmermann for those wishing more detail, but, please, if your buy just one railroad book this year, buy “Waiting on the Train;” it’s time and money well spent. We can only hope Mr. McCommons will one day do a follow-up book.

4. Speaking of the latest issue of Passenger Train Journal (2009:4, Issue 241) which just hit the newsstands in the past week or so, there is an ever-so-timely article on Amtrak’s Pioneer, the subject of much discussion for an expensive route restoration, as well as the usual mix of good articles and photos. Editor Mike Schafer’s On The Point column – as always – not only hits the mark about the Pioneer, but covers some other good points, too. Other rail magazines may publish more frequently, but Passenger Train Journal remains the magazine of record for the business of passenger trains.
5. And, this e-mail to TWA arrived shortly after the last issue was published regarding VIA Rail Canada.
   

   I am a big fan of VIA and have been doing a yearly trip from Toronto to Vancouver on that lovely train, the Canadian for quite a few years. About a year ago, I wrote a comment to Crain’s Chicago Business online about Amtrak and their lack of interest in taking care of their equipment. When we board the Canadian in Toronto, she is shining, the windows are spotless,  (glass, not micro scratched plastic), flowers are fresh and the crew seems happy to see us!

   A couple of weeks ago, we went from Portland, Maine to New York City, and while waiting in Boston to transfer trains, several Acela’s came and went: they were already grimy and neglected looking. One of my stories about VIA involved what I consider to be a remarkable piece of quality railroading when the Canadian from the west was delayed by a blizzard and a freight accident making it too late east to turn. VIA put together a very spiffy “shuttle” consist which left on schedule from Toronto with a complementary lunch, complementary wine too!, and in several hours we rendezvoused with the now turned train and proceeded west, right on schedule. I asked a supervisor how this feat was accomplished, to which he replied, “it is all a matter of attitude.” Says it all about the difference between VIA and Amtrak.

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