United Rail Passenger Alliance » webmaster http://www.unitedrail.org Almost anything is possible in a train ... - Paul Theroux Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:43:35 +0000 en hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 This Week at Amtrak 2007-01-12 http://www.unitedrail.org/2007/01/12/this-week-at-amtrak-january-12-2007/ http://www.unitedrail.org/2007/01/12/this-week-at-amtrak-january-12-2007/#comments Fri, 12 Jan 2007 18:00:12 +0000 webmaster http://www.unitedrail.org/2007/01/12/this-week-at-amtrak-january-12-2007/ Volume 4 Number 2

  1. Last week’s This Week at Amtrak brought some interesting comments this week. One, from a middle-aged wag in California noted how difficult it often is to find an Amtrak train station in any given city or town. He, and another gentleman noted that road signs appear for almost any reason these days along public right-of-way, announcing the smallest and most insignificant public park, tourist trap, or commercial venture, yet, rarely do signs appear directing the general population to the nearest Amtrak station.This problem was solved a number of years ago here in Jacksonville because URPA founder Austin Coates made it his mission to badger the Florida Department of Transportation into erecting signs along Interstate 95 and other feeder roads to the specific Jacksonville Amtrak station. In North Carolina, a state which has a high interest in passenger rail, many signs are present along I-95 directing drivers to the various stations in the state. This is true elsewhere, but not everywhere.Is this yet another worthy and inexpensive mission Amtrak has failed to spend the salary of a junior manager on to reap hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of free publicity by announcing to all drivers directions to the nearest Amtrak station? Isn’t this something that could become a motivating project for a rising young star in the Amtrak firmament; a year’s worth of effort that would produce incalculable amounts of revenue for years to come? Can someone start working on this, today?
  2. Another area of consideration are official state tourism Internet sites. Every state has one, but not every state mentions Amtrak as a way or getting to or getting around the state. This is another case of “Amtrak blindness,” where travel planners and promoters have no idea Amtrak exists, or, if it does, it goes anywhere someone may want to travel. The same holds true for state department of transportation Internet sites. Lots of things about highways and interstate highways, but, often, not a word about passenger rail. At least, we could hope Amtrak becomes an afterthought, instead of no thought at all.
  3. If you love to go to the movies, you know it has become common practice to screen commercials before the movies, in addition to previews. Some of this movie theater commercials, such as the famous Coca-Cola Christmas bears are great fun and have a huge impact. These commercials are generally considered institutional advertising, versus a specific type of advertising which has a call to action.A dark movie theater with a huge screen provides the most conducive atmosphere for absorbing visual images accompanied by high quality sound. Imagine what an impact a wide screen movie theater commercial for Amtrak could have on people who have never ridden a passenger train, much less seen a train. A clever marketer could find a way in a short commercial to introduce the high points of train travel such as accommodations, scenery, the ability to move around, food service, and much more. All on a huge movie screen in a slickly produced advertisement.
  4. Here in Florida, tourism is big business. In fact, we rely on tourism so much that everything we do in Florida is geared to the Yankee tourists. We don’t have rain in Florida – we have liquid sunshine, so we don’t scare the tourists away.As a result of this we’ve learned a few things about reaching tourists. One of the best way to reach tourists is through the paid brochure racks at Florida Welcome Centers and in motel lobbies. These racks feature all sorts of tourist attractions, discount books, and more. The racks are found not only in Florida, but almost anywhere there are travelers. The cost of stocking these racks is cheap, and the cost of printing in huge bulk quantities is often much cheaper than reaching targeted demographics in traditional publications.If Amtrak used these racks, it’s doubtful anyone already on a trip would change their mode of travel. However, we know materials picked up from these racks are read and absorbed (and can be tracked through coupon codes and other ways) and acted upon. A brochure read today may not cause an instant reaction, but a brochure read today may cause a reservation for the next holiday trip.
  5. Let’s go through an exercise together as to how Amtrak can greatly improve its financial fortunes with a relatively small cash investment.Here are some things we know:
    • Amtrak’s greatest potential for growth, in terms of both revenue and profits is in the national system, outside of short distance corridors. The trains and routes involved, and the FY 06 load factors for each train are the Coast Starlight, 56%; Empire Builder, 59%; California Zephyr, 50%; Southwest Chief, 63%; Sunset Limited, 44%; Texas Eagle, 49%; City of New Orleans, 49%; Lake Shore Limited, 63%; Capitol Limited, 61%; Cardinal, 51%; Auto Train, 53%; Silver Meteor, 57%; Silver Star, 55%; Palmetto, 44%; and the Crescent 49%. All of these trains, with the exception of two, are traditional long distance trains with baggage cars, coaches, sleepers, diners, and lounges. The Palmetto has no sleepers, and food service is limited to a lounge car. The Auto Train, has no baggage service, but does handle the carriage of automobiles, vans, and motorcycles along with all other long distance train amenities.
    • All of the above named trains are running with relatively small consists, with limited sleeping car and coach space.
    • The average load factor on these trains for FY 06 was 53%. A long distance train is considered “sold out” at a load factor of 65% due to on/offs and seat/berth turnover.
    • The total revenue produced by these 15 trains for FY 06 was $382,200,000, solely from ticket revenue and food and beverage sales.
    • Advertising and sales expense for these 15 trains was $18,900,000. In a normal company, advertising and sales costs would be budgeted at roughly 10% of revenue, or $38,000,000.
    • We want to increase revenue/income without dramatically increasing expenses. Since the 15 trains are running an average load factor of 53%, and a sold out train runs at a 65% load factor, we should be able to raise the load factor by 10% without adding any additional equipment or onboard employees, except in the dining car where 10% larger crowds could be expected.
    • For mathematical equation purposes, let’s divide the revenue by the advertising cost to determine that under present conditions, it costs $1.00 in advertising and sales costs for every $20.00 in revenue generated. Expressed another way, every percentage point of load factor costs $356,603 to generate.
    • We know this is simplistic, because like every other costs, advertising and sales costs are not measured on a dollar-for-dollar basis. However, for hypothetical purposes, this model is the simplest way to demonstrate an approximate cost to increase revenue passenger miles and load factor on Amtrak’s 15 long distance trains.
    • If we want to increase the long distance train load factor by 10%, by this formula we must increase the long distance train advertising and sales budget by $356,603 x 10, to equal an increase of $3,566,030 in advertising cost to generate an increase of long distance train revenue by $71,320,600, without adding any additional equipment to existing train sets, no additional stations or route changes, and only minimal costs for additional onboard supplies such as sheets and pillowcases, dining and lounge car food, and additional dining car personnel. This requires no new concessions by the host freight railroads, no new union agreements, no experimentation in new programs, and no new management structure.It’s always prudent to be conservative when estimating costs and income. Let’s triple the amount in advertising and sales costs to generate another 10% load factor. That will make the new figure $10,698,090, or 15% of the anticipated revenue.So, using the conservative cost figure, this simply requires an increase of $10,698,090 in Amtrak’s long distance train advertising and sales budget, which is .003 of Amtrak’s FY 06 expenses. In other words, it’s pocket change in the overall Amtrak universe of spending, which would generate an additional $71,320,600 in high profit revenue.Amtrak long distance train revenue passenger miles for FY 06 were 2,430,166,000. The average revenue passenger mile generated just under 15 cents per mile. To generate $71,320,600 in additional revenue for a long distance system increase of 10% of the load factor, 475,470,666 additional revenue passenger miles will have to be generated (about 19% of the revenue passenger miles now generated).

      Now that we have demonstrated how much passenger revenue is just waiting to be harvested, when each of these trains consistently start reaching about 60% load factors, start adding sleeping cars and coaches to the consists. Again, the incremental costs of adding these cars to existing trains with no new train miles, but an increase in seat miles, can make more of a dramatic difference in income for Amtrak’s long distance national network. All Amtrak passenger trains, be it a single level train with Viewliner sleeping cars, Heritage diners and Amfleet coaches, or a Superliner train with every car configuration available, can run up to 18 cars per consist without having an impact on the hotel power head end electrical supply from the locomotive (In Canada during the heavy summer travel months, the Canadian, from Toronto to Vancouver, using the same electrical system as Amtrak, regularly runs 20 and 21 car consists.). It is rare today to see a typical Amtrak long distance train with more than nine or 10 cars. When you double that number of cars, you double the number of revenue opportunities, but don’t double the costs because of static train mile costs, station costs, and headquarters overhead costs.

      Let’s be blunt. With Amtrak’s present anemic long distance system (with the caveat of having the Sunset Limited and Cardinal run daily), it is not unreasonable to determine that the long distance system, with better marketing and longer consists, could generate a much higher return on investment and positive cash flow for the railroad than any other part of the company, including the Northeast Corridor and the obviously cooked books of the Acela service. By doing this, Amtrak would be living up to its original mandate and mission to operate a viable long distance train network and provide a service to those Americans and visitors to America who wish to choose passenger rail as their preferred mode of intercity travel. All without continuing handouts of free federal money.

  6. To augment our brief exercise above, review this article from Andrew Selden which ran in TWA issue number 3-45 on November 8, 2006.

    By Andrew Selden

    Some of the data that no one (including Amtrak itself) seems to understand about the Empire Builder, and the interregional trains generally, includes these points:

    • The Empire Builder is, by a wide margin, the highest grossing (in ticket revenue) single train that Amtrak operates, despite being …
    • … the most geographically-isolated train in the country, and traversing the least-populated route in the country.Isn’t that remarkable? How could those two conditions co-exist?
    • The Empire Builder also generates, by a VERY wide margin, the highest output of any single train Amtrak operates. Output is measured by revenue passenger miles, not ridership. Ridership (which is a measure only of transaction volume) is almost irrelevant to any meaningful measure of performance of any passenger transportation service (except in cases like urban transit systems where fares are not variable with distance, and headcount is a valid proxy for revenue, but still not output).
    • The Empire Builder’s remarkable results come about because it has the longest average trip length of any train in the system, over 800 miles. That means that the average passenger is on board for about 18 hours. Some traverse the entire route, and some even travel beyond by connecting to or from other trains at the three end-points. This average trip length is functionally identical to the average trip length in the U.S. commercial aviation industry. Every seat and every berth on this train turns over on average two to three times every trip.
    • Calculations made by the Minnesota Association of Rail Passengers, before Amtrak stopped carrying mail and express on this train, the Empire Builder contributed from its revenues about $20,000,000 a year in free cash flow, after paying all of its direct operating expenses, towards Amtrak systemwide overhead and fixed costs.
    • The Empire Builder would do even better commercially if Amtrak would add capacity to the train. It runs with one fewer coach and sleeper lately than it used to in the 1990s. That is not because demand is lower — in fact, demand is very high and growing — but because Amtrak does not have, or chooses not to assign, additional cars to this train.
    • The Empire Builder, year in and year out, has extremely high utilization. Its load factor (the proportion of available seat miles that are occupied by paying passengers, i.e., available seat miles divided by revenue passenger miles) is in the range of about 60%. A long distance train is functionally sold out at about 65% (because of all of the many on-and-off boardings across its long itinerary), and the Builder is in fact sold out during the summer and holiday peak periods, especially in the sleepers. This compares well to the regional corridors, including the Northeast Corridor, where load factors range from the high 20% range to about 35-40%, which means Amtrak cannot sell, or even give away, well over half of its inventory in the short corridors, where it competes with private automobiles.
    • As a group, the long distance trains require (depending on whom one asks) between $100 million and $300 million a year in subsidy (at Amtrak’s current and bloated fixed costs; Amtrak refers to the $300 million figure, while a Federal Railroad Administration study a few years ago pegged the losses at under $100 million); the rest of the $1.3 billion annual subsidy goes to subsidizing the Railroad Retirement Fund and debt service (from borrowings used for the Northeast Corridor eight years ago), totaling a little over $200 million, and the rest — about $750 million a year — subsidizes Amtrak’s short distance corridor services. Of that $750 million, more than 90% goes to support the Northeast Corridor. The long distance trains collectively produce about half of Amtrak’s total output of transportation, on less than a quarter of the annual federal subsidy, while the short distance corridors produce the other half of system output on about three quarters of the subsidy. The long distance trains are nearly full, while the short distance corridor trains, statistically speaking, are more than half empty. Which of these services is “successful”? Which has the greater growth potential? In which segment does the federal government pay more subsidy in the aggregate, or per passenger mile of output?
    • Despite the foregoing, Amtrak has always plowed, and continues to this day to plow, the vast majority (historically, nearly 95% of its available investment capital — its annual free subsidy from the federal government) into the short corridors, and 90% of that has gone into the Northeast Corridor, where over the last two decades, in purely financial terms, Amtrak has achieved a negative rate of return on invested capital — it loses more money there every year than it ever has, and the annual losses are continuing to increase.
    • In terms of capital investment, while the Northeast Corridor has received more than $20 billion over the last 25 years (which is equal to nearly $55 billion in today’s dollars), the Empire Builder has received NO net capital investment at all. Amtrak has never addressed what performance metrics the Empire Builder — and its sister trains — could achieve if they were to add carrying capacity to match latent public demand for this service, and especially if they were to be networked into reliable interconnections with other existing trains and routes to allow usage by people in still more origin-destination city pairs than can now use these once-a-day (or less) services.Thus, when we see discussions along the lines of, “What is to be done with this train/these long distance trains? It/they cost(s) so much, yet seem(s) so popular,” it’s perplexing, because no one ever wants to get into the actual results of operations of the Empire Builder, which by ordinary business standards are very, very good. If Amtrak were being run like a business, instead of a subsidized public transit service for the Northeast, it would be pouring capital into the Empire Builder and the other long distance trains, rather than starving them and then wondering why they aren’t doing well, by Amtrak’s distorted measures of performance.
  7. Going back to last week’s TWA and the ABC News story about the changing Amtrak dining cars, it’s tough not to consider what a 10% increase in load factor would do for Amtrak’s food and beverage business on long distance trains.Superliner dining cars were designed for a crew of 11 employees. The cars were designed to be full service rolling restaurants offering full menus of freshly prepared food. Amtrak is currently running crews of less than half of that under the new Dining Car Lite program. Those numbers will be decreased further by the combination of the dining and lounge cars into one car.The only bright spot from a passenger perspective (and, lest we forget, providing service and transportation to passengers is Amtrak’s sole reason for existence) is the extended hours of the new cars, from early morning to late at night. In other words, when the car is out on the road, other than for the few hours of night time rest the crew has, the car is making money. That is not the case with today’s dining cars, which are only open a very limited number of hours, mostly for the convenience of the crews instead of the passengers.Since Amtrak says it loses about $300 million a year on long distance train operations (but the FRA says that figure is less than $100 million a year), what would an increase of over $71 million a year in revenue with only minimal, incremental increases in expenses, do to the Amtrak long distance system? That extra $71,000,000 may make decision makers sit up and take notice how important the long distance system is, and how a minimal amount of investment in the system produces far greater return on investment than any possible amount of money invested into short distance corridors.

    A huge potential for Amtrak is sitting right under its corporate nose. Let’s hope someone doesn’t sneeze and blow it away.

  8. As noted late last year in TWA, the cost of making the Sunset Limited and Cardinal into daily trains is minimal in relation to the high cost of continuing the trains under tri-weekly service. When you consider the above scenario about filling existing trains to capacity, it’s a natural progression to think about all of the lost revenue, matrix connections for passengers, and how poor tri-weekly service is in relation to daily service on any route. It is a minimal equipment requirement to move the Cardinal into the daily category, but a full turn of the Sunset Limited from Los Angeles to Orlando requires one trainset for every departure from Los Angeles. To take the train daily will require four more train sets. Looking at Amtrak’s current equipment roster, that is possible.
  9. The next big question beyond that is putting the Sunset Limited, or a substitute for the Sunset back into service between New Orleans and Orlando (or Tampa). This continuing gaping, embarrassing hole in Amtrak’s national system only exists because Amtrak management is unwilling to make a return of the Sunset a reality. In just another 100 days, it will be a full year since CSX released the track between New Orleans and
    Jacksonville for use by Amtrak. The old canard about stations closed due to hurricane damage we know is a smokescreen, because so many other Amtrak stops are a mere “wide spot in the ballast” along a railroad main line. All of the platforms at the existing Amtrak stops are still in place, and useable. All of the stations east of Mobile, Alabama are in full working order. Most of the stations to the west of Mobile, such as Bay St. Louis and Biloxi, received no damage.Amtrak played an important role in the rehabilitation of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. While the rest of America supports the Gulf Coast, why is Amtrak snubbing this important region, and why is it continuing to hinder a resurgence of tourism (many of the casinos are back open) by not providing a train, such as the Sunset Limited, or a replacement train running between New Orleans and Jacksonville or Orlando?
]]> http://www.unitedrail.org/2007/01/12/this-week-at-amtrak-january-12-2007/feed/ 0 This Week at Amtrak 2006-12-05 http://www.unitedrail.org/2006/12/05/twa20061205/ http://www.unitedrail.org/2006/12/05/twa20061205/#comments Wed, 06 Dec 2006 04:18:34 +0000 webmaster Volume 3 Number 48

  1. In years past, Amtrak in Chicago has struggled, often without success, against the cruelties of harsh winter weather. It has often appeared that like clockwork, Amtrak in Chicago has been caught totally unaware that winter was coming, and preparations should have be made for the convenience of passengers and personnel.This year, Amtrak Chicago boss Don Saunders and his many employees appear to have “gotten the drop” on Old Man Winter, as he blew in with a late fall visit to the Midwest.Here is a December 1st internal Amtrak report of the preparations made in Chicago last week in preparation for the coming pre-Winter killer snow and ice storm.

    Winter Storm Warning, North Central US and Great Lakes Region

    The first winter storm of the season is projected to bring heavy snow from the southern Plains to the Great Lakes region, including Chicago, IL and the surrounding areas. Forecasts from the National Weather Service have light snow beginning mid to late afternoon on November 30, with the heaviest snow moving into this area during the early morning hours of December 1, 2006. Total accumulation of 10 to 12 inches is forecast for portions of Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan by the time the storm moves out of the area on December 1, however moderate temperatures may limit total accumulation near the Great Lakes.

    Terminal Preparation: In Chicago, sleet, freezing rain and heavy snow is forecast. Preparation for this weather event began on the afternoon of November 30, 2006. Snow removal equipment was deployed, salt shed fully stocked, salt applied to platform areas and walkways, switch pots were lit, and tractors were deployed on platforms. Clean up and storage of material including cables and air hoses was performed to minimize tripping hazards and potential damage by plows. Extra forces from all departments were on duty during the overnight and morning hours, and rooms were secured at a local hotel for temporary housing for yard and road crews, On Board Service crews as well as other forces from various departments as required.

    All trains and other rolling stock equipment were put on power and doors were closed to prevent snow accumulation in vestibules and other weather related damage. Equipment will be kept in the facility or under sheds to keep trains out of the weather as much as possible during layover.

    In accordance with the winter plan, salt, brooms and extra food stock was deployed on trains for passenger safety, comfort and convenience in the event of unexpected delay. Vendors were contacted at outlying facilities to ensure their preparedness for the approaching storm.

    Management personnel from Engineering, Transportation, Mechanical and Passenger Services are on duty during the overnight hours when this storm is expected to arrive.

    And, a follow-up from the same internal Amtrak reporting source, on December 2nd.

    Winter Storm Warning, North Central US and Great Lakes Region

    The first winter storm of the season in the Midwest is projected to bring heavy snow from the southern Plains to the Great Lakes region, including Chicago, IL and the surrounding areas. Heavy snow and ice conditions occurred throughout the region.

    In accordance with the winter plan, salt, brooms and extra food stock was deployed on trains for passenger safety, comfort and convenience in the event of unexpected delay. Vendors were contacted at outlying facilities to ensure their preparedness for the approaching storm.

    Train 300(01) was delayed operating between St. Louis and Alton due to down trees and frozen switches. Train 302(01) coupled to 300(01) at Alton and operated to Carlinville, where both trains were terminated when the UPRR found extensive areas of downed trees between Carlinville and Lincoln. Train 22(30) was operated to Carlinville and coupled to Trains 300(01) and 302(01). At Carlinville, the passengers were provided alternate transportation to Chicago. A light locomotive was dispatched from St. Louis, coupled to the three train sets and operated back to St. Louis. At St. Louis, the equipment from Train 22(30) was turned and serviced to represent Train 21(01), St. Louis to San Antonio. Trains 304(01) and 306(01) were cancelled, with alternate transportation provided to Lincoln, where the passengers boarded equipment from Train 305(01).

    Trains 301(01), 303(01), and 21(01) were able to operate from Chicago to Lincoln, were they were terminated, due to the above mentioned conditions. Alternate transportation from St. Louis was provided to the passengers traveling between Lincoln and St. Louis. 90 passengers were taken to the Logan County Emergency Center to await 2 additional buses for St. Louis. Train 305(01) was also terminated at Lincoln and passengers provided alternate transportation to St. Louis. Train 305(01) equipment then coupled to Trains 301(01), 303(01), and 21(01) and operated back to Chicago. Train 307(01) was operated to Bloomington–Normal, terminated, and returned to Chicago. There were no passengers traveling beyond Chicago.

    The following service was cancelled on 12/02/06:

    Trains 300/301/302/303(CHI-STL)/304(KCY-STL)/380/381/382.
Train 22(01) was canceled STL-CHI, with alternate transportation.
Delay: Bus 8304(30) Cancelled
Bus 8303(01) Cancelled
316(30) 7'00"
300(01) 1'55" STL, Equipment off 300(30)
2'00" WR-Wan
Terminated at CRV
301(01) Terminated at LCN
303(01) Terminated at LCN
304(01) Cancelled
306(01) Cancelled
307(30) 2'10"
Terminated at BNL
302(01) 41" STL, Equipment off 307(1)
2'00" WR-Wann
Terminated at CRV
22(30) Terminated at CRV
21(30) 55" Striking ice laden trees, hanging in ROW
26" PBF, repairing damaged ditch lights
21(01) Cancelled LCN-STL
380(01) 46" No transportation for crew from hotel; BNSF provided
transportation
2'22" Frozen switches, blowing & drifting snow
821(01) 45" Crew-rest off 820(30)/transportation problems from hotel

    Plus, the follow-up from the same report for Sunday, December 3rd.

    Winter Storm Warning, North Central US and Great Lakes Region

    The first winter storm of the season in the Midwest is projected to bring heavy snow from the southern Plains to the Great Lakes region, including Chicago, IL and the surrounding areas. Heavy snow and ice conditions occurred throughout the region.

    The following service was cancelled on 12/02/06:

    Trains 300/301/302/303/304/305/306/307/313/314/316/380/381/382 with no alternate transportation.

    Train 22(01) was canceled STL-CHI, with alternate transportation, and equipment turned at STL to operate for 21(02) STL-SAS.

    Train 21(02) was canceled CHI-STL, with alternate transportation to STL and train service from STL-SAS.

    The following service was cancelled on 12/03/06:

    300/301/302/305/306/307/313/316/303 SPI-STL/304 STL-SPI with no alternate transportation.

    Train 22(02) was canceled STL-CHI, with alternate transportation, and equipment turned at STL to operate for 21(02) STL-SAS.

    Train 21(03) was canceled CHI-STL, with alternate transportation to STL and train service from STL-SAS.

    Train 21(01) was terminated at Ft. Worth due to late operation. Passengers were provided alternate transportation between Ft. Worth and San Antonio. The equipment was turned and serviced to represent Train 22(03) Ft. Worth to Chicago.

    Delays: 311(02) 45″ Initial terminal Delay 5’11″
    21(01) 4’07″ STL-PBF Terminated at FTW
    22(01) 4’13″ WNR-STL

    The storm was so severe, it’s hard to understand just numbers. Here is a narrative provided by an anonymous Amtrak employee.

    Not one of the Chicago-St. Louis or St. Louis-Chicago trains made it into their final terminals on Friday, December 1st. Not ONE!

    Lincoln Service train no. 301 made it as far as Elkhart, Illinois (just north of Springfield), where the UP dispatcher told them there was a “telephone pole across the tracks” ahead, and then apparently could not be contacted for over 3 hours. Lincoln Service train no. 303 (with a newly promoted conductor working by himself) pulled up behind them and eventually coupled up, then dragged the whole thing back to Lincoln, Illinois. The train crews were told busses were on the way, and had told their passengers to prepare to board busses, but they had not showed up yet as of 8:30 P.M. Texas Eagle train no. 21 was advancing to couple up to the combined train nos. 301-303 train sets; final disposition to be determined.

    Account Kansas City Mule train no. 316 (of November 30th departure) arrived St. Louis 5:30 A.M. (due in at 10:10 P.M.) and crew would not be rested to work Kansas City Mule train no. 311 (01), a conductor (train operated with a conductor only) was pulled off his regular assignment and train no. 311 barely departed St. Louis on time. The train departed St. Louis with a dozen UP relief crews, to be dropped off where UP freight trains had been sitting since their crews’ Hours of Service expired.

    That lone conductor got off at Jefferson City, Missouri to work Ann Rutledge train no. 304 back to St. Louis, and ran out on Hours of Service at Webster Groves, Missouri after following an eastbound coal train to Kirkwood; picking up stranded UP freight crews along the way; and sitting for three hours waiting for UP freight trains out of St. Louis that never showed up. Train 304 finally arrived St. Louis about seven hours late, but most of the passengers on 304 had given up and got off at Kirkwood, anyway.

    More than an hour of that delay was caused by a frozen compressor on AMTK 34 [locomotive] that had to be thawed out; the rest was due to delays on the railroad enroute.

    On Saturday morning, December 2nd:

    Two routes out of Chicago … St. Louis and Quincy … were in a major state of meltdown. Amtrak Central Division Operations set up conference calls one after another to try and figure a way out of the morass, but problems kept cropping up. Everything was going wrong: crew shortages in Chicago, both road and yard; and in St. Louis and Kansas City. A shortage of operable engines in Chicago. Equipment out of position at Chicago and St. Louis.

    Just on the UP Springfield Sub there were 34 locations without power Saturday morning, and 45 grade crossings under “stop and protect” orders. On the ex-Missouri Pacific tracks west of St. Louis, UP freight trains were tied down all over the place with Amtrak stuck in that mess.

    And THEN:

    Despite what Amtrak Central Division wanted to do, UP refused to accept the Texas Eagle, train no. 21 (2). It was bustituted to St. Louis and the equipment at St. Louis from northbound Texas Eagle train no. 22 was turned to a new southbound train no. 21. The crew rotation went out the window; patch crews are being used to run the trains.

    There was an extra set of equipment in Chicago that someone suggested be sent out to see how bad things are, and even a crew to operate it. It even had an operable cab car, so they could turn around and go home if it got THAT bad. That plan went on hold until it could be discussed at yet a fourth late afternoon conference call; and was ultimately abandoned.

    Meanwhile the St. Louis-Kansas City service was cancelled, with the MoPac blocked up solid with UP trains and no more crews, as they needed the ones they had to dogcatch [substitute for] the ones yesterday, just to bring them in to terminals.

    What else could they do? Punt?

    Later Saturday, it looked like a punt:

    [From the Amtrak computerized reservations system]

    ******* NATIONAL OPERATIONS CENTER ADVISORY ***************

ISSUED 02DEC06 WILMINGTON, DE

DUE TO EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS, AMTRAK HAS BEEN FORCED TO TEMPORARILY
SUSPEND SERVICE BETWEEN CHI-STL. THE RECENT STORM THAT PASSED THROUGH THE
AREA HAS LEFT PORTIONS OF THE UPRR MAINLINE WHICH WE OPERATE OVER
CURRENTLY IMPASSIBLE.

    And, if that was not enough …

    Illinois Zephyr train no. 383 (1) was terminated at Mendota, Illinois due to mechanical issues on AMTK 169 [locomotive]. No traction; head end power remained okay so at least the passengers didn’t freeze. BNSF was to drop a freight unit to rescue, but it turned out they could not do so because that BNSF engine had mechanical problems, also. No buses available. Carl Sandburg train no. 382 (1) coupled to train no. 383 and they operated combined as train no. 382 (1), back to Chicago, arriving 3 hours and 40 minutes late. Passengers off train no. 383 were put up overnight in hotels.

    Do you ever wonder what it costs Amtrak (and/or you, the taxpayer when the federal government is coughing up free federal monies for Amtrak subsidies) to pick up the inconvenience tabs for stranded or mis-connected passengers due to late or stranded trains?

    On November 30th, seven passengers arriving Chicago on the Empire Builder missed their connecting trains. A combination of taxis, commercial bus service, and a charter van got the passengers to their final destinations, at a total expense of $572.00 to Amtrak.

    That same day, 60 passengers arriving Chicago on the California Zephyr missed their connecting trains. Fifty-four passengers were housed in 42 hotel rooms for a total of $4,777.50. The cost of meals was $1,639.00. A combination of taxis, commercial bus service and a charter bus was $2,165.00, for a total of $8,580.50 for one late train.

    On December 2nd in Chicago, 29 Texas Eagle passengers missed their connections, for a total cost of $3,641.11 for hotels, meals, and other transportation.

    That same day in Chicago, two passengers from the Southwest Chief also missed connections, for a total cost of $199.17 for hotels, meals, and other transportation.

    It is obvious to see the incentive for any business to operate as promised, when dealing with passengers. This is what happens when host railroads run Amtrak trains late, or Amtrak equipment plagued with mechanical failures due to internal problems causes train delays.

  2. If you haven’t bought a Christmas card to send to former Amtrak President and CEO and now New Jersey Transit Executive Director George D. Warrington, go out and find the largest, most lavish card you can find and spend whatever postage is necessary for him to receive the card before Christmas Eve.Mr. Warrington, possibly one of the worst presidents Amtrak ever suffered under, is helping to float the idea of a business group supporting a compact of states and the federal government (not Amtrak) assuming ownership of the infrastructure of Amtrak Northeast Corridor. Called the Northeast Corridor Action Plan, Amtrak would still manage the corridor, but not be responsible for maintenance of way or upgrades to the track and other infrastructure.You may recall just a short year ago, when TWA reported this idea as coming from the Amtrak Board of Directors, there was a storm of media criticism and unnecessary posturing by NEC politicians how the Republic would fall if Amtrak did not own the NEC and continue to pour countless billions of dollars into the rehabilitation of the NEC for the convenience and comfort of commuters and travelers in the Northeast. Many were sure this plan was the result of Evil Republicans out to systematically destroy Amtrak and all that America stands for. Now that Democrats will control Congress starting next month for the next two years, a positive, guarded reception to the idea seems to be forthcoming from everyone, except, of course, Amtrak itself.Quoted on November 29th on NorthJersey.com (a coalition of Northern New Jersey newspapers), Cliff Black, one of Amtrak’s most respected spokesmen, said, “A change in ownership won’t change the underlying funding needs for the corridor or the process to obtain that funding – it just sidesteps the issue.”Well, yes, Mr. Black, it won’t change the funding needs, but it will put the funding needs in a clear spotlight, in a defined category to be determined by Congress and supporting states, and it will keep that argument away from the fundamental issue of Amtrak, which is operating a viable national system, not the NEC and a subsidiary of the NEC, known as the Amtrak national system.

    Contained in Amtrak’s November 15th progress report to Congress, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2006, Amtrak reported total operating revenue of $2,502,000,000, including $139,400,000 in state support, and $485,100,000 in federal support. Whoops! If Amtrak only received $485 million in operating support, that means for the federal monies which flowed into Amtrak, more than another $800 million went into other areas (that translates to mostly into the NEC infrastructure). Would not it be better if Amtrak’s annual federal budget begfest was for around half a billion dollars instead of the usual figure of three times that much? The incoming Democrat chairman of the House of Representatives railroad committee which oversees Amtrak says he wants to give more money to Amtrak so it won’t always be struggled to meet payroll and buy paper towels for restrooms. If Amtrak is receiving around $1.3 billion a year now, and less than $500 million of that is going to operations for all trains (including NEC operations), does that mean he wants to give more money to NEC states for Amtrak infrastructure there? If the NEC was taken away from Amtrak, the needs of Amtrak on a national basis would be much clearer. The debate would be friendlier, and more meaningful.

    The scenario of NEC states in conjunction with the federal government taking over the NEC infrastructure is perfect for Amtrak, and is probably another step in a long process wisely began by the Amtrak Board of Directors in 2005 to allow Amtrak to be a successful company without the millstone of the NEC’s infrastructure costs. Many will recall this was one of the fundamental disagreements between mercifully departed Amtrak President and CEO David Gunn and the board.

    It’s amazing how the “not invented here” disease can be quickly cured when the same proposal comes from the NEC states instead of the Amtrak board. Whoever has the final plan for this great idea should take a medal out of petty cash. Everyone will win with this proposal, especially Amtrak, so it can rightfully focus on the national system, and not almost exclusively on the NEC.

  3. CLARIFICATION: Last week, TWA reported on Amtrak’s active and inactive fleet of passenger equipment. Some readers did not understand Amtrak owns two fleets of equipment. The first fleet, what Amtrak calls its “Active” fleet, are all of the cars assigned to equipment pools for the operation of current trains, and as “protect” equipment, to be used when regularly assigned equipment is either out of service for routine maintenance or needed because equipment may be isolated away from a terminal and unavailable for use due to a freight train derailment, adverse weather conditions, or other unforeseen difficulty.There is a second pool of equipment, consisting of Amtrak’s current models of cars, that is not on the “Active” roster. This equipment is considered surplus by Amtrak, and has either been wrecked and not repaired, allowed to fall out of required inspection routines, or not considered necessary for the normal operations of the railroad. This pool consists of about 750 pieces of equipment (and does not include counts of any Heritage fleet equipment that was recently disposed of by Amtrak).The active fleet consists of 1,344 cars of all types including Superliners, Viewliners, Amfleet, Horizon, Heritage diners and crew cars, and other equipment.
  4. It’s lonely here in Florida, looking in vain westward down the CSX tracks, hoping, just hoping, a Sunset Limited may be coming along, since CSX released the track to Amtrak April 1, 2006 for use by the Sunset Limited east of New Orleans after it was repaired from damage by Hurricane Katrina.It’s hard to understand how Amtrak can run bus connections from hurricane-damaged areas such as Mobile, Alabama, but can’t run a train over a spectacularly rebuilt piece of railroad track. One has to presume that for a certain element of the population, being in the bus business may be considered a plus. However, if you’re in the train business, like Amtrak, being in the bus business is a poor second choice for passenger convenience and comfort.
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