Volume 3 Number 42
- As those of us living east of New Orleans are still helplessly peering down the tracks hoping to see an oncoming Sunset Limited, it seems things are not well in the Sunset’s onboard crew base in Los Angeles.Chefs and Lead Service Attendants for dining and lounge cars are deserting the Amtrak ship at a fast rate. There are dozens of LSA vacancies just in Los Angeles alone, thanks to Diner Lite, or what is otherwise known as Amtrak’s Simplified Dining Service. Since the great majority of crew members for all areas of dining cars - both the kitchen and service staff - have been laid off allegedly because they are not needed with the new menu, those remaining are working much harder than before, and are simply wearing out faster. The bottom line is that for these onboard employees, the pay and benefits are just not enough to justify the level of work that is required to keep the dining cars running without adequate staff.
- On October 17th, Progressive Railroading magazine reported in a daily news digest on its web site:
National intercity passenger railroad registers FY06 ridership, revenue gains
Amtrak’s streak of record-breaking years now stands at four. In FY2006, the national intercity passenger railroad’s ridership and ticket revenue exceeded FY2005’s figures and FY2006 projections, according to the October issue of employee newsletter “Amtrak Ink.”
During the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, Amtrak carried 24.3 million passengers, up 1.3 percent compared with FY2005’s adjusted figure of 24 million and 3 percent compared with the FY2006 projection. Amtrak adjusted FY2005 ridership from a record 25.4 million to reflect an October 2005 agreement to transfer operations of its “Clocker” service to New Jersey Transit.
“We wanted to compare apples to apples,” says Amtrak spokesperson Karina Romero.
Also in FY2006, the railroad posted its highest-ever ticket revenue at $1.37 billion - $132 million more than FY2005 and $28 million higher than Amtrak’s projection.
Short-corridor and state-supported routes increased ridership 6 percent and boosted ticket revenue 8 percent compared with budgeted figures. However, ridership on long-distance routes was 2 percent lower than projected. The Silver Star, California Zephyr, Coast Starlight and Sunset Limited posted ridership and revenue losses compared with budgeted figures, while the Empire Builder and Lake Shore Limited exceeded projections.
In the Northeast Corridor, ridership and revenue on regional trains rose 3 percent and 9 percent, respectively, compared with projections. The Acela Express carried 2 percent more passengers than expected, but ticket revenue dropped 6 percent. &emdash; Angela Cotey/progressiverailroading.com
- Frederick K. Plous of Chicago, who often provides interesting analysis of passenger rail issues, added his thoughts about the above story:
Note that long-distance trains that lost ridership are the ones that encounter substantial timekeeping problems on CSX or UP.
The popularity of the Lake Shore is one of the great wonders of the age. When we rode it from Albany to Chicago August 26th and 27th we found it bulging with passengers, including three sold-out sleeping cars and four sold-out coaches. I thought this was simply the end-of-summer-vacation peak, but at the Passenger Trains on Freight Railroads conference Monday and Tuesday [in Washington], three different speakers mentioned they had been on the Lake Shore during September or October and it is still running with three full sleepers. One wonders how many sleepers it would be carrying if Amtrak had more. Unfortunately, Amtrak does not release train-by-train or day-by-day figures for numbers of passenger turned away for lack of space, so we have no idea what level of demand is out there.
The night we traveled we got a beautiful, freshly restored Heritage dining car in which a really good staff served excellent food. However, I understand that there are not enough of these diners to go around and that on many nights an unrestored diner is operated and the competence and attitude of the service staff is pretty much the luck of the draw. The Amfleet lounge car was a slime pit - aging plastic surfaces from which the color had actually faded, unimaginative seating space, weary plumbing, noisy and generally unappealing either as a place from which to sightsee or in which to socialize. The Amfleet II coaches were okay, but no more. They’d seen a lot of hard riding.
One has to wonder how many passengers the Lake Shore would be carrying if: a) Amtrak had a big enough fleet to meet demand; b) all rolling stock was new or rebuilt and were designed for an actual overnight assignment rather than simply re-assigned, as the lounge car was, from daytime corridor service; c) the train ran on time; d) all the stations were attractive, accessible and functional, and the larger ones manned and able to support checked-baggage service; and, d) Amtrak had a budget for promotion that could actually draw people to this service.
Item “c,” of course, cannot be accomplished unless federal funds are made available to restore at least one of the two main tracks that were removed from the 4-track Water Level Route during the 50s and 60s when the New York Central was eliminating its passenger trains and the New York, Ohio and Indiana toll roads were stealing its highest-rated freight traffic. Now that the railroad is full of fast freight trains again, it needs at least one of those tracks back.
My sense is that if these amenities were in place the Lake Shore not only would run with 5 or six sleepers and six or seven coaches every night, but that it actually could be split into two or more separate frequencies so that cities from Toledo to Buffalo could receive service at a more convenient hour. If you look at the map now you find that about one third of the population along the Water Level Route simply has no inducement to use the Lake Shore, now matter how fast the trains go or how pretty they are.
- The comments of Mr. Plous provoked these thoughts from one Heartland wag:
Interesting report by Fritz [Mr. Plous].
The overflowing Lake Shore sends the same message that Amtrak has been ignoring for 30+ years — there is a large, untapped market for long distance rail passenger service.
Amtrak has chosen to invest the vast majority of its resources in the NEC; therefore:
- The long distance trains run with mostly rundown equipment,
- And there is not enough equipment to meet demand,
- Which depresses ridership,
- Which holds down revenue,
- Which creates the false impression that long distance trains are huge money losers,
- Which justifies pouring more money into the NEC,
- Which starts the cycle all over again.
- Further discussion about the Progressive Railroading story ensued, including much of the usual rhetoric and modal envy about the alleged unfairness of it all and how some people believe airlines and trucks and cars have a “free ride.”
NEC costs consist of two parts. First, the cost of maintaining/upgrading the infrastructure. Second, the cost of running and maintaining the trains.
… a firm believer that the NEC trains themselves make money. It’s the infrastructure cost, which for the most part the long distance trains don’t bear, that drive the NEC numbers so far into the red. If Amtrak were an airline, the Federal, state and local governments would be providing the entire infrastructure to Amtrak (and commuter rail agencies) for a fraction of the true cost of maintaining/upgrading it …
… Some folks claim the NEC trains themselves lose money. However, they determine this assertion using Amtrak’s accounting numbers. Unfortunately, Amtrak includes as part of the trains’ cost, some costs that others in other modes of transportation would consider infrastructure or non-operating costs. (For example, the airlines receive air traffic control for free from the federal government, and nowhere does the cost of all of the radars, computers, facilities show up on airline balance sheets. … The railroad equivalent of air traffic control is called “dispatching.” Amtrak funds its own dispatching and allocates these costs to train operations.) This is not a ding on Amtrak since from what I have heard, they use standard railroad accounting rules. However, I do know that railroad accounting rules differ from those of other modes of transportation, thus making it impossible to properly compare the cost of operating a train to that of operating say, a plane. So if one were to apply airline accounting rules to NEC trains (eliminating those non-operating costs that Amtrak attributes to train operation), I strongly believe these trains would be money makers.
… The freight railroads maintain their own track - upon which the long distance trains make the majority of their trips. The freight railroads do maintain their tracks (albeit to varying standards) allowing Amtrak to physically run on them, so other than track access fees, Amtrak has no need to spend additional money on these routes. However, it is Amtrak that owns the NEC. If Amtrak does not maintain it, its trains can’t run on it. Since the majority of Amtrak passengers ride the NEC, Amtrak must maintain it. Seeing losses in the NEC simply shows how expensive maintaining infrastructure is compared to simply running a train. By extension, this should be an indicator to the public of how large a subsidy the government provides to the airlines, maritime and highway users who shoulder little of the cost of maintaining their infrastructure.
… The long distance trains supposedly … lose money. But note that each long distance route hosts at best one train in each direction per day. These two daily trains shoulder all of the fixed costs of that route. Tying in what [Mr. Plous] mentions … about the popularity of long distance trains, and applying economies of scale, if Amtrak were to increase long distance frequencies, carry more passengers and distribute these overhead costs to more trains, its per train losses would decrease.
- And, a final word on the Progressive Railroading story and the subject of finances on the Northeast Corridor from Andrew Selden, URPA Vice President of Law and Policy:
The great charade goes on.
The classification of costs by Amtrak as “capital” and “operating” is arbitrary, inconstant among reporting periods, inconsistent among divisions, and highly manipulable by management.
The passenger service is the incremental user on 99% of the route system, and should pay towards leased infrastructure on that basis: 100% of documented and traced incremental costs, plus a fair share of other costs, measured by SFGTM formulas for facilities, and documented costs of people and systems for other functions (What is the documented, traced, actual “additional” dispatching or signals maintenance cost to the UP or CSX CAUSED BY Amtrak trains on any given district?).
On 1% of the route system, Amtrak is the base user. The infrastructure exists solely or predominantly for its use and benefit. Upkeep of the infrastructure is (1) necessary to produce the revenue stream, (2) solely associated with and caused by the activities (i.e., train-miles, or SFGTMs) that generate the revenue stream, and (3) regularly recurring on a daily or monthly basis. Replacing a bridge is different from regular maintenance of way in the NEC, but that doesn’t mean that the trains’ performance shouldn’t be charged with an amortization of the non-recurring capital item.
I challenge ANYONE to point out one penny of depreciation of any new or improved bridge or substation that is being charged against Acela revenues on any external Amtrak report of Acela financial results of operations. I am dubious that even the routine, recurring maintenance of way and other “infrastructure” costs are being charged against Acela revenues on its own income statements, or that if they are they are being allocated on the basis of SPEED-FACTORED gross ton miles.
If anyone thinks otherwise, produce the Amtrak or NEC or Acela income statement that shows it, plus a statement from Amtrak’s CPA or its CFO attesting that depreciation of ALL such assets, and allocations of ALL such recurring costs based on SFGTM or other appropriate algorithms, consistently applied, have been reflected. Otherwise, I assert that the NEC is deep under water ON TRAIN OPERATIONS on a monthly and annual basis, to the tune of tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars a year, as well on a fully-allocated basis, to the tune of about three-quarters of a billion dollars a year.