This brings us to “the vision thing” as the first President George H.W. Bush used to say at the end of the 1980s.

As it stands today, Amtrak and its management lack vision. Amtrak may corporately lust after the pot of money which is being thrown at the development of high speed rail, but it really has not proven itself worthy of the privilege of directing the spending of that money.

Here is what Andrew Selden has to say as a vision for the immediate and long-term future of Amtrak.

A. Amtrak must become relevant.

Its contribution to national mobility today does not justify its cost. The national network is too small – it goes to too few places and interconnects too few city pairs (e.g., it doesn’t go to Las Vegas, Nevada or Columbus, Ohio, and one cannot get from Dallas to Denver or Dallas to Orlando). Even in what its own supporters characterize as its strongest market, the Northeast Corridor, its market share of intercity trips is less than 1%, at a public cost of about three-quarters of a billion dollars a year. Even in the NEC, a complete shut-down would be all but imperceptible as all of its customers (except in the New York-Philadelphia sub-market) could be easily absorbed into existing road and airway capacity.

B. Amtrak must grow.

No business, or social service, succeeds by stagnating. Amtrak’s share of the national intercity travel business has shrunk steadily for three decades. Its carrying capacity has shrunk steadily for two decades. The newest Superliner rail car is more than 10 years old and the average age of the intercity fleet is far older than the cars Amtrak inherited from the private railroads in 1971. At the same time, Boeing builds a new 737 airliner every day, and Airbus builds a new A320 every day. Southwest Airlines adds a dozen or more new aircraft to its fleet every year. Amtrak could not absorb real growth if it were to occur, except in regional corridor markets where even a doubling of transactions would not raise it to a 2% market share.

C. Amtrak must change its vision.

Amtrak views itself as a social service, like a transit agency or a sewer authority, and thus as a ward of government. It measures its performance by the metrics of a public agency, in simple transaction volume. The only function at which it truly excels is extracting money from public sector sponsors. This vision condemns Amtrak to always being irrelevant to the needs of the traveling public. Amtrak must adopt a vision of sustained growth, relevance and minimized dependence upon public agency financing in favor of dependency upon customer selection, of mode and route. Amtrak must position its services and its operational network such that it can become the mode of consumer preference for most intercity travel.

D. Amtrak needs a new business model.

Amtrak has pursued the same business model for its entire history, one based upon the supply-driven model of point-to-point short corridors between urban city-pairs, based on the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1966. That model has produced the current state of Amtrak: irrelevancy to the traveling public and financial catastrophe. The model causes the results, the results do not occur despite the model. The new business model must be based on consumer demand, in applications that can be financially remunerative. The new model must focus on the metrics of output, not merely transaction volume, and growth, market share, and maximal return (in output and revenue) on invested capital. The model must create volume and efficiencies of scale on a national basis, by developing a true national network of regional and interregional routes that allow use of rail for most intercity travel demand, and inherently grow with demand and population growth. Capacity must be re-allocated to match consumer demand, and must grow to anticipate and accommodate growth in demand.

“I have enclosed a few questions that I feel would be vital to any new president or employee of Amtrak. I look forward to reading others and hearing thoughts concerning these.
Don in WV”

Questions:

Question 1.

In order for Amtrak to go totally private, what method do you feel would work best? Amtrak as it is now, or two systems with the NEC as one, and long distance the other, or neither. Explain.

Answer:

Amtrak is indeed two totally different operations, the NEC and the rest of the nation. As President of Amtrak, I would strive to maintain the highest quality of service on both operations, while at the same time running them as separate fiscal systems.

The NEC and the National System must have independent and totally separate accounting systems. This does not mean separate corporate management, national image, reservations, ticketing, or equipment maintenance systems, since the two economically different operations still must function as an integrated national rail passenger system.

The NEC is a highly socially useful operation, which provides vital transportation to millions of riders. However, it is of an entirely local nature.

The length and population base of the NEC is not much different from corridors in California, and potential future corridor systems in the Midwest and elsewhere.

While it may be entirely proper for a national rail system to invest in a regional corridor system, these investments must be made in conjunction with local investments. Given that the NEC carries between 170 and 220 million total passengers (depending on which commuter agencies are counted) of which a mere 11 million actually ride on Amtrak trains, why is the bulk of infrastructure investment coming from an entity (Amtrak) that has less than 10% of the riders?

It is indeed true that the NEC has around 50% of the total ridership of Amtrak, but the other 50% of the ridership, and the bulk of the revenue passenger miles are generated elsewhere on the National System.

Given this fact, how can management of a national system continue to invest well over 70% of its capital resources in the NEC, and only less than a third of its resources in the rest of the National System, which still is the main source of its revenue generated from passenger ticket sales?

The only rational investments that can reduce the needs for federal support are investments in the National System. Amtrak investments in corridors are needed, but principally to provide urban access to the centers of major populations for long distance Amtrak trains.

The full infrastructure costs of all corridors must be from sources other than the national Amtrak system. Only by moving the infrastructure costs for the NEC to another funding mechanism can Amtrak come close to a break-even system.

Given the high overhead costs of corridors, Amtrak investments in them can never be justified on the basis of reducing the need for overall Amtrak subsidies.

The NEC, like all urban corridors, has intensive infrastructure costs associated with it. Current Amtrak accounting allocates these costs over the entire National System. This is misleading and deceptive to decision-makers both in and out of Amtrak. In fact, the only part of Amtrak that has a chance of being “privatized” is the National System, precisely because it is the National System that has no major infrastructure costs associated with it, and a positive cash flow from current operations. We need to fairly compensate Amtrak’s host freight railroads, but we do not need to build or own and maintain any right of way for the National System.

Given the totally different nature of the roles as well as the cost structure for the NEC and other corridors from the economics of the long distance National System, they cannot be financed or operated in the same manner or under the same accounting system.

The value of the NEC and other corridors must be based on the social contribution each makes while providing transportation to a highly urbanized region of the country. In this way it must be treated as transit, subject to the same political forces as other transit systems. If a region such as the NEC or the Midwest wishes to make the social investment in such projects, Amtrak, acting as a partner of both the local agencies and the federal government, can make limited, rational investments in these projects.

The National System must be treated much more like the “private” operation it can be. Investments must be made not on the basis of social utility, but on the basis of maximum return on investment.

Under proper management and accounting systems, long distance routes already can be shown to be marginally profitable. This means that the marginal costs of the route operation, including investments in train sets, are less than the marginal revenue these trains produce.

This is especially true if mail and express revenue potentials are fully developed. Train sets related to these operations can be commercially leased using non-governmental resources. This is entirely different from the operation of corridors, and is the reason that corridor operations must be completely isolated economically from the potentially profitable long distance system.

Such economic and operational separation does not mean the two systems cannot complement each other. We must strive to not only retain seamless ticketing between “privatized” long distance trains and corridor trains, but also we must introduce seamless ticketing between all rail service, including commuter trains.

While commuter trains, corridor trains, and long distance trains may in the future be operated by totally independent agencies, (some public, some private) the entire system must appear to the customer as a single, integrated domestic rail transportation system.

Airlines, on a worldwide basis, cooperate to form a seamless air transportation system. There is no reason that Amtrak, the commuter agencies, and other operators cannot do the same. Potential passengers should be able to purchase from either a travel agent or via Amtrak’s web site, tickets from any rail passenger station in the United States and Canada to any other rail passenger station in these two countries.

As an example, a rider should be able to buy a ticket from the Covina, California METROLINK station (not served by Amtrak) to a suburban station in Toronto. The actual transpiration might be provided by METROLINK, to a transfer station, then Amtrak to the Canadian border, and then depending on the chosen route, both VIA and Go TRANSIT would provide the service to the final destination.

To such a passenger it does not matter who owns the trains involved or how they are financed. What matters is the seamless connectivity of a user of the rail passenger system.

Question 2.

Explain how you would finance your selection from above? If you choose neither, explain financing it as another entity, or part of another entity, or would you close it down?

Answer:

Under no circumstance should either the corridor systems (NEC, Midwest, California and Northwest) or the long distance system be closed down. They have their own reasons for existing, and need to have financial and management structures that best reflect their individual needs. This means that the NEC and other corridors should be separated from the National System for economic and political reasons, not as an excuse to shut either one down.

There is no way private investment can be channeled directly into the high overhead corridor systems precisely because there is no prospect for profit or any return on the investment.

Private investment can occur in some aspects of a corridor operation, such as station area development and the leasing of rolling stock for service on a corridor. This means the leadership of Amtrak must work with local and state agencies and private corporations to maximize the investments in these corridors through a partnership with Amtrak or the designated operator of a corridor.

Ways must be found to move the infrastructure costs of these corridors which represent a social “good” that is fully appropriate to be publicly funded by UMTA or a similar federal agency system, to funnel federal grants into local rail transportation systems.

The long distance system, if freed from the huge overhead costs of Amtrak which are a result of Amtrak ownership of the NEC, can be operated virtually as a “private” subsidiary of Amtrak, or could be spun off into a new, privatized corporation.

This corporation would have no track overheads, lease its fleet, and contract out maintenance and other services as appropriate.

The real problem with the current Amtrak and its accounting system is the social costs of maintaining the NEC infrastructure are co-mingled with the costs of the rest of the system.

Separating the NEC overhead costs not only from the National System, but from Amtrak itself , would make a tremendous contribution to both the National System and the long term future of the NEC.

Question 3.

If you could add new long distance trains, what trains would you consider? What NEC trains would you consider?

Answer:

The choice of long distance trains to add is extremely difficult, simply due to the fact that the number of trains that should be added to form a truly integrated national system is far larger than the number of train sets currently available. However, some guidelines can be applied for a long term, 10 year program. These include, not necessarily in this order:

1. Improvements in equipment availability and utilization.
2. Conversion of less than daily routes to daily routes.
3. Restoring trains recently discontinued.
4. Closing gaps in the system such as Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
5. Stable private finance mechanisms for leasing a much larger fleet.
6. Improved relations and compensation to host freight railroads.
7. The acquisition of more American Flyer sets to standardize the NEC operation around modern design, multi-class, high-speed trains.

In the short term, first year, the only course is to bring all of the available long distance equipment into full operational condition. Far too many cars are currently languishing in various states of disrepair. In addition to maximizing the availability of train sets, we must inspect the entire national system to see where the combining of a Western and Eastern Service may lead to a reduction in train sets required. This has been done with the Southwest Chief and Capitol and with the Empire Builder and City of New Orleans.

The potential closing of the SuperLiner maintenance facility in Oakland, which serves only the California Zephyr, could lead to substantial savings if that train were extended overnight to Los Angeles, where the LA base could maintain it. A single additional train set on such a service would introduce a new overnight train in California, while reducing the number of SuperLiner maintenance bases by one.

From a purely economic point of view, the conversion of less than daily service to daily requires no additional stations to be added to the system, while at the same time making more productive use of existing station facilities.

Similarly, adding a second frequency to a route with daily service is far more productive than introducing a new route. New routes must be added for the purpose of integrating the National System into a network.

Routes cannot be considered as an independent system. Instead, they must be evaluated on the basis not only of the on-line traffic they generate, but also on the basis of how they add connecting traffic to other segments of the system.

The introduction of new double deck corridor cars in California, and possibly in the future in the Midwest should be seen as an opportunity to cascade older, low-level equipment into new secondary long distance services. Such a move will greatly reduce the initial start-up investment needed to start any new service. At a later date, such secondary services can be converted to new SuperLiner cars, which should be privately financed and leased in the same manner as the American Flyer sets are financed and leased for corridor operation.

In the long term, Amtrak should also seek additional private financing to increase both the number and the length of the American Flyer sets for the corridor.

These trains are not only faster than the current Amfleet, but due to their modern truck design, produce much less wear on the track than Amfleet, even while running at a slightly higher speed.

The total replacement of Amfleet on the corridor, and the combination of all classes of service on the same high speed train sets (as is done on all European and Japanese high speed lines) will improve the overall performance of the NEC. At the same time, this will reduce the high maintenance costs associated with the NEC.

The displaced Amfleet would be sent through a major rebuilding program to convert coaches to either 60 seat long distance cars, or 20 economy bedroom cars using modified SuperLiner standard (former economy) bedroom modules.

After conversion, these cars would be used to start additional long-distance services using the criteria outlined above. Such an Amfleet renewal program could be done in-house, or by selling the cars to an entity that would do the modernization, and then lease these cars back to Amtrak.

This is a program that complements both the long-term needs of the NEC and the National System. While the systems would be economically autonomous, they can complement each other, and support each other through a program as outlined above.

Also, at some point in the next four to five years, Amtrak needs to reopen a SuperLiner production line and start bringing new SuperLiners online at a steady rate of about three to four cars a month.

Question 4.

If, as President, you had to abandon trains, what criteria would you use for the selection of these trains?

Answer:

Above all else, Amtrak’s customers will determine where the company does, and does not operate trains. But, in general, if Amtrak is to survive, it must grow the National System, not contract it. While this does not mean that every route operated today must operate in the future, it does mean that if a totally unproductive service needs to be abandoned, it must be replaced by several more productive services. No one can justify running three-quarters empty trains up and down a line, for any reason.

The result of any equipment transfer from one service to another must always be done so that the overall system is more productive.

The criterion for operating, starting or discontinuing any service must be the ratio of marginal cost to the marginal revenue of that service. However, this can only be properly computed if we totally revise the current accounting systems.

Any service that fails to be marginally profitable, is a drain on the overall performance of the system.

The first course of action in such a situation is to look at ways of increasing revenue by marketing, or adding express and mail.

The second priority is to minimize the costs of that service.

However, in the event that no combination of marketing and cost reduction produces a train that is marginally profitable, the corporation must discontinue the service and assign these valuable assets to a service where marginal profits are possible.

We must keep in mind that any corporation with the high overhead costs of Amtrak cannot be shrunk into profitability.

Only by increasing the scale of the corporation’s operations, while strictly controlling the overhead costs, can move Amtrak to a more profitable economic state.

Question 5.

Explain a way to finance new train systems as well as a way to bring all tri-weekly trains up to daily service.

Answer:

The long distance services are already operated at a marginal profit. This fact, which needs to be communicated to the investment community, is the basis of establishing a stable private funding system for leasing the long distance fleet.

The first step is to totally reform the accounting system so Amtrak can identify those parts of the system that are marginally profitable.

Train sets for such routes can be leased from the private sector as long as it can be shown that the lease payments can be recovered from revenue, and the service can be run without the need for operating subsidies. That is the case now with the western SuperLiner trains, and probably Auto Train.

The NEC is currently using this method by showing the projected operational profitability of the American Flyer train sets, which, if they are absolved of over $300,000,000 in annual overhead and maintenance costs, are projected to show a marginal profit of around $150,000,000 without using an operating subsidy.

The NEC analogy is, however, totally unfair to the National System since the $300,000,000 in overhead and maintenance not charged to the NEC trains are “averaged” out over the National System, and are the root cause of the “operational losses” on the National System. Only by isolating the overhead cost of the NEC by reforming the accounting system and quarantining the NEC infrastructure costs can the same technique be applied to the long distance trains.

This does not mean moving the NEC overhead and maintenance of way back onto the Amtrak NEC operation, since this would jeopardize the American Flyer lease program. Since it is totally unjustified to charge these expenses to the Amtrak NEC operation which produces only about 10% of the NEC ridership figures, these costs must be totally transferred to a multi-state authority with independent access to federal and state support.

Question 6.

What type of employee incentives would you encourage as a way to get present and future employees to perform at their top levels for Amtrak? Discuss in detail ideals concerning seniority, new recruits, and turnover.

Answer:

One of the major problems at Amtrak is the low state of morale among dedicated employees. With well over 20,000 employees in many different crafts and working under many different union rules, it is impossible for the president to work directly with individuals. However, the president does have control over the overall direction of the company. Reversing Amtrak’s decline and instilling pride in the company will make major contributions to employee morale. Amtrak employees will respond well to advanced training, better support, a new corporate culture, and an overall climate of growth and success.

The detailed issues on seniority, recruitment of new employees and their training will be one of the key questions that should be opened to a full debate within the entire company. American railroads have a long tradition of top down management and control dating back to the formation of these corporations just before, during, and after the Civil War. That model is obsolete and inappropriate in a national passenger transportation service company, and it must be replaced as soon as possible.

Much of the command structure was imported directly from the procedures for military command and control. Many of these procedures are now institutionalized, and part of long standing rules and regulations. However, this does not mean these issues cannot and should not be discussed openly, not only by management, but, by all the employees of Amtrak.

Amtrak does not belong exclusively to management or government agencies, or if moved into privatization, private investors. Amtrak also belongs to its employees.

The tradition in railroads and other large corporations has been that an employee received a negotiated wage for a specific task. Traditionally nothing else was expected from the employee. These traditions must change for the simple reason that doing things the same old way has brought Amtrak to it’s current dilemma. America and her citizens have moved beyond that. Amtrak’s customers demand a different approach.

Amtrak must actively encourage every employee to put forward ideas on how to improve their specific task, and how to make life easier for that employee while improving the overall safety, quality and efficiency of how they are delivering their task. Nobody wants to play on a losing team. New philosophies and related positive action will turn Amtrak around.

In many cases, the onboard or station personnel are much more familiar with recurring problems than management. They are the ones that deal with the problems on a daily basis. If these needs are not communicated clearly from the employees to the management of the company, it becomes difficult for management to really understand the problems encountered in the field. Management must then respond by providing all the appropriate resources and policy direction, and then get out of the way.

In effect, every dedicated employee must become part of the management team by clearly having a way of passing information and suggestions on to management.

A goal is to reduce the complex layers of headquarters management currently in place, and replace it with a much smaller, more flexible, more accountable and more accessible management structure.

One of my top priorities is this: within three years after assuming the presidency, Amtrak will be listed as one of the “100 best places to work in America,” and further, within five years, Amtrak will be in the top half of that list.

Question 7.

What present areas of Amtrak need to be changed immediately, and which ones can be changed over a longer period of time?

Answer:

The first task of a new administration must be to change the accounting system. If this can be accomplished within the first year, then all things are possible in the future. If there is failure at this task, there is no long-range future for Amtrak as it now exists.

This is the critical task confronting Amtrak between now and 2002. If Amtrak is not well on its way to having an accurate accounting system in place before 2000, Amtrak will fail to even move toward the goals set for it by Congress for the year 2002.

In parallel with the restructuring of the accounting procedures, the second task for the corporation is to streamline and open up the entire management system, and to reform the culture within the company from the employees’ point of view.

Longer-term goals include a move to private financing and expanding the national service matrix, however this is dependent on accomplishing the first two primary tasks. We also need to improve Amtrak’s relationships with its host railroads and its public agency partners and customers.

Question 8.

Would you encourage the leasing of extra cars private, commuter, etc., for holiday traffic and peak traffic seasons? Would you consider these as part of service until new train sets arrive?

Answer:

I would look at all sources for economically useable train sets.

The problem with private cars is that they are generally incompatible with current regulations governing the use of railway cars used by a common carrier railroad.

More important, the number of cars in private hands is exceedingly small. However operators such as American European Express should be encouraged to make full use of the private car fleet if they choose to increase the services offered. Amtrak must be a good partner to all operators of private cars, and encourage them to place their cars on Amtrak trains wherever possible.

Commuter agencies generally already have arrangements with Amtrak to lease to Amtrak commuter cars for special movements. This works well on special holiday weekends when Amtrak needs many additional seats, and the commuter agencies generally operate a much reduced schedule. However, on a daily basis, the commuter agencies are using all the cars in their possession.

Question 9.

Can you give a viable plan for effectively dealing with the various political entities with which Amtrak now deals?

Answer:

The main problem with Amtrak’s relations with local agencies is that Amtrak has been uniformly arrogant and unhelpful with local and state agencies throughout the entire National System. Instead of sending representatives who know little about the local political situation, Amtrak needs to send representatives who are knowledgeable about local conditions and are willing to listen to what local leaders are trying to say.

This is one area where professional rail supporters who have been active for years and are knowledgeable about the local situation could form an important consulting group to Amtrak, or act as agents of the local agencies in dealing with Amtrak.

Question 10.

How would you encourage volunteer rail groups to help keep Amtrak rolling?

Answer:

See above reply.

There is a cadre of several hundred highly dedicated professionals who have formed local rail passenger associations in all parts of the country. Each group should recruit professionals who may be able to form consulting firms that could be used by both Amtrak and the local agencies as a source of local expertise on rail issues. These groups can also be a testing ground for new ideas and a place where the basic concept of a new interaction between Amtrak and local agencies can be worked out before Amtrak and the local agency try to work out a solution. The classic case of such a consulting organization was the firm established by the late Byron Nordberg, which was instrumental in changing the original San Diegan service into today’s Southwest Corridor and METROLINK system.

The development of many such local consulting groups should be encouraged, and Amtrak should set up procedures for them to be organized nationally under some professional think tank type of organization. Local rail passenger associations, local consulting firms, Amtrak, commuter agencies and manufacturers would all be represented in such an organization.

Question 11.

How would you deal with other Class I railroads, and would you consider using more shortline railroads if they paralleled Class I high traffic areas?

Answer:

The relationships between all host freight and commuter railroads and Amtrak must be greatly improved. These are often, but not always, private corporations that are answerable to stockholders for management decisions made. Such corporations must be able to show a net improvement to their financial conditions by hosting any sort of a train, including a passenger train. The entire mechanism for gaining access to the rails of private railroads should be open for restructuring in a way that is mutually favorable to both Amtrak and the private railroads.

United Rail Passenger Alliance recently published a model in which tax credits replace the current transportation and incentive payments from Amtrak to the railroads. These tax credits would be assigned to a host railroad on both a train mile with on-time incentive formula, and on the basis of capital investments made to improve the route for the benefit of passenger service.

Such tax credits would compensate the host railroad at a higher level than the current payments from Amtrak, and would remove these payments from Amtrak’s costs for the long-distance trains, making them more profitable. This idea thereby helps both Amtrak long distance trains and the private railroad industry.

These tax credits would accrue to any qualifying railroad, Class I, shortline, or commuter railroad. In the case of the government owned commuter lines, they would be allowed to re-sell the credits for cash to any private corporation needing a tax credit.

Question 12.

As Amtrak president, would you actively work to bring all the original rights and packages that were brought forth in 1971 at the beginning of Amtrak? If so, how, and if not, why, not?

Answer:

While many of the rights and packages from 1971 may still be applicable in 2001, we must recognize that the railroad industry — like American society itself — has undergone far greater restructuring over the almost 30 years since the inception of Amtrak than Amtrak itself.

Rules and regulations that may have been valid at that time may or may not be valid today. What is needed is not to go back to the past, but to move forward and implement new, more appropriate rights and packages that apply to the first decades of the 21st century.

Amtrak should form an advisory committee made up of management, employees, and union representatives to work out the fundamental rules that should govern employment at Amtrak in the future.

Question 13.

Would you be willing to develop other rail corridors such as a Midwestern or Far Western corridor or Southern corridor. If so, how, and why? If not, why?

Answer:

Shorter distance corridors are inherently unproductive as a source of financial return on investment. The NEC is a classic example of that. This does not mean Amtrak should not be a participant in corridor projects. The basic model for how Amtrak can help the evolution of corridors is not the NEC, but, rather, the California corridors.

In California, the state department of transportation under the direction of the state legislature, with far greater expertise in local matters than Amtrak, has taken the lead with Amtrak acting as an operator and partner to corridor development.

While the California model is more applicable to the nation in general than the NEC, Amtrak has been guilty of extreme arrogance and non-cooperation even in this relatively successful corridor development. This is again due to two major factors,

1) Amtrak has no local expertise. This means that Amtrak needs to contract with local rail experts to represent them. This is where Amtrak needs to build local support through networks of strong, local and independent passenger associations and local rail consulting groups, and

2) Amtrak always tries to extort the maximum in payments from local agencies while delivering a minimum of services. This has not made Amtrak the partner of choice in California, or anywhere else. If Amtrak does not learn to change its ways, it will discover that there are other organizations quite willing to compete against Amtrak in local commuter and corridor operations. If Amtrak cannot give the best service to local agencies, the agencies will find another partner. As a partner and contract operator, Amtrak can generate considerable amounts of additional revenue, but only by giving true value for the income received.

Question 14.

Discuss innovative ways that Amtrak could advertise its service to the nation.

Answer:

By using local, route specific advertising in local newspapers, radio, and television outlets.

Amtrak has always been proud of its award wining advertising campaign. Unfortunately, while winning awards, it has done nothing except to announce to a largely uncaring world that the company operates trains. Many television news reports of freight derailment now feature an Amtrak logo somewhere in the background. The public, and, unfortunately, many local news outlets cannot distinguish between Amtrak and BNSF, CSX, METRA, or Illinois Central. If it’s a train, it must be Amtrak.

More seriously, Amtrak’s image campaigns have run in major media outlets, which are expensive, and produce only extremely limited results. This is why many major media outlet expenditures should work harder, and some of those resources should be moved to local newspapers in smaller cities and towns where stations are located and where yield ratios are much higher.

A uniformly scheduled advertisement for a few hundred dollars in a small local paper buys not only regional route specific advertising tailored to the needs of a local Amtrak station, but also gives Amtrak access to the local paper, radio or TV outlet. This establishes Amtrak not as a nationwide distant cooperation, but a local business represented by the local Amtrak station and agents.

Question 15.

How would you encourage other railroads, as well as Amtrak, to keep as close to its timetables as possible? What would justify as a sufficient padding in this timetable to keep trains on time? How would you encourage employee innovations in this area?

Answer:

Time keeping, along with unreliable trains, is one of Amtrak’s greatest problems for passengers. No one will take Amtrak seriously as long as trains are unreliable in performance and time keeping.

The reliability problem is almost exclusively Amtrak’s, and can be corrected in-house by improving maintenance and the training of on-board crews to trouble shoot and repair minor defects while enroute.

The time keeping problem is related to both the reliability of equipment, which can be controlled, and the dispatching reliability of the host railroads. This can be partially offset by incentive arrangements either under current payment plans to the railroads, or under some form of a tax credit scheme.

Under current transportation charges, including incentive payments, it is really not economically justified to compel a private corporation to give preference to an Amtrak train over a much more economically beneficial freight train.

In addition, it is virtually impossible for Amtrak to make any significant infrastructure improvements in a route over a host freight railroad that would enhance the performance of trains on that route.

As an alternative, the tax credit scheme would make the passenger train much more economically lucrative to the railroad, and make it economically competitive with freights.

If the tax credit is based not only on train miles, but also on time keeping performance, this should give dispatching centers some incentive to operate the train on time.

In addition, the provision for tax credits for infrastructure improvements made by the host railroad to expedite the movement of a passenger train should encourage the railroads to make such investments.

Question 16.

Describe what you feel makes a great long distance train, include what services would be necessary?

Answer:

Amtrak’s customers will tell us that. What management feels is of almost no importance. The most important criteria for evaluating a great performing long distance train is the operating ratio. The greater the return on investment, the greater the success of that train. The onboard services offered on various routes will therefore vary by return on investment. The investments management chooses to make will be determined by what our customers tell us they need to have and want to have on their travels to make Amtrak their carrier of first choice wherever we operate.

Obviously, a secondary route with a limited passenger and express potential can only be economically viable if it is a minimum service train. Given the choice between no train, a minimum service train that can break even, or a luxury train that would be unproductive, the minimum service train should be run.

Having said that, what would be a minimum service secondary train? It would probably be made up of reconditioned Amfleet I cars reconfigured to 60 seat legrest coaches, and at least one car reconfigured as a 20 economy bedroom sleeper. Food and lounge service would be provided by an Amfleet food service car with tables.

Such trains would serve secondary routes and as feeders for the primary SuperLiner long distance network. In some cases, the secondary train might operate as a second frequency over part of a SuperLiner route.

As for the truly great long distance trains, three levels of on-board services should be used. I see many opportunities for “L” shaped runs for these trains.

1. Standard Coach ― strictly point to point transportation, no food service allowance; these cars would operate close to the coach lounge. Access to the train beyond the lounge would be limited. This class is primarily designed for shorter distance travel, or for economy travel by family groups.
2. Premiere Class Coach ― Coaches between the diner and coach lounge would be reserved for Premiere Class. These cars might feature some additional in-car amenities such as video monitors. Included in the fare is access to the diner for complementary meals. This is for more long distance travel, or for travelers who want more amenities, but are not willing to pay sleeping car fares. All meals in the diner would be complementary, which will speed up service and reduce onboard cash control problems.
3. First Class and First Class Deluxe ― SuperLiner sleeping car service with access to the diner and a separate first class lounge.

With the exception of two classes of coach service, this is essentially what is offered on the Coast Starlight today.

Question 17.

Describe what you consider to be the best routes in the U.S. at this time, and the worst. Detail what makes the best, and what makes the worst.

Answer:

Looking only at long distance trains, the best routes, based on independent analysis, are the major East/West transcontinental services. The weakest of these, being tri-weekly, is the Sunset Limited. However, our calculations show that a daily Sunset or Eagle, would be among the top performers. In terms of on board service, the worst long distance trains are the Florida service.

There are several ways of comparing trains, however, the CEO of Amtrak has the responsibility to assess the economic viability of each route.

Even among long-distance trains, there are stronger and weaker routes, but, as a class they perform very closely to each other. The Mercer report was such a disaster in that it required Amtrak to eliminate the “worst” route, and then re-evaluate what was left and them do it all over again. If Amtrak had carried the Mercer plan to completion, it would have eliminated every long distance train, and many regional corridor trains as well. According to Mercer, for example, the Chicago-Detroit corridor was not sustainable.

The president of Amtrak must identify the weakest train at any given time, and instead of eliminating it, should appoint a study group to report back how this train can be made more productive.

Only in the case of trains that actually loose money under a restructured accounting system and after a vigorous rescue effort, would abandonment even be considered. Under proper accounting, every discontinued long distance train in the last 10 years or more was marginally profitable. Their discontinuation made Amtrak’s economic situation worse, not better.

Question 18.

If you could add international trains where would these be? Would you consider adding at least one to Mexico?

Answer:

Amtrak should not rule out eventual service to Mexico, however, the company has not even properly penetrated the much more lucrative Canadian market, so should concentrate on establishing several Canadian connections to the Amtrak system.

Earlier, it was pointed out that one way of improving route equipment utilization was to move to more run-through operations with equipment. Once additional train sets come available either by conversion of low level corridor cars or the actual leasing of a vastly greater SuperLiner fleet, it will be possible to consider operations such as:

1. A restored Desert Wind (Los Angeles – Denver – Chicago – Toronto)
2. A new Florida – Chicago – Minneapolis – Winnipeg Route
3. Florida trains to Toronto and Montreal, and
4. Toronto-Vancouver service via Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis and Winnipeg.

Question 19.

If it could be feasible, would you consider having the absorption of either VIA to Amtrak or Amtrak to VIA? Would there be any advantages? disadvantages?

Answer:

VIA has some of the same structural problems as Amtrak, such as a reasonably high density corridor and a highly productive long distance service.

As a Canadian Crown Corporation, VIA is considered a national asset by Canadians. Even though VIA is not widely patronized by Canadian citizens, many Canadians still consider their railroads, particularly their passenger railroad, a source of national pride. If VIA and Amtrak were to be combined, a way must be found to maintain national pride in each part of the system. This would be very difficult to achieve and is not a high priority.

The area of closest compatibility between Amtrak and VIA is in their long distance operations. It is easy to envision a privatized operator in the future operating both the Amtrak and VIA long distance trains as an integrated service.

Question 20.

What is your interest in wanting to be president of Amtrak, what special areas can you give to Amtrak that is not presently available? What areas of service do you feel could be added or deleted?

Answer:

What I offer is simply this: a clear vision of a successful and growing national intercity rail passenger service, and a clear sense of exactly how to move Amtrak in that direction. My primary business goal — and I believe Amtrak cannot survive without this — is that in 10 years Amtrak will have an annual output measured in revenue passenger miles that is 10 times its five billion rpms today. That will come from growth — economically rational growth – in corridors, regional services, and long hauls.