Transcribed copy of the letter from the Senate to Amtrak Board
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This is a word for word transcription of the letter (originally on United States Senate letterhead), dated Friday, October 31, 1997 and simply addressed, Read more…
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This is a word for word transcription of the letter (originally on United States Senate letterhead), dated Friday, October 31, 1997 and simply addressed, Read more…
The topic of regional rail versus a national system leaves a lot of room for discussion. First, though, some realities and fundamentals must be discussed.
For now, Amtrak is the only game in town regarding long-haul trains. As California has on many occasions concerning many other subjects, they have shown the way to regional self-reliability through willingness to tax themselves for local concerns. And they should be applauded for this. They wanted more rail, so they were ready to pay for it, along with the necessary equipment to operate services. All other areas of the country should take note. And, don’t forget the commuters of the Midwest in and out of Chicago have been doing this very thing successfully for years.
How to Reduce Ridership and Justify Train DiscontinuancesWhen Amtrak discontinued the Dallas-Houston segment of the Texas Eagle in September 1995, it was generally assumed that the coaches operating between Chicago-Houston would be reassigned to operate on the surviving segment of the train between Chicago-San Antonio, due to heavy utilization of these cars for ridership which either originated or terminated at stations between Dallas and St. Louis. Rather than reassign these cars to accommodate existing ridership, however, Amtrak management chose to simply remove the cars, immediately dropping the total capacity of the Texas Eagle approximately 40 percent. In reviewing Amtrak actions involving the Texas Eagle during the past 18 months, it appears that the loss of these Houston cars was probably tied to Amtrak’s desire to show a larger “paper” savings as a result of the discontinuance of the Dallas-Houston trains. The true out of pocket costs of the Dallas-Houston segment was relatively minor, essentially only the train operating costs. No significant savings were achieved at either the Houston or Dallas stations, and the discontinuance generated no station savings enroute since all intermediate stations were unmanned. A number of mechanical department employees were furloughed at Houston and/or Dallas, but most of these so-called savings continue to be offset by C-2 severance payments..
From the beginning of Amtrak in 1971, any attempt to add new routes, trains or frequencies has been met with Amtrak’s standard reply that “We don’t have enough equipment.” A lack of equipment is now being given by Amtrak as one of the reasons to eliminate service on the Texas Eagle, Pioneer, Desert Wind, and Boston section of the Lake Shore Limited.
A “sold out” sign is not something one associates with a failing business. Yet that is the paradox of Amtrak, the federally chartered and financed operator of America’s intercity passenger trains. Perceived by some as an economic anachronism, catering to occasional tourists and senior citizens, Amtrak in reality is bursting at the seams. Trains in the Southwest and Northeast Corridors often experience standees. Sleeping cars on long hauls are sold out, months in advance, around the country, much of the year. Amtrak estimates it loses $60 million a year from reservation requests denied for lack of available seats and berths.
by Andrew C. Selden and E. P. Hamilton III