United Rail Passenger Alliance

Vol. 2, No. 1 - January 19, 2005

1. The passenger and freight railroad publishing industry sadly lost one of its pioneers last week with the passing of Paul Carleton, co-founder of P. & D. Carleton Railbooks.

   Mr. Carleton’s work helped create the modern-day railroad publishing industry, which plays an important part in preserving the heritage of railroading. There is nowhere more important than in the railroad industry that the old adage applies, “those that do not know history are doomed to repeat it.” Mr. Carleton helped preserved what was both good and bad about the past, and taught us to learn from those previous lessons. The following was released by his sons this week:
   

   “It is with heavy hearts the D. Carleton Railbooks family informs the railroading community of the passing of our father and co-founder, Paul Carleton, on January 15, 2005. He was 66 years of age. He was preceded in death by his parents and is survived by his wife of 45 years, Daphne (the ‘D’ in P. & D. Carleton), two sisters and one brother. He also leaves four children: Cheryl, David, Daniel and Lydia, along with six grandchildren.

   “Born August 21, 1938 in Orange, New Jersey and growing up in the formidable presence of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Newark, New Jersey he quickly appreciated the beauty and grace of railroading. His paternal grandparents’ home in Dunellen, New Jersey proved to be an excellent vantage point for observing the Central Railroad of New Jersey as well as the Royal Blue of the Baltimore & Ohio, his first encounter with diesels. “As a teenager in the 1950’s he kept himself busy documenting steam’s last stand, particularly on the New York & Long Branch. Like many of his peers he also ventured to Appalachia to record the twilight of Norfolk & Western steam. Following high school he began his career in the printing trade.

   “While many put away their cameras at the end of steam, Paul carefully and faithfully continued to chronicle the ever-changing landscape of railroading, especially in the metropolitan New York area. Merging his occupation and hobby in 1962 he published his first book, the paperback “Pennsy, A to T,” a pictorial history of his favorite subject, PRR steam. The following three decades would see many more works on a variety of subjects and collaborations with long time associates Bert Pennypacker and Arnold Haas. In 1983 he left his native New Jersey for the warm caresses of Florida and continued to publish pictorial histories to teach a new generation of railroad enthusiasts from where we have come and what we have lost. Twenty separate publications have carried the banner of P. & D. Carleton or D. Carleton Railbooks. His final work returned to his home road in 1995, A Pennsy Diesel Power Review. “In 1996 Paul was diagnosed with Parkinsonian Syndrome, which slowly sapped his mobility. Despite this he continued to plan future projects such as a book dedicated to the East’s electrified railroads. For now these shall remain unfinished. Our family wishes to thank all our loyal readers for the many years of support you have given us. Paul passed away in sight of the former Seaboard Air Line main in Ocala, Florida knowing the railroads will still run. We can’t think of a more peaceful departure. - David & Daniel Carleton”

   A truly wonderful benediction from his sons. In today’s appalling and annoyingly politically correct world where we impossibly and ignorantly try to make sure everyone has good self esteem, we have downplayed the role of father. For the great majority of us, including this writer, nothing can or will ever replace the teaching, guidance, and general love felt from a wonderful father. Our sympathy and prayers are extended to the Carleton family.

2. URPA Vice President for Law and Policy and guiding light Andrew Selden has shared some analysis of Amtrak’s recent financial performance. This information was originally included in a written letter, and has been condensed for use here.
   

   “In FY 04, the Northeast Corridor accounted for about 30.4% of system output (long distance trains produced 48.3% and the other short distance services about 21.3%). The NEC had 56% of system passenger revenue (based on the very high prices), while the long distance trains had 27.7% and the other short distance trains about 16.2%.

   “NEC load factors appear to be about 45%, long distance 69% and short distance about 37%. (The data is a little less clear for this.) “But then we have to ask, ‘At what cost?’ This is where people have argued for years, and will probably always argue due to the need to allocate many fixed, semi-variable and other costs, and due to the structural shortcomings of the Route Profitability System. But, we do have a remarkably consistent statement from Mr. Gunn to the effect of where the federal subsidies go. He has said more than once that the national system (I am not clear whether he means by that the long distance routes, or ‘everything outside the NEC’) costs about $300 million in subsidy to run; by necessity, after transitional transactional costs are excluded, that means the rest, probably just the NEC, costs $900 million in annual subsidy. I have asserted that it is about $750 million. The difference may be in the ‘other’ short distance routes, or in the inherent fuzziness of cost classification and assignment; these numbers (the 900 and my 750) are probably the same number, once we could establish that we are comparing apples to apples. We think the long distance trains are closer to $200 million in cash costs and that Gunn’s $300 is a fully-allocated number; but within these error tolerances, the long distance trains consume about a quarter of the annual subsidy, to produce about half the output, while the corridor services consume three quarters of the subsidy to produce a third of the output (if we are covering just the NEC) or, the other half of the output (if we are covering everything other than the long distance trains).

   “The load factors show that the long distance trains are heavily used where offered, and the long distance market is sharply underdeveloped, and the corridor services are lightly used (relative to the volume of service offered) and somewhat overdeveloped relative to actual demand. AND - the corridor and NEC load factors would be MUCH lower if the purely New York/Philadelphia traffic were to be excluded (this traffic amounts to somewhere between 35 and 45% of ALL NEC traffic!), so all of what I am saying overstates the value and performance of the NEC segment if we are measuring true intercity rather than 90-mile regional traffic.

   “Finally, the federal subsidy cost of producing one revenue passenger mile of transportation output in the NEC (despite the outrageously high prices being charged in that market and the high revenues being generated there) is 53.55 cents; in the long distance markets, it is 11.26 cents. Each capital dollar invested into a long distance market therefore produces about five to seven times more revenue and output than the same dollar invested into any short corridor market, especially in the NEC. “If you assume the role of an investment banker (which is the role played by the Congressional appropriations committees), where would you direct the bulk of your investment capital based purely on financial and econometric returns on that investment, rather than sociopolitical or intuitive factors?”

3. Ralph von dem Hagen, Chief Operations Planning Officer in Amtrak’s Operations Planning Department in Washington, DC, spoke at the Rail Users Network (RUN) meeting on January 8, 2005. Here is a partial and condensed summary of his remarks.
   • Amtrak’s focus is on state of good repair.
   • There is a need to grow revenues and establish credibility (to Congress and to states).
   • If Amtrak runs it, Amtrak needs to run it right. The Sunset Limited is not run right. In 2004, over $2 million was spent by Amtrak busing passengers between El Paso and Fort Worth to make the connections between the Sunset and Texas Eagle that otherwise would be missed at San Antonio.
   • Reservations balance demand with supply of equipment. The expanding of reservations to nearly all weekend NEC trains was working well and eliminated the prior situation of one train operating with 150 empty seats while the next train had 100 standees. Several Empire Service trains were made all reserved, as Amtrak’s reservation system did not handle the unreserved/reserved based on destination very well and that loading passengers in New York’s Penn Station on these trains simply did not work, especially for the Ethan Allen. Sometimes Train 63 appeared sold out in the reservations system, but would really have 50 more available seats.
   • The Three Rivers, west of Pittsburgh, has about 70-90 passengers, with just 15-20 passengers each train traveling to destinations after Pittsburgh and before Chicago. Yes, it is full near the holidays, but Amtrak fills its trains near holidays, regardless of route and cannot operate a daily train that is only used near holidays. West of Pittsburgh, its direct cost of operation is $20 million and the revenue is $13 million.
   • Amtrak must have one train (either the Lake Shore or Capital Limited) depart Toledo after 6 AM, to Chicago or completely lose the Ohio market. Currently the Capital Limited does this, but starting in April 2005, the Lake Shore will serve this market, as the Capital Limited will operate earlier and the Lake Shore later, to Chicago.
   • In California, the state buys equipment and Amtrak runs trains and if the cost recovery rate is 48%, so be it. When the state covers the cost, as in California, then the (revenue) recovery rate (percentage of direct costs covered by the revenue) does not make a difference. When an overnight train or any train averages less than 100 passengers, it really must be looked at for cost effectiveness, if Amtrak is covering the cost.
   • Train movements in New York’s Penn Station have risen from 600 to 1,000, over the past 10 years. From 4:00 PM to 6:45 PM, no long distance train is, nor will be scheduled to either depart or arrive Penn Station, as there is simply no platform space for a train that requires a platform for a minimum of 20 minutes, and often longer.
   • The Silver Star is now scheduled to arrive NYP at 7 PM, not 3:40 PM (prior to October 2004), as then when it was late it would hit Penn Station during rush hours.

   For April 2005 Amtrak Schedule Changes:

   • The Capitol Limited (Train 29) will run earlier from Washington, DC, departing mid-afternoon, instead of 5:20 PM.
   • The Sunset Limited will operate eastbound from Los Angeles earlier in the afternoon.
   • One Seattle-Portland roundtrip will be added.
   • The Lake Shore Limited (Train 49) will depart NYP at 3:50 PM (one hour LATER than today).
   • For Chicago destined passengers from Philadelphia who used to take the Three Rivers to Chicago, Amtrak will encourage them to travel to NYP to the Lake Shore or to Washington, DC for the Capital Limited and NOT to travel to Pittsburgh and then wait for the Capital Limited, although that will still be a connection.
   • There is now no difference between reserved and unreserved fares on regional trains between Boston and Washington, DC, as for awhile Amtrak was charging higher fares on reserved trains. On Northeast Corridor, fees to change tickets have been eliminated.

   One Washington wag had some brief, pithy comments about Amtrak’s status, as set out above: “Boy, once in awhile the mask really slips, doesn’t it? [Referring to the California cost of state supported trains.] Outside the NEC, this sounds like what Amtrak wants to be in its heart of hearts. Operating in a cost + markup basis, with the state holding the bag. Funny, I thought it was the ‘evil Republican Bush/Mineta plan’ that proposed unloading all the operating subsidies onto the states.
   

   “And once again, we have the long distance trains being re jiggered for operational convenience, not for passengers. Can’t abide having those precious NYP platforms occupied for more than 20 minutes. (sigh) “And, let me get this straight, a Chicago/Philadelphia. passenger is expected to change trains in Washington or NYP, to make things easier for Amtrak, instead of instituting a reasonable and reliable connection in Pittsburgh? (double sigh)”

4. Amtrak suffered from lots of internal customer service naughtiness over the Christmas holidays, which will be reported on in future issues of This Week. One note however, stands out. A prominent former Amtrak board member, while riding the Silver Star between Christmas and New Years, experienced (along with everyone else on the train) a major service breakdown, which can only be described as of epic proportions. Some perpetually politically naive Amtrak apologists and cultists tried to ameliorate the situation by noting that the gentleman making the complaint was (Gasp!) … a Republican. For some reason, these bigots seemed to think that Republicans must not have the same ability to complain about blatantly bad service as Democrats do. It’s truly hard to believe that here in 2005, with Amtrak quickly becoming more and more of a nonpartisan issue, that anyone would be so politically tone deaf and insensitive to try to dismiss someone’s problems simply because they were a known Republican.
5. Whither Amtrak President and CEO David Gunn, the third member of the ignoble Transit Trio of Downs, Warrington, and Gunn? Other than the lengthy stay of the late Graham Claytor, the average tenure of an Amtrak president has been about three years. Mr. Gunn will achieve this milestone shortly, in May. Considering he will have a new board of directors that didn’t hire him, and a board that is more (thank goodness) business oriented than public transit and free federal money oriented, it will be interesting to see how long Mr. Gunn and the board will coexist.